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STRUCTURAL BIAS AND THE NEED FOR 
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW 
JULIAN VELASCO* 
One of the fundamental debates in corporate law pits the authority of 
the board of directors to make business decisions without judicial 
interference against the accountability of directors to shareholders for 
their decisions. The business judgment rule attests to the value ascribed to 
authority by providing only limited judicial review for claims of breach of 
the duty of care, while the entire fairness test demonstrates the value 
ascribed to accountability by providing far more exacting scrutiny for 
claims of breach of the duty of loyalty. In cases involving structural bias, 
however, neither doctrine is appropriate. Whenever the interests of 
directors are in conflict with those of shareholders, there is a justifiable 
concern that directors will pursue their own interests instead of those of 
shareholders. The interposition of “disinterested” directors is helpful but 
inadequate because no directors are truly disinterested; at the very least, 
all directors are inherently interested in issues of accountability. In 
certain situations involving structural bias, the courts have developed 
intermediate standards of review for breach of fiduciary duty, but these 
standards are inadequate. This article proposes and defends a standard 
that draws upon the insights of both the business judgment rule and the 
entire fairness test. The proposed standard calls for a moderate review of 
the merits of directors’ decisions in cases involving structural bias. A 
review of the substantive merit of directors’ decisions is necessary to 
guard against possible abuse by conflicted directors (whether conscious 
or unconscious), but such review must be limited in order to afford 
directors sufficient latitude for the exercise of business judgment. Only 
such an approach can provide the appropriate balance between 
directorial authority and accountability. 
 * Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School. J.D., 1994, Columbia University; B.S., 1991, 
Georgetown University. The author would like to thank Matthew J. Barrett, Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., 
Patricia L. Bellia, Lisa L. Casey, Nicole Stelle Garnett, and Rebecca J. Huss for their thoughts and 
comments, Dwight B. King and Patti Ogden for their expert research assistance, and Kathleen Shields 
Dugan, Amy Katcherian, William L. Law III, Sonja Redmond, and John F. Wingerter for their 
excellent student assistance. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 821 Velasco book pages.doc4/6/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
822 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:821 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 823 
I. THE BASIC STANDARDS OF REVIEW.................................................... 827 
A. Business Judgment Rule .......................................................... 828 
B. Entire Fairness Test ................................................................ 834 
C. Shortcomings........................................................................... 838 
II. STRUCTURAL BIAS IN THE COURTS.................................................... 840 
A. Judicial Skepticism.................................................................. 841 
B. Endorsement Via Intermediate Standards of Review .............. 845 
1. Hostile Takeovers ............................................................ 846 
2. Derivative Litigation ....................................................... 849 
3. Disinterested Approval.................................................... 851 
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT STRUCTURAL BIAS........................................... 853 
A. As Implicit Conspiracy ............................................................ 856 
B. As Relationship—Friendship and Collegiality........................ 858 
C. As Psychological Phenomenon—Ingroup Bias ....................... 860 
D. Critique of Structural Bias ...................................................... 865 
IV. REVIEW FOR SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS................................ 870 
A. Lessons Learned...................................................................... 871 
1. Need for Substantive Review ........................................... 871 
2. Need for Latitude............................................................. 874 
B. Substantive Reasonableness .................................................... 876 
1. Outlines of Reasonableness............................................. 876 
2. Hostile Takeover and Derivative Litigation Standards 
Distinguished................................................................... 879 
C. Shortcomings........................................................................... 883 
V. APPLICATION...................................................................................... 887 
A. Hostile Takeovers .................................................................... 888 
B. Derivative Litigation ............................................................... 893 
C. Executive Compensation ......................................................... 904 
D. Director Exculpation Statutes ................................................. 913 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 916 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/4
p 821 Velasco book pages.doc4/6/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] STRUCTURAL BIAS 823 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the fundamental debates in corporate law pits the authority of 
boards of directors to make business decisions without judicial 
interference against the accountability of directors to shareholders for their 
decisions.1 These competing values are reflected in the courts’ treatment 
of directors’ fiduciary duties:2 the business judgment rule attests to the 
value ascribed to authority by providing only limited judicial review for 
claims of breach of the duty of care, while the entire fairness test 
demonstrates the value ascribed to accountability by providing far more 
exacting scrutiny for claims of breach of the duty of loyalty.3 
Unfortunately, there are many situations in which the competition between 
these two values yields no obvious victor. In such situations, neither 
standard of review provides an adequate judicial response to claims of 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
Courts have attempted to respond to such situations in a variety of 
ways, but have not developed a comprehensive approach to the problem. 
 1. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. 
L. REV. 83, 84 (2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine]; see also STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 242, 207–08 (2002) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATION LAW]. 
 2. Delaware courts generally speak of a “triad of fiduciary duties: good faith, loyalty, [and] due 
care.” Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995) (citation omitted). Not 
everyone agrees that good faith is on an equal footing with care and loyalty. See, e.g., In re Gaylord 
Container Corp. S’holders. Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000) (arguing good faith is 
subsidiary requirement of duty of loyalty). At best, the duty of good faith is the least well developed of 
the three. For an interesting argument that the duty of good faith is an emerging body of law, see 
Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004). 
 3. In Delaware, the two standards have been joined by innovations that are—or, at least, 
originally were—fairly unorthodox. All claims of breach of fiduciary duty initially are protected by the 
presumption of the business judgment rule. If a plaintiff can establish a breach of fiduciary duty, 
whether the duty of loyalty or the duty of care, then the entire fairness test is invoked. See Cede & Co. 
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). 
 This intermingling of the standards has been the subject of criticism. See, e.g., William T. Allen, 
et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 874–78 (2001); Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. 
LAW. 625 passim (2000). However, the effect of these developments is not as great as might be 
thought. Because the burden of proof for overcoming the business judgment rule’s presumption is 
much greater in cases involving the duty of care than those involving the duty of loyalty, it is still true, 
as a general matter, that duty of care cases are reviewed under the business judgment rule (because the 
burden of proof cannot be overcome in most cases) and that duty of loyalty cases are reviewed under 
the entire fairness test (because the burden of proof can be overcome in many cases). In any event, 
these complications do not necessarily interfere with the operation of an intermediate standard of 
review. Instead, an intermediate standard merely would have to be positioned properly between the 
business judgment rule and the entire fairness test. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (characterizing intermediate standard of review as threshold inquiry, 
“before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As a result, the development of the corporate law on fiduciary duties has 
been chaotic. Intermediate standards of review have multiplied, but 
without much effect. The business judgment rule has been exalted over the 
entire fairness test, and accountability has been sacrificed in the name of 
directorial authority. Whether or not this state of affairs has caused or 
otherwise contributed to the recent corporate scandals, it has left 
shareholders under-protected from the abuses of their fiduciaries. 
To restore order in this area of law, courts must recognize and address 
the central problem: structural bias. The term “structural bias” generally 
refers to the prejudice that members of the board of directors may have in 
favor of one another and of management.4 It is said to be the result of the 
“common cultural bond” and “natural empathy and collegiality” shared by 
most directors,5 the “economic[] or psychological[] dependen[cy] upon or 
tie[s] to the corporation’s executives, particularly its chief executive,”6 and 
the “process of director selection and socialization, which incumbent 
management dominates.”7 Because of structural bias, directors may—or, 
at least, may be tempted to—act in the interests of each other and of 
management rather than in the interests of shareholders. Structural bias is 
not an issue with respect to most business decisions. However, it is an 
inescapable problem whenever directors stand to benefit at the expense of 
shareholders. This is true even if the conflict of interest does not rise to the 
level of self-dealing,8 such as when a colleague has a financial conflict but 
does not take part in the decision making, or when the benefit is 
 4. For other definitions of structural bias, see Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050–51 (Del. 
2004) (“[The] ‘structural bias’ argument . . . presupposes that the professional and social relationships 
that naturally develop among members of a board impede independent decisionmaking.”); Miller v. 
Register and Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 716 (Iowa 1983) (“[T]he ‘structural bias’ 
approach . . . suggests that it is unrealistic to assume that the members of independent committees are 
free from personal, financial or moral influences which flow from the directors who appoint them.”); 
James D. Cox & Donald E. Schwartz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Context of Termination of 
Derivative Suits by Independent Committees, 61 N.C. L. REV. 541, 542–43 (1983) (describing 
structural bias as “predisposition toward the defendant because the members who serve on the special 
litigation committee have a common cultural bond with the defendants on whom they are passing 
judgment”); and Mark A. Underberg, Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against 
Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 601 n.14 (1980) (describing structural bias as “inherent prejudice 
. . . resulting from the composition and character of the board of directors [and management]”). 
 5. James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation’s Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A 
Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 962. 
 6. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 145 
(1976). 
 7. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation 
and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 283 (1981).  
 8. A fortiori, it is true when there is self-dealing. However, the remedy in such situations is the 
entire fairness test. 
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considered too intangible, indirect, or speculative to compromise 
directors’ impartiality. Derivative litigation and hostile takeovers are two 
common examples. In such situations, there is a legitimate concern that 
directors may take actions that promote their own interests and those of 
management rather than the interests of shareholders. Although such 
concerns, without more, may not warrant the application of a standard as 
severe as the entire fairness test, they do undermine confidence in the 
applicability of a standard as deferential as the business judgment rule. In 
cases where neither standard is appropriate, the solution is an effective 
intermediate standard of review. 
The courts have developed a number of inconsistent standards9 when 
an appropriate theoretical framework would have revealed the possibility 
and benefits of a common approach. A good intermediate standard of 
review should be derived from the two extreme standards it seeks to 
mediate. Both the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test 
reflect the corporate law wisdom of the ages, so the intermediate standard 
must draw on the strength of their fundamental insights. However, neither 
basic standard is adequate to deal with structural bias, so the intermediate 
standard must overcome their shortcomings. 
This Article will propose an intermediate standard of review for cases 
involving structural bias that will do just that.10 Because of the directors’ 
conflicts of interest, the appropriate standard must allow courts to look 
into the substance of directors’ decisions; however, because of the need for 
the exercise of business judgment, it must afford directors significant 
latitude. The proposed standard calls for an inquiry into the substantive 
reasonableness of directors’ decisions: those that are unreasonable should 
be considered a breach of fiduciary duty while those that fall within a 
range of reasonableness should be upheld. This standard is neither wholly 
unfamiliar nor a mere restatement of an existing standard. A review for 
substantive reasonableness is the best way to bridge the gap between the 
business judgment rule and the entire fairness test in situations that call for 
the application of neither extreme standard. 
Part I lays a foundation by exploring the business judgment rule and 
the entire fairness test. It describes the two standards, considers the 
justifications commonly given for each, and examines their relative 
 9. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) 
(disinterested shareholder approval of transaction with controlling shareholder); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (takeover defense); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 
779 (Del. 1981) (derivative litigation); see also infra Part II.B. 
 10. For another example of a similar endeavor, see Allen et al., supra note 3. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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weaknesses. It argues that the two doctrines provide complementary 
insights that are equally fundamental to corporate law: that, as a general 
matter, the interests of shareholders and directors are aligned such that 
directors can be trusted and need not be policed very closely, but that, 
when their interests conflict, directors cannot be trusted and must be 
subject to careful judicial scrutiny. Thus, the two standards represent 
opposite sides of the same coin. They are the twin pillars of enforcement 
of fiduciary duties in corporate law that provide balance between the 
competing values of authority and accountability. 
Part II examines how courts have dealt with the issue of structural bias. 
It begins by examining cases in which courts have resisted the theory. 
Rather than accepting structural bias as a conflict of interest inherent in 
certain situations, courts often have demanded proof of actual bias in 
directors’ decisions. Part II then turns to cases that have been more 
accepting of the theory of structural bias, if not the title. It demonstrates 
that courts have responded in an ad hoc manner, and argues that a common 
solution would be a better approach. 
Part III takes a closer look at structural bias. It argues that conflicts of 
interest are more problematic than currently recognized under the duty of 
loyalty. It proposes three paradigms for understanding structural bias: first, 
an implicit conspiracy among directors to benefit themselves; second, the 
effect of relationships which cause friends and colleagues to favor each 
other over strangers; and third, a psychological phenomenon—ingroup 
bias—that causes members of the board of directors to show favoritism 
towards other members of the same group. Although such conflicts may 
not rise to the level of self-dealing, they do undermine confidence in 
directors’ decisions. Thus, although none of these paradigms may make a 
strong case for the application of the entire fairness test, all three militate 
against the application of the business judgment rule. 
Part IV proposes a new intermediate standard of review for cases 
involving structural bias. It begins by arguing that the appropriate 
approach would strike a balance between the deference of the business 
judgment rule and the rigor of the entire fairness test, and that a moderate 
review of the substance of directors’ decisions best bridges that gap. It 
then proposes a new standard: review for substantive reasonableness. 
After delineating the contours of the proposed standard and distinguishing 
it from existing standards that sound similar, it addresses certain practical 
concerns that may be raised against it. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/4
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Finally, Part V attempts to apply the new standard to some basic 
situations in order to demonstrate its impact. It begins by addressing two 
situations commonly accepted as involving structural bias: hostile 
takeovers and derivative litigation. It then addresses an additional situation 
in which structural bias is a problem: executive compensation decisions. 
Finally, it considers the applicability of director exculpation statutes to 
situations involving structural bias. The goal of Part V is to demonstrate 
that the proposed standard is not nearly as radical as it may seem at first. 
I. THE BASIC STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The twin pillars of enforcement of fiduciary duties in corporate law are 
the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test. These two core 
doctrines stand in stark contrast to each other because of the radically 
divergent level of judicial scrutiny they provide. The leniency of the 
business judgment rule embodies the principle of directorial authority, 
while the strictness of the entire fairness test embodies the principle of 
directorial accountability. Despite the tension between them, the two are 
actually highly complementary doctrines. Each provides insights that are 
central to modern corporate law. 
Often, it is assumed that the business judgment rule is the lone 
foundation of corporate law.11 This is as unfortunate as it is wrong. The 
entire fairness test is no less fundamental or essential.12 The two standards 
“are, so to speak, of equal dignity,”13 and neither has a claim to primacy 
over the other. The deference of the business judgment rule is justifiable 
only because of, and also makes possible, the rigor of the entire fairness 
test. The legitimacy of either depends upon the other. Thus, an appropriate 
understanding of both standards—including their insights as well as their 
limitations—is indispensable to the proper formulation of an intermediate 
standard of review capable of dealing with the issue of structural bias. 
 11. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 3, at 867 (arguing that Delaware courts “link all the 
disparate review standards together by using the business judgment rule as the medium”); Johnson, 
supra note 3, at 625 (arguing that “Delaware courts both wrongly formulate the business judgment rule 
and unsoundly make it the centerpiece of corporate fiduciary analysis”). 
 12. This is true even under the reorganization of corporate law doctrine effected by Cede & Co. 
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). See supra 
note 3. The business judgment rule may presume compliance with fiduciary duties, but the entire 
fairness test is the result of a rebuttal of that presumption. 
 13. Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963) (setting forth the “equal dignities 
rule” of form over substance in corporate law). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. Business Judgment Rule 
Despite its history and pedigree,14 the business judgment rule cannot be 
reduced easily to a written formula.15 According to the Delaware courts, it 
is “a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”16 
This description is inadequate at best. Although the business judgment rule 
can be said to provide “a powerful presumption” in favor of directors,17 it 
does much more. It is better understood as either a standard of review or a 
policy of non-review.18 
 14. See 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF 
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 7 (1998) (“For over a century and a half, the business judgment rule has been 
the primary means by which courts have reviewed decisions by corporate directors concerning 
ordinary day-to-day business matters.”); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278 (2000) 
(“The business judgment rule traces its roots back around 170 years.”) (footnote omitted); S. Samuel 
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 93 (1979) (“[T]he business 
judgment rule [has been] a common law principle of corporate governance that has been part of 
corporate law for at least 150 years.”); Johnson, supra note 3, at 639 (“Although the phrase ‘business 
judgment rule’ apparently was not used by the Delaware Chancery Court until 1959, the phrase 
‘business judgment’—and the concept of the rule itself—had been in use for several decades.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 15. See GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 279. 
A difficulty with the business judgment rule occurs, however, when courts and writers go 
beyond the general concept of judicial restraint and attempt to inject specific content into the 
rule. Immediately, a lack of consensus emerges as to exactly what the business judgment rule 
really is. An example of this difficulty occurred during the drafting of the 1984 revision of the 
Model Business Corporation Act. The drafters of the 1984 revision initially thought it would 
be a good idea to include the rule as part of the Act. This process broke down, however, when 
the drafters could not reach a consensus on a formulation of the rule. As one of the 
participants explained, “we are saying that there is a business judgment rule, that we know 
what it is and when it should be applied, but we can’t define it.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01, Comment to § 4.01(c) cmt. a (1994) 
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] (“Confusion with respect to the business 
judgment rule has been created by the numerous varying formulations of the rule and the fact that 
courts have often stated the rule incompletely or with elliptical shorthand references.”); BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATION LAW, supra note 1, at 242 (“[I]n many ways, [the business judgment rule] remains 
poorly misunderstood. In part, this is because the doctrine is neither straightforward nor even, in some 
respects, well developed.”); cf. Johnson, supra note 3, at 625 (“Delaware courts both wrongly 
formulate the business judgment rule and unsoundly make it the centerpiece of corporate fiduciary 
analysis.”). 
 16. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). 
 17. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). But see R. Franklin Balotti 
& James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48 BUS. LAW. 1337, 1353 (1993) (“The 
presumption of the business judgment rule is not a presumption in the ordinary evidentiary sense of 
allocating the burden of proof.”). 
 18. See BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW, supra note 1, at 243 (“Two basic conceptions of the 
business judgment rule compete in the case law. One treats the rule as a standard of review . . . . The 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/4
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Many alternative formulations of the business judgment rule have been 
proposed.19 The varying formulations reflect the reality that the business 
judgment rule consists of two separate components: one dealing with 
process and one dealing with substance.20 The process component requires 
that breaches of the fiduciary duty of care not be reviewed under a 
negligence standard, but something much less demanding; in Delaware, 
the standard is gross negligence.21 Thus, it could be said that the business 
judgment rule “presumption” is strong enough that evidence of ordinary 
negligence is insufficient to rebut it. The substance component, on the 
other hand, requires that the merit of a business decision not be reviewed 
at all, except in the most extreme circumstances. Courts will not hold 
directors liable for decisions that are objectively unwise, unreasonable, or 
other treats the rule as an abstention doctrine that creates a presumption against judicial review of duty 
of care claims.”). For the view that the business judgment rule serves as a standard of review, see, for 
example, MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003); 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 8.31 official cmt., at 8-193 (2002); 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1036, at 35; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of 
Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 440–42 
(1993). For the view that the business judgment rule serves as a policy of non-review, see, for 
example, Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, passim; Allen et al., supra note 3, at 870 
(“[T]he ‘business judgment rule’ is not, functionally speaking, a standard of review at all. Rather, it is 
an expression of a policy of non-review of a board of directors’ decision . . . .”); Johnson, supra note 3, 
at 625 (“The business judgment rule . . . is better understood as a narrow-gauged policy of non-review 
. . . .”). See also 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 15, § 4.01, Comment to 
§ 4.01(c) cmt. a (“Although courts have not expressed it this way, the business judgment rule has 
offered a safe harbor for directors or officers who make honest, informed business decisions that they 
rationally believe are in the best interests of their corporations.”). 
 19. See, e.g., 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 15, § 4.01(c); 2 MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31, official cmt., at 8-197 (2002) (“In basic principle, a board of directors enjoys 
a presumption of sound business judgment and its decisions will not be disturbed (by a court 
substituting its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment) if they can be attributed to 
any rational business purpose.”) (citation omitted). For additional formulations, see 1 WILLIAM E. 
KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 2.01, at 2-1 to -5 
(7th ed. 2003). 
 20. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided 
Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 302 (1994) (“There are a number of variations on this process-
versus-substance theme. All have in common, however, the notion that the business judgment rule 
calls for less judicial scrutiny of the merits of the directors’ decision than of the process the directors 
used in arriving at the determination.”). 
 21. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (“We think the concept of gross 
negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board 
of directors was an informed one.”); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[U]nder the 
business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”). But see 
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (1940) (“[D]irectors are liable for negligence in the 
performance of their duties. Not being insurers, directors are not liable for errors of judgment or for 
mistakes while acting with reasonable skill and prudence.”). 
 Although Delaware courts purport to apply a gross negligence standard, many have argued that 
courts sometimes apply a pure negligence standard. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 3, at 872–74. 
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even stupid22—unless, perhaps, a decision can be shown to be utterly 
irrational or amounting to waste.23 Thus, it could be said that the business 
judgment rule “presumption” is nearly irrebuttable with respect to 
substance. For this reason, it is fair to say that the business judgment rule 
focuses primarily on the directors’ decision-making process.24 
However defined, the business judgment rule universally is 
acknowledged to demonstrate great deference to directors’ business 
decisions and to provide a strong shield from liability for those decisions. 
The business judgment rule affords corporate directors unique protection 
from civil liability for the consequences of their actions.25 This special 
treatment demands justification. 
The justifications for the business judgment rule are well-known. They 
often are said to begin with the statutory language.26 Section 141(a) of the 
Delaware General Corporate Law, for example, provides that “[t]he 
business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under 
the direction of a board of directors . . . . ”27 Thus, it is the board of 
directors that should be making business decisions, not the shareholders 
who would challenge their decisions, and certainly not the courts who 
would evaluate them.28 
 22. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“As for . . . ‘substantive due care,’ we 
should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts do not measure, weigh 
or quantify directors’ judgments. We do not even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due 
care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.”) (footnote omitted); In re Caremark Int’l 
Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[W]hether a . . . decision [is] 
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational,’ 
provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was 
either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance the corporate interests.”). 
 23. See Eisner, 746 A.2d at 264 (“Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule. 
Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the decision 
is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 24. Some would have the business judgment rule focus entirely on process. See, e.g., Allen et al., 
supra note 3, at 890–93; Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 99; Johnson, supra note 3, 
at 632–33. 
 25. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Whereas an automobile driver who 
makes a mistake in judgment . . . injuring a pedestrian will likely be called upon to respond in 
damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake in judgment . . . will rarely, if ever, be found liable 
for damages suffered by the corporation.”). 
 26. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“Under Delaware law, the 
business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del.C. § 141(a), that 
the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.”). 
 27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). 
 28. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (“The business judgment rule exists to protect and 
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors.”) (citation 
omitted); see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) (“[B]y definition the 
responsibility for business judgments must rest with the corporate directors; their individual 
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A second rationale for the business judgment rule is based on the fact 
that business decisions are inherently risky. Directors often have to make 
important decisions with imperfect information. The quality of the 
decision cannot necessarily be determined by the result that follows. 
Second-guessing is especially dangerous under such circumstances.29 
Courts, in particular, are said to be ill-equipped to make, or even to 
review, business decisions.30 Some even argue that courts are “radically 
incompetent” in this regard.31 
In addition, imposing liability on directors for poor business decisions 
would be counterproductive in several respects. It might discourage people 
from serving as directors because the potential liability would far exceed 
the compensation that would be received for such service.32 It also might 
discourage directors from engaging in risky behavior, even when it would 
be in the interests of shareholders to do so.33 
capabilities and experience peculiarly qualify them for the discharge of that responsibility.”). 
 29. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 886. The Joy court stated: 
[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate 
corporate business decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not 
easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call for quick 
decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information. The entrepreneur’s function is to 
encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time made may 
seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect knowledge. 
Id. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998); see also id. at 619–23. 
 30. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (“‘Courts are ill-fitted to attempt to 
weigh the “adequacy” of consideration under the waste standard or, ex post, to judge appropriate 
degrees of business risk.’”) (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997)); Cuker 
v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1046 (Pa. 1997) (“[The business judgment] doctrine prevents courts 
from becoming enmeshed in complex corporate decision-making, a task they are ill-equipped to 
perform.”) (citation omitted); Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 (Conn. 1994) 
(“Courts recognize that managers have both better information and better incentives than they . . . . Not 
only do businessmen know more about business than judges do, but competition . . . provides 
sufficient punishment for businessmen who commit more than their share of business mistakes.”) 
(citation omitted); Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 367 (Mont. 1990) 
(“Judges are not business experts and therefore should not substitute their judgment for the judgment 
of the directors.”) (citation omitted); Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1000 (“[T]he business judgment 
doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and 
infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments.”). 
 31. Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 119–20 (quoting Eric A. Posner, A Theory 
of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 754 (2000)). 
 32. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. UAL Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff’d, 
897 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1990) (“It would be considerably more difficult to recruit directors to serve on 
corporate boards if their business decisions were subject to substantive scrutiny. The business 
judgment rule encourages competent individuals to become directors who otherwise might decline for 
fear of personal liability.”). 
 33. See In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 n.16 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“If 
those in charge of the corporation are to be adjudged personally liable for losses . . . based upon what 
. . . persons of ordinary or average judgment . . . regard as ‘prudent[,]’ ‘sensible[,]’ or even ‘rational,’ 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 821 Velasco book pages.doc4/6/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
832 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:821 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, imposing liability on directors for bad decisions would 
run counter to a standard rationale for the imposition of liability: the 
spreading of costs. Rather than taking a large loss that befalls one or a few 
individuals and imposing a fractional cost on the public generally, director 
liability would take small losses from a large number of shareholders and 
impose huge aggregate liability on a small group of directors.34 
Finally, shareholders can be said to have assumed the risk of bad 
business decisions in several respects. First, shareholders voluntarily 
invest in risky assets: rather than invest in risk-free assets, such as U.S. 
government bonds, they invest in equity securities in order to achieve a 
higher rate of return.35 It would be inappropriate for shareholders to 
complain that things did not turn out as hoped. In addition, shareholders 
have the ability to reduce their risk through diversification—an 
opportunity not generally available in other circumstances.36 Thus, 
litigation concerning the management of a business is not as critical as 
other types of litigation. Moreover, shareholders elect directors to manage 
the corporation on their behalf. In doing so, they should be deemed to 
such persons will have a strong incentive at the margin to authorize less risky investment projects.”); 
Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[D]irectors will tend to 
deviate from this rational acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the corporation to undertake a 
risky investment, the directors must assume some degree of personal risk relating to ex post facto 
claims of derivative liability for any resulting corporate loss.”); Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 (“[B]ecause 
potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders 
that the law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions.”). 
 34. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 
575. 
In most cases, liability for negligence operates to shift the loss from a single human victim 
and spread it, by means of insurance and doctrines such as respondeat superior, across a 
larger, more diversified group. At least in the case of larger, publicly held corporations, 
directors’ liability has just the opposite effect. . . . Imposing liability on the directors serves to 
re-concentrate [a] loss on a small handful of individuals. 
Id. Of course, to the extent that directors and officers insurance is available, this negative impact is 
reduced. 
 35. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 885 (“[S]hareholders to a very real degree voluntarily undertake the risk 
of bad business judgment. Investors need not buy stock, for investment markets offer an array of 
opportunities less vulnerable to mistakes in judgment by corporate officers.”); Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 
1052 (“Shareholders don’t want (or shouldn’t rationally want) directors to be risk averse. 
Shareholders’ investment interests . . . will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly 
assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are 
above the firm’s cost of capital.”). 
 36. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 (“Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their 
holdings. . . . Given mutual funds and similar forms of diversified investment, courts need not bend 
over backwards to give special protections to shareholders who refuse to reduce the volatility of risk 
by not diversifying.”); Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052 (“Shareholders can diversify the risks of their 
corporate investments.”). 
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accept the judgment of those directors—and to assume the risk of bad 
decisions made by those directors.37 
Of course, it can be argued that none of the reasons given truly justifies 
the existence of the business judgment rule because most, if not all, are 
applicable in many other contexts as well:38 
Can anyone seriously argue that surgeons in the operating room, 
lawyers in the midst of a heated trial, or accountants up against a 
closing deadline are not also called upon to make snap judgments in 
response to circumstances that may be difficult to recreate [sic] in a 
courtroom years later? Nonetheless, our legal system is quite 
comfortable relying on the device of litigation to review, invariably 
with the benefit of hindsight, the quality of these professionals’ 
performances and to assess damages, often in the millions of 
dollars, when those performances are found wanting. Why should 
directors be any different?39 
There is significant merit to the argument. 
However, there does seem to be something qualitatively different in the 
business context. In most other situations, people generally would prefer 
to avoid risk, while in the business context, investors often are eager to 
accept more risk in order to increase their expected rate of return.40 
Moreover, in most other situations, people are seeking to avoid a loss or 
even bodily harm, while in the business context, investors generally are 
investing their surplus funds in the anticipation of profit.41 Thus, the 
 37. See In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (“If the shareholders thought themselves entitled to some other quality of judgment than such a 
director produces in the good faith exercise of the powers of office, then the shareholders should have 
elected other directors.”); Joy, 692 F.2d at 885 (“Since shareholders can and do select among 
investments partly on the basis of management, the business judgment rule merely recognizes a certain 
voluntariness in undertaking the risk of bad business decisions.”). 
 38. See generally Gevurtz, supra note 20, at 304–21. Cf. Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, 
Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 
587, 590 (1994) (concluding that “there are indeed justifiable reasons for courts to treat business 
decisions differently than medical decisions”). 
 39. Davis, supra note 34, at 581. 
 40. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. It is true that tort plaintiffs often accept risk 
voluntarily. For example, medical patients are made to understand that surgery necessarily involves 
risk. However, there is a categorical difference between a patient and an investor. A patient generally 
is required to undergo surgery. Although some surgery is elective, it is rarely optional in the sense that 
an investment decision is optional: the investor, unlike the patient, has a risk-free investment 
alternative. Moreover, a patient would prefer to reduce the risk associated with any given surgery to 
the fullest extent possible. An investor, on the other hand, may be willing to accept any amount of risk 
as long as the expected return is commensurate. 
 41. The doctrine of limited liability ensures that an investor can decide freely how much to put at 
risk with any investment decision. The same is not true in many other circumstances, such as surgery, 
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arguments based on risk (and assumption of risk) are more substantial in 
the business context than in other situations. 
The key insight that drives the business judgment rule is this: as a 
general matter, directors can be trusted and need not be policed very 
closely. By and large, the interests of the directors and the shareholders are 
aligned: they both want the business to prosper.42 Disagreements, for the 
most part, are about the best way of achieving that goal. It is likely that 
litigation on substantive decisions, and even on duty of care issues, would 
be about matters on which reasonable people would disagree. In light of 
the principles discussed above, there is no good reason to waste scarce 
judicial resources on such disputes. This is especially true given that 
neither judges nor shareholders are likely to be capable of making better 
decisions than the professionals charged with running the business. It is 
only when there are conflicts of interest that the courts need to get 
involved. 
B. Entire Fairness Test 
If the key insight of the business judgment rule is that directors 
generally can be trusted, the key insight of the entire fairness test is that 
this is not always so.43 Although the interests of directors usually are 
where a person’s life can be at risk. 
 42. See Allen et al., supra note 3, at 875 (“[A] board that is not conflicted is motivated to achieve 
the highest price the market will permit. Because in those circumstances the board’s interests and the 
interests of the shareholders are aligned, there is no reason for courts to engage in a substantive review 
of the board’s decision.”); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. 
POL. ECON. 110, 117 (1965) (“Generally speaking, managers’ incentives and interests coincide with 
those of their shareholders in every particular except one: they have no incentive, as managers, to buy 
management services for the company at the lowest possible price.”). 
 Agency theory suggests that any agent may be tempted to act in her own interests rather than 
those of the principal. In corporate law, this is generally understood to apply to officers, who may 
prefer their own interests to those of shareholders. Thus, officers would prefer greater compensation 
and job security, and less pressure and accountability, than shareholders would want them to have. 
Under agency theory, the role of directors is to monitor officers. One of their most important functions 
is to implement executive compensation packages that re-align the interests of officers and 
shareholders. However, directors themselves are not immune to the agency problem, making perfect 
resolution impossible. See generally Michael C. Jenson & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Ownership, Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); see also 
GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 229–41. 
 Nevertheless, corporate law generally assumes that directors can be trusted. Various justifications 
can be given for this, ranging from the discipline of market forces to directors’ integrity. In any event, 
the problem is not so much the law’s willingness to assume that, absent conflicts of interest, directors 
are willing and able to act in the interests of shareholders. Rather, the problem is identifying conflicts 
that could upset this assumption. This issue is confronted infra Part III. 
 43. See Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 443 n.9 (Del. 1996) (“The premise of the entire 
fairness test is that the business judgment rule is inapplicable where self-interest may have colored 
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aligned with those of the shareholders, there are times when their interests 
conflict. In those situations, the deference afforded to directors by the 
business judgment rule is wholly inappropriate.44 Thus, when a plaintiff 
can establish a cognizable duty of loyalty issue, the protections of the 
business judgment rule are lost, and the directors’ actions are reviewed 
under the entire fairness test. 
The entire fairness test is far more demanding than the business 
judgment rule.45 It requires the directors to prove that the transaction in 
question was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.46 Like 
directors’ actions.”); see also Allen et al., supra note 3, at 874–75 (“Claimed breaches of the duty of 
loyalty . . . [are] reviewed under a far more exacting standard—entire fairness. . . . Where . . . a 
majority of the board is conflicted . . . it cannot be presumed that the board will be motivated to 
achieve the highest transaction price the market will permit.”). 
 44. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Whatever its merit, however, the 
business judgment rule extends only as far as the reasons which justify its existence. Thus, it does not 
apply in cases, e.g., in which the corporate decision . . . is tainted by a conflict of interest . . . .”); AC 
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. 1986) (“This unwillingness 
to assess the merits (or fairness) of business decisions of necessity ends when a transaction is one 
involving a predominately interested board . . . In that setting there is no alternative to a judicial 
evaluation . . . other than the unacceptable one of leaving shareholders unprotected.”); Gottlieb v. 
Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Del. 1952) (“Human nature being what it is, the law, in its 
wisdom, does not presume that directors will be competent judges of the fair treatment of their 
company where fairness must be at their own personal expense.”); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 
(Del. 1939) (“The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that 
there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.”); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int’l, 
Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430–31 (Del. Ch. 1968) (“[W]hen the persons, be they stockholders or directors, 
who control the making of a transaction and the fixing of its terms, are on both sides, then the 
presumption and deference to sound business judgment are no longer present.”); see also 2 MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.60 Subchapter F, introductory cmt., at 8-372 (2002) (“The law regulates interest-
conflict transactions because experience shows that people do often yield to the temptation to advance 
their self-interests and, if they do, other people may be injured. That contingent fear is sufficient 
reason to warrant caution and to apply special standards and procedures to interest-conflict 
transactions.”); Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 122–23 (“Despite the limitations of 
judicial review, rational shareholders would prefer judicial intervention with respect to board decisions 
. . . tainted [‘by considerations other than shareholder wealth, as where the directors engage in self-
dealing or seek to defraud the shareholders’]. The affirmative case for disregarding honest errors 
simply does not apply to intentional misconduct.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 45. “Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so powerful and 
the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial 
review frequently is determinative of the outcome . . . .” AC Acquisitions Corp., 519 A.2d 103, 111 
(Del. Ch. 1986). But see infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 46. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (“Their dealings with the corporation are 
subjected to rigorous scrutiny and . . . the burden is on the director . . . not only to prove the good faith 
of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those 
interested therein.”); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 
(Del. 1994) (“Where actual self-interest is present and affects a majority of the directors approving a 
transaction, a court will apply . . . exacting scrutiny to determine whether the transaction is entirely fair 
to the stockholders.”); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1375–76 (Del. 1993) (“[T]he defendants 
are on both sides of the transaction. For that reason, . . . the entire fairness test applies . . . . 
Accordingly, defendants have the burden of showing the entire fairness of those transactions.”); 
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the business judgment rule, the entire fairness test has both a procedural 
and a substantive component. The Delaware Supreme Court has described 
the entire fairness test as follows: 
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair 
price. The former embraces questions of when the transaction was 
timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the 
directors, and how the approvals of the directors and stockholders 
were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic 
and financial considerations of the proposed [transaction], including 
all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, 
and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a 
company’s stock. . . . However, the test for fairness is not a 
bifurcated one as between fair dealing and fair price. All aspects of 
the issue must be examined as a whole, since the question is one of 
entire fairness.47 
Nevertheless, the court recognized that “in a non-fraudulent transaction 
. . . price may be the preponderant consideration outweighing other 
features,”48 thereby making substantive review an essential part of the 
entire fairness test. 
The deference that is the hallmark of the business judgment rule is 
entirely absent under the entire fairness test.49 Not only do directors bear 
the burden of proof, but they must justify both their decision making 
process and the substance of their decisions. The business judgment rule 
and the entire fairness test could not be much more divergent. This 
difference also demands justification. 
The duty of loyalty always has been taken very seriously by the courts. 
Whether or not their actions always have been correspondingly tough,50 
courts have used the strongest language in describing and defending the 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“When directors of a Delaware corporation 
are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the 
most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.”); Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 570 (Del. 
Ch. 2000) (“Under [the entire fairness test], where the controlling shareholder and the directors stand 
on both sides of the transaction, they bear the burden to demonstrate that the transaction was entirely 
fair to the corporation and the minority stockholders, both as to process and price.”). 
 47. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (citations omitted). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1376 (“The entire fairness analysis essentially requires ‘judicial 
scrutiny.’ In business judgment rule cases, an essential element is the fact that there has been a 
business decision made by a disinterested and independent corporate decisionmaker. When there is no 
independent corporate decisionmaker, the court may become the objective arbiter.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 50. See infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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duty of loyalty. They speak of “the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive,”51 “the most scrupulous observance of [one’s] duty,”52 and “the 
utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness.”53 It should 
not be surprising, then, that there should be a heightened standard of 
review in corporate law for breaches of the duty of loyalty. 
When their interests conflict, directors cannot be trusted to pursue the 
interests of shareholders over their own.54 Even assuming directors would 
not be dishonest by consciously favoring their own interests, their bias 
may make them unable to pursue shareholder interests as zealously as the 
shareholders deserve.55 This would seem to be cause to prohibit, to the 
fullest extent possible, conflict of interest situations such as transactions 
between the company and its directors. In fact, the law originally followed 
such an approach.56 However, because such transactions are not always 
contrary to the interests of the shareholders, there was reason to find a way 
to permit beneficial transactions. Among the means selected was the entire 
fairness test, under which transactions would be permitted if the directors 
could prove that the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its 
shareholders.57 
 51. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (addressing fiduciary duty of loyalty 
among partners). 
 52. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 53. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710. 
 54. See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Del. 1952) (“Human nature being 
what it is, the law, in its wisdom, does not presume that directors will be competent judges of the fair 
treatment of their company where fairness must be at their own personal expense.”); GEVURTZ, supra 
note 14, at 325 (“[T]he fundamental problem with conflict-of-interest transactions is that we do not 
trust individuals with a personal financial stake at odds with the corporation’s to put the corporation’s 
interest ahead of their own.”). 
 55. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004) (“A director’s interest may be shown 
by demonstrating a potential personal benefit or detriment to the director as a result of the decision. ‘In 
such circumstances, a director cannot be expected to exercise his or her independent business 
judgment without being influenced by the . . . personal consequences resulting from the decision.’”) 
(quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993)); Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 (stating that entire 
fairness test is “derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives”); W. States 
Life Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 135 P. 496, 500 (1913) (“It matters not that the officer is entirely free from 
any intent to injure the corporation in the slightest degree, acting in fact in the highest good faith 
throughout, or that his actions really advantage the corporation.”). 
 56. “In 1880, it could have been stated with confidence that in the United States the general rule 
was that any contract between a director and his corporation was voidable at the instance of the 
corporation or its shareholders, without regard to the fairness or unfairness of the transaction.” Harold 
Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 36 
(1966); cf. Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director’s Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the 
Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 655 (1992). 
 57. Another option would be to submit the matter to disinterested directors and/or shareholders. 
See infra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
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Courts are not well-suited to making business decisions; that is the job 
of directors.58 However, conflicted directors are not well-suited to making 
business decisions in the interests of shareholders, either.59 Moreover, it is 
difficult to have confidence that conflicted directors can overcome their 
substantive bias by any procedural means because the arm’s length 
bargaining process cannot effectively be re-created when directors are on 
both sides of the transaction.60 Thus, the supervision of the courts often is 
the only available alternative.61 
Finally, it bears emphasis that the courts are not exactly imposing their 
own business judgment under the entire fairness test. Rather, they simply 
are demanding strong justification for a given transaction.62 That exercise 
is within the core competence of the courts. 
C. Shortcomings 
Occupying, as they do, the two extreme positions in corporate law, 
both the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test suffer from 
significant shortcomings. Although each has its proper role, neither should 
be employed too broadly or without caution. Excessive use of either 
standard could lead to disastrous results. 
The main shortcoming of the entire fairness test is that it is too strict.63 
There could be plenty of transactions or other business decisions that 
would be, in fact, entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders but 
with respect to which the directors would be unable to carry their burden 
of proof. For the reasons discussed with respect to the business judgment 
rule, the substance of business decisions is often difficult to defend. 
 58. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 59. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 60. Cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306–07 (1930) (“The essence of the test [of intrinsic 
fairness] is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s 
length bargain.”); see also infra notes 72–74 and accompanying text (discussing delegation of decision 
making to committees of disinterested directors). 
 61. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) 
(“[W]hen a transaction is one involving a predominately interested board with a financial interest in 
the transaction adverse to the corporation . . . there is no alternative to a judicial evaluation of the 
fairness of the terms of the transaction other than the unacceptable one of leaving shareholders 
unprotected.”); GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 322 (“The various rationales for the business judgment 
rule . . . largely disappear when dealing with conflict-of-interest transactions. The idea that directors 
. . . are more likely to reach a better business decision than the courts presupposes a situation in which 
we can trust the directors to act in the best interest of the corporation.”); see also supra note 44 and 
accompanying text. But see infra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 62. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; cf. infra notes 266–70 and accompanying text. 
 63. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text. But see infra note 137 and accompanying 
text. 
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Second-guessing is not the best way to assess the merits of a business 
decision. While it may be necessary to do so at times, it would be 
inappropriate to expand the application of the entire fairness test too 
broadly. 
Moreover, if the entire fairness test were employed too frequently, it 
would consume a great deal of judicial resources.64 It also would subject a 
great number of business decisions to a form of review—i.e., judicial—
that is acknowledged to be highly imperfect.65 Thus, prudence dictates that 
the entire fairness test ought not to be over-extended. 
However, the business judgment rule is imperfect as well. Its main 
shortcoming is the exact opposite of the entire fairness test’s: it is too 
lenient. In theory, at least, only grossly negligent conduct and wholly 
irrational decisions would fail to pass muster.66 Surely there have been, 
throughout the years, countless negligent business decisions and 
substantively unreasonable transactions that have been upheld under the 
business judgment rule. That is the price to be paid for deference.67 
Of course, such deference is subject to abuse. If directors are confident 
that their decisions are subject to review only under the business judgment 
rule, it could be expected to affect their behavior. They may decide, 
consciously or otherwise, to shirk their responsibilities by behaving 
negligently. Although shirking would have to avoid gross negligence in 
order to escape liability, this provides little comfort to shareholders. Worse 
yet, directors may find ways to divert corporate assets to their personal 
benefit (again, consciously or otherwise). Especially in large public 
corporations, directors would need to redirect only a small, perhaps even 
insignificant, amount of assets from each shareholder to themselves in 
 64. Going to trial to determine the fairness of a transaction necessarily consumes significantly 
greater resources than dismissing a case because of the business judgment rule: 
As our Supreme Court has recognized, a determination that entire fairness is the appropriate 
standard of review ‘is often of critical importance.’ That conclusion normally will preclude 
dismissal of a complaint on a . . . motion to dismiss. . . . [T]he requirement of an entire 
fairness review may also preclude the entry of a final judgment even after discovery on a 
motion for summary judgment . . . . 
Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2002) (citation omitted). Of course, the courts 
recognize that judicial economy cannot be the ultimate value in these matters. See Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) (“[I]f we failed to balance all the interests involved, we 
would in the name of practicality and judicial economy foreclose a judicial decision on the merits.”). 
 65. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 66. See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text. 
 67. “Establishing the proper mix of deference and accountability thus emerges as the central 
problem in applying the business judgment rule to particular situations.” Bainbridge, Abstention 
Doctrine, supra note 1, at 109. 
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order to amass huge fortunes.68 The outer limit for substantive 
overreaching—irrationality or waste—is virtually unworthy of mention.69 
Thus, the deferential nature of the business judgment rule easily could lead 
to an increase in negligent and substantively unreasonable business 
decisions. If the business judgment rule were employed too often, it would 
leave shareholders under-protected. While not all directors would succumb 
to the temptation, it would be inappropriate to assume that directors are 
any less frail than others.70 Thus, prudence dictates that the business 
judgment rule also ought not to be overextended. 
The obvious conclusion is that an all-or-nothing approach, employing 
either the entire fairness test or the business judgment rule, is inadequate 
to deal with all situations. The development of one or more intermediate 
standards of review was inevitable. 
II. STRUCTURAL BIAS IN THE COURTS 
Because the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test occupy 
the extreme ends of the spectrum in terms of judicial review, there are 
situations in which neither standard can be considered appropriate. Cases 
involving structural bias are the leading examples. When directors have a 
conflict of interest that does not rise to the level of self-dealing, the 
deference of the business judgment rule seems as inadequate as the rigor 
of the entire fairness test seems excessive. 
The issue of structural bias has not escaped the notice of the courts. 
Their response, however, has not been entirely consistent. Some courts 
have been more accepting than others.71 Delaware courts have vacillated 
on the issue. On the one hand, they clearly have expressed hesitancy when 
addressing the issue of structural bias explicitly. On the other hand, the 
development of intermediate standards of review for breach of fiduciary 
 68. See supra note 42 (discussing agency theory); see also Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, 
supra note 1, at 107–09 (discussing trade-off between authority and accountability). 
 69. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249 (Del. 2000) (upholding severance package 
worth over $140 million after an unsuccessful fifteen months as president, albeit as “a close case”). 
 70. See supra notes 44, 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 71. Compare Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983) 
(“We believe that the potential for structural bias on the part of a litigation committee appointed by 
directors who are parties to derivative actions is sufficiently great and sufficiently difficult of precise 
proof in an individual case to require the adoption of a prophylactic rule.”), with Auerbach v. Bennett, 
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000–03 (N.Y. 1979) (applying business judgment rule to decisions of disinterested 
and independent special litigation committee). See also Houle v. Lowe, 556 N.E.2d 51, 54–59 (Mass. 
1990) (discussing different courts’ approaches to derivative litigation in light of structural bias). 
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duty has been largely a response to concerns about structural bias, 
although not explicitly so. 
This Part will explore the courts’ response to structural bias. It will 
begin with a discussion of the cases in which the courts have resisted the 
concept of structural bias and then turn to cases in which they have 
embraced it. This review will lay the groundwork for the subsequent 
discussion of the true nature of structural bias and why the courts’ 
response has been inadequate. 
A. Judicial Skepticism 
Clearly, the courts are not overly concerned with the threat of structural 
bias. This is obvious from the most common method of dealing with 
conflicts of interest. Rather than rely heavily on the entire fairness test, 
courts seek to eliminate the conflict altogether. One way is to have the 
interested directors recuse themselves from the decision-making process 
and to have the matter decided by disinterested directors; another way is to 
have the board’s decision conditioned upon the approval of disinterested 
shareholders. In theory, at least, there would be an unconflicted decision 
maker, obviating the need for judicial scrutiny and justifying deference.72 
This logic is the basis for various state statutes that permit interested 
transactions that are approved by fully-informed, disinterested directors or 
shareholders.73 Relying on these statutes, directors generally direct 
decisions involving conflicts of interest to disinterested directors or 
shareholders, and courts generally review those decisions under the 
business judgment rule.74 
 72. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991) (“The key to upholding an interested 
transaction is the approval of some neutral decision-making body. . . . [A] transaction will be sheltered 
from shareholder challenge if approved by either a committee of independent directors, the 
shareholders, or the courts.”). 
 73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.61 (2002). 
 74. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366 n.34 (Del. 1993) (“[A]pproval of an 
interested transaction by either a fully-informed disinterested board of directors, or the disinterested 
shareholders, provides business judgment protection.”) (citations omitted); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 
A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) (“[A]pproval by fully-informed disinterested directors . . . or 
disinterested stockholders . . . permits invocation of the business judgment rule and limits judicial 
review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of proof upon the party attacking the transaction.”). 
But see Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV. A. 11134, 1997 WL 367034, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 23, 1997) (“[E]ven 
if a board’s action falls within the safe harbor of section 144, the board is not entitled to receive the 
protection of the business judgment rule. Compliance . . . merely shifts the burden to the plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that the transaction was unfair.”) (unpublished opinion). Cf. infra notes 412–17 and 
accompanying text. 
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If structural bias were a serious concern, disinterested director approval 
would not be sufficient to invoke the business judgment rule. Shareholder 
approval might be a different story,75 but the courts would not be so 
trusting of directors sitting in judgment over each other or management. 
Disinterested directors may not have a financial interest in the transaction 
in question, but they may nevertheless be conflicted with respect to the 
decision itself, if only because of its effect on a colleague. The concept of 
structural bias suggests that too much deference is inappropriate because 
of such conflict. 
The courts’ hesitancy with respect to structural bias is not limited to 
such general considerations. The Delaware Supreme Court first addressed 
the issue of structural bias explicitly in the case of Aronson v. Lewis.76 The 
case involved a derivative action and the issue was how a plaintiff could 
establish demand futility.77 The court announced a two-part test: 
[I]n determining demand futility the Court of Chancery in the 
proper exercise of its discretion must decide whether, under the 
particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) 
the directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the 
challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise 
of business judgment.78 
In the course of the discussion, the court had the occasion to address 
the issue of structural bias briefly in a footnote: 
Critics will charge that we are ignoring the structural bias common 
to corporate boards throughout America, as well as the other unseen 
socialization processes cutting against independent discussion and 
decisionmaking in the boardroom. The difficulty with structural bias 
in a demand futile case is simply one of establishing it in the 
complaint . . . . We are satisfied that discretionary review by the 
Court of Chancery of complaints alleging specific facts pointing to 
 75. But see infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. 
 76. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 77. A derivative action is “a suit asserted by a shareholder on the corporation’s behalf against a 
third party (usu[ally] a corporate officer) because of the corporation’s failure to take some action 
against the third party.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 475 (8th ed. 2004). Before shareholders can 
initiate a derivative action, they must make a demand that the board of directors take such action. 
However, demand will be excused if making such demand would be futile because of directorial 
interest. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. See generally infra notes 348–69 and accompanying text. 
 78. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 (emphasis added). 
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bias on a particular board will be sufficient for determining demand 
futility.79 
By demanding that the plaintiff establish a strong case of bias, the court 
clearly rejected the notion that structural bias is an inherent aspect of 
director relations. 
In its most recent discussion of structural bias, the Delaware Supreme 
Court reaffirmed and elaborated upon the Aronson approach. In Beam v. 
Stewart,80 shareholders of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. 
brought a derivative action against the corporation as well as its founder, 
officers and directors alleging, among other things, breaches of fiduciary 
duty by Martha Stewart herself. The issue before the court was whether 
demand was futile in light of the directors’ personal relationships with her 
and her control over the company.81 The court concluded that demand was 
not futile because a majority of the directors were disinterested and 
independent.82 
In the course of its opinion, the Stewart court considered the concept of 
structural bias under the rubric of “personal friendship.”83 The court 
acknowledged that friendships could disrupt the independence of an 
otherwise disinterested director.84 However, it was convinced that this 
would be a very rare situation: “‘Not all friendships, or even most of them, 
rise to this level . . . .’”85 On this point the court was clear: “Allegations of 
mere personal friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing 
alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s 
independence.”86 Instead, the plaintiff would be required to establish that 
the relationship in question was “of a bias-producing nature”:87 
 79. Id. at 815 n.8. 
 80. 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004). 
 81. “Stewart was, at all relevant times, [the company]’s chairman and chief executive. She 
controls over 94% of the shareholder vote.” Id. at 1044 n.3. 
 82. Id. at 1057. 
 83. See id. at 1050–52. Friendship is only one possible understanding of structural bias. See infra 
Part II.B. 
 84. See Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1050 (“A variety of motivations, including friendship, may 
influence the demand futility inquiry.”); id. (“‘[S]ome professional or personal friendships, which may 
border on or even exceed familial loyalty and closeness, may raise a reasonable doubt whether a 
director can appropriately consider demand.’”) (quoting Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 979 (Del. Ch. 
2003); id. at 1052 (“[P]ersonal friendship is [not] always irrelevant to the independence calculus.”). 
 85. Id. at 1050 (citation omitted). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.; see also id. at 1051 (“The difficulty with structural bias in a demand futile case is simply 
one of establishing it in the complaint. . . . We are satisfied that discretionary review by the Court of 
Chancery of complaints alleging specific facts pointing to bias on a particular board will be sufficient 
for determining demand futility.”) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del. 1984)). 
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The Court of Chancery . . . must review the complaint on a case-by-
case basis to determine whether it states with particularity facts 
indicating that a relationship . . . is so close that the director’s 
independence may reasonably be doubted. This doubt might arise 
either because of financial ties, familial affinity, a particularly close 
or intimate personal or business affinity or because of evidence that 
in the past the relationship caused the director to act non-
independently vis á vis an interested director. . . . Mere allegations 
that they move in the same business and social circles, or a 
characterization that they are close friends, is not enough to negate 
independence for demand excusal purposes.88 
The facts of the case demonstrate that the quantum of proof required by 
the court is quite high: 
Allegations that Stewart and the other directors moved in the same 
social circles, attended the same weddings, developed business 
relationships before joining the board, and described each other as 
“friends,” even when coupled with Stewart’s 94% voting power, are 
insufficient, without more, to rebut the presumption of 
independence. . . . Whether they arise before board membership or 
later as a result of collegial relationships among the board of 
directors, such affinities—standing alone—will not render presuit 
demand futile.89 
The burden is especially onerous given that the plaintiff is required to 
make its case on the pleadings, with particularized allegations, and without 
the benefit of discovery.90 
The underlying concern is not wholly unreasonable: if structural bias 
were accepted as a conflict of interest, it could alter radically the balance 
between authority and accountability.91 Because of the nature of 
relationships among directors,92 many issues that are deemed to involve 
 88. Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1051–52. 
 89. Id. at 1051. 
 90. See infra notes 350–51, 359–69 and accompanying text. 
 91. See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative 
Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503 (1989). 
[T]he structural bias argument has no logical terminus. . . . If familiarity breeds acquiescence 
in litigation matters, will it not do so in other contexts as well? If so, does this not suggest a 
wholesale abandonment of the business judgment rule in favor of judicial review of every 
board approval of a management proposal that turns out badly? 
Id. at 534–35 (footnote omitted). 
 92. See infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
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the duty of care might be considered to involve the duty of loyalty. If so, 
the entire fairness test would swamp the business judgment rule. However, 
recognition of structural bias as a conflict of interest need not lead to the 
conclusion that there is a breach of the duty of loyalty requiring the 
invocation of the entire fairness test.93 There are other possibilities. 
To be sure, the Delaware Supreme Court has not rejected the concept 
of structural bias outright. However, the cases discussed thus far do not 
provide a ringing endorsement. By requiring specific proof, the court 
undermined the concept of structural bias, which suggests that bias is 
inherent in such relationships. It would seem that the Delaware courts are 
not particularly sympathetic to claims of structural bias. However, the 
foregoing discussion does not paint a complete picture. There are many 
situations in which they do endorse the concept of structural bias more 
fully, although not necessarily under that label. 
B. Endorsement Via Intermediate Standards of Review 
Despite the reservations by the Delaware Supreme Court in cases such 
as Aronson and Stewart, the concept of structural bias has achieved 
considerable judicial acceptance in a number of circumstances. In fact, this 
section will demonstrate that structural bias is the primary reason for the 
development of various intermediate standards of review. 
“[T]he emergence of these intermediate standards of review has been 
one of the major recent developments in corporate law.”94 It is not a 
surprising development, given the extreme divergence between the 
business judgment rule and the entire fairness test. However, it was less 
predictable that intermediate standards would multiply rather than 
coalesce. When confronted with circumstances that required it, the courts 
developed intermediate standards of review for the specific situations 
before them. The individual intermediate standards were surely better than 
either basic alternative but were not particularly apt. Had the courts been 
willing to recognize that the various standards address the same general 
concern—structural bias—they might have been able to develop a 
comprehensive theory of review. 
 93. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 94. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 467. 
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1. Hostile Takeovers 
One obvious endorsement of the concept of structural bias can be 
found in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.95 In that case, Mesa 
Petroleum Company made a two-tier, front-loaded tender offer for the 
shares of Unocal:96 it offered $54 per share in cash to acquire a majority of 
the shares, after which point it would squeeze out the remaining 
shareholders for subordinated securities with a face value, but not a market 
value, of $54.97 “[S]uch offers are a classic coercive measure designed to 
stampede shareholders into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is 
inadequate, out of fear of what they will receive at the back end of the 
transaction.”98 The Unocal board responded in kind. Its defense was a 
selective self-tender in which the company would exchange 49% of its 
shares for senior debt securities worth $72 per share, but the offer was not 
open to Mesa Petroleum.99 This effectively would cause Mesa Petroleum 
to pay the higher amount on the back end of its transaction in order to 
proceed. “[T]he board stated that its objective was either to defeat the 
inadequate Mesa offer or, should the offer still succeed, provide the 
[remaining] stockholders, who would otherwise be forced to accept ‘junk 
bonds’, with [additional consideration].”100 Mesa challenged the 
discriminatory nature of the defensive measure, but Unocal prevailed. 
The Delaware Supreme Court noted that directors must be free to 
respond to hostile takeover offers in the interests of shareholders.101 
However, the court also recognized that, in circumstances involving the 
threat of a hostile takeover, there is an “omnipresent specter that a board 
may be acting primarily in its own interests [i.e., entrenchment], rather 
than those of the corporation and its shareholders [i.e., maximizing 
shareholder wealth].”102 This “omnipresent specter” is nothing more than 
an articulation of structural bias. Although the court did not see the case as 
 95. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 96. “[A] two-tier, front-loaded tender offer is a tender offer for a majority of a company’s shares 
with the explicit or implicit promise of a subsequent merger in which the minority shareholders will be 
eliminated for inferior consideration.” Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 
J. CORP. L. 381, 386 n.27 (2002). 
 97. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985). 
 98. Id. at 956. 
 99. See id. at 950. 
 100. Id. at 956. 
 101. “When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to determine whether 
the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. In that respect a board’s duty is 
no different from any other responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions should be no less entitled to 
the respect they otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business judgment.” Id. at 954. 
 102. Id. 
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involving self-dealing, it understood that directors were conflicted. This is 
the essential claim of structural bias. 
In response, the court recognized “an enhanced duty which calls for 
judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business 
judgment rule may be conferred.”103 The threshold inquiry established by 
the court was a new intermediate standard of review in the form of a 
bipartite test. First, “directors must show that they had reasonable grounds 
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed 
. . . . ”104 Second, the defensive measures “must be reasonable in relation 
to the threat posed.”105 This seemed to be a reasonable attempt to balance 
the competing concerns with an intermediate standard of review. 
Unfortunately, there was not much depth to the enhanced scrutiny. As 
the Delaware Supreme Court noted, directors can “satisfy [the first prong] 
‘by showing good faith and reasonable investigation . . . .’”106 With respect 
to the second prong, the court would subsequently clarify that “‘courts will 
not substitute their business judgment for that of the directors, but will 
determine if the directors’ decision was, on balance, within a range of 
reasonableness.’”107 These elaborations make the enhanced scrutiny 
standard sound strikingly similar to the business judgment rule.108 
In fact, as the court would later explain, there is “a direct correlation 
between findings of proportionality or disproportionality and the judicial 
determination of whether a defensive response was draconian because it 
was either coercive or preclusive . . . .”109 In other words, a defensive 
response is likely to be considered unreasonable only if it is either 
coercive or preclusive.110 With such limitations on judicial review, the 
enhanced scrutiny standard cannot serve the primary function of an 
intermediate standard of review: to bridge the gap between the business 
judgment rule and the entire fairness test.111 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 955. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964)). 
 107. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386 (Del. 1995) (quoting Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45–46 (Del. 1994)). 
 108. See Velasco, supra note 96, at 385–90, 416–22 (2002); id. at 390 n.58 (“Directors thus are 
afforded substantially the benefits of the business judgment rule before it can be determined that they 
are entitled to its protection . . . .”). 
 109. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387. 
 110. See Velasco, supra note 96, at 419. 
 111. The “enhanced scrutiny” that is applied to takeover defenses extends beyond Unocal. It 
arguably consists of three different standards of review, the applicability of which depends upon the 
particular circumstances. Unocal set forth the basic aspect of “enhanced scrutiny.” The second aspect 
is derived from Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
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There, the court recognized that there may come a point in a takeover battle when it is clear that the 
company will be sold. See id. at 182 (discussing inevitability of “the break-up of the company”); see 
also Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989) (clarifying that “sale 
of corporate control” is a triggering factor); Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 
637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1994) (listing both “change in corporate control” and “break-up of the corporate 
entity”). At that point, “[t]he duty of the board . . . change[s] from the preservation of [the company] as 
a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.” 
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. If Revlon duties apply, directors must “seek the best value reasonably 
available to the stockholders.” QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 48. Conduct that favors a white knight over 
a hostile bidder is suspect. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. 
 The Revlon decision can be seen either as an entirely new test or merely as a specific application 
of Unocal. Revlon generally does not allow directors to employ defensive measures to resist a hostile 
bidder: directors’ responsibility is narrowly prescribed and their discretion is limited. See Revlon, 506 
A.2d at 182 (“The whole question of defensive measures bec[o]me[s] moot. The directors’ role 
change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for 
the stockholders at a sale of the company.”). This is in sharp contrast to Unocal. On the other hand, it 
can be argued that Revlon flows logically from Unocal. Once a sale of control is inevitable, perhaps 
the only course of conduct that could be considered “reasonable” under Unocal would be to seek the 
best value reasonably available to stockholders. Cf. Allen et al., supra note 3, at 895 (“Except for 
requiring the court to evaluate the reasonableness of the directors’ action against the singular objective 
of current value maximization, the Revlon standard differs little from the Unocal standard in practical 
application.”). This seems to have been the Revlon court’s view. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 
(characterizing Revlon duties as “significantly altered . . . responsibilities under the Unocal 
standards”). 
 A third aspect of “enhanced scrutiny” applies to actions taken “for the primary purpose of 
thwarting the exercise of a shareholder vote.” Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 
(Del. Ch. 1988). In Blasius, the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that such action by a board of 
directors would be upheld “only if it was supported by a compelling justification.” Chesapeake Corp. 
v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 319 (Del. Ch. 2000) (citing Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660–63). This holding was 
later endorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992). 
 Although the Blasius court rejected a per se rule against such actions, see Blasius, 564 A.2d at 
660–61, the standard is nevertheless “quite onerous.” Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 
1996). The reason given for the demanding standard was “the central importance of the franchise to 
the scheme of corporate governance.” Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. According to the Blasius court, other 
forms of takeover defense generally “involve the exercise of the corporation’s power over its property, 
or with respect to its rights or obligations,” id. at 660—judgments which are appropriately made by the 
board of directors. Decisions as to the composition of the board of directors, on the other hand, are the 
prerogative of the shareholders. See id. Thus, director interference in shareholder democracy is 
arguably illegitimate. 
 As with Revlon, the Blasius test can be seen either as an entirely new test or merely as an 
application of Unocal. Clearly, a “compelling justification” standard is far more demanding than a 
“reasonableness” standard. In fact, while the Unocal standard has been characterized as providing little 
more protection than the business judgment rule, the Blasius standard probably exceeds the rigor of the 
entire fairness test. On the other hand, it can be argued that Blasius also flows logically from Unocal 
because intentional interference with shareholder voting rights is unreasonable under most 
circumstances. See Allen et al., supra note 3, at 884–90 (“[T]he post-Blasius experience has shown 
that the Unocal/Unitrin analytical framework is fully adequate to capture the voting franchise concerns 
that animated Blasius, so long as the court applies Unocal ‘with a gimlet eye out for inequitably 
motivated electoral manipulations or for subjectively well-intentioned board action that has preclusive 
or coercive effects.’”) (quoting Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 323). In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Blasius is not far off. See Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92 n.3 (“A board’s unilateral decision to 
adopt a defensive measure touching ‘upon issues of control’ that purposefully disenfranchises its 
shareholders is strongly suspect under Unocal, and cannot be sustained without a ‘compelling 
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2. Derivative Litigation 
A second obvious endorsement of the concept of structural bias can be 
found in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.112 That case involved a derivative 
action in which demand had been excused as futile because all of the 
directors were defendants in the case. However, the board subsequently 
established a “Special Investigation Committee,” composed of two newly-
appointed directors, to consider whether the case should be dismissed. The 
committee concluded that it should, and the Delaware Supreme Court had 
to decide whether the motion to dismiss should be granted. The court held 
that “an independent committee possesses the corporate power to seek the 
termination of a derivative suit.”113 However, the court also believed that 
“there [was] sufficient risk in the realities of [the] situation . . . to justify 
caution.”114 The court described those “realities” as follows: 
[W]e must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow 
directors in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this 
instance, who designated them to serve both as directors and 
committee members. The question naturally arises whether a “there 
but for the grace of God go I” empathy might not play a role. And 
the further question arises whether inquiry as to independence, good 
faith and reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against 
abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse.115 
The “realities” of Zapata are not very different from the “omnipresent 
specter” of Unocal; it is simply another articulation of structural bias. It is 
an empathy and bias on the part of all directors rooted in their relationship 
as colleagues. Despite the lack of self-dealing—because the newly-
justification.’”). The court’s most recent discussion of Blasius, however, is more nuanced. Compare 
MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1129 (Del. 2003) (noting “the substantial degree 
of congruence between the rationale that led to the Blasius ‘compelling justification’ enhanced 
standard of judicial review and the logical extension of that rationale within the context of the Unocal 
enhanced standard of judicial review”), with id. at 1130 (noting that Blasius standard can be applied 
“either independently, in the absence of a hostile contest for control, or within the Unocal standard of 
review when the board’s action is taken as a defensive measure”). 
 Thus, “enhanced scrutiny” could be characterized as a single test, based on Unocal. On the other 
hand, it seems as a practical matter to consist of three separate tests: one of general applicability in 
situations involving takeover defenses, and two additional tests for specific circumstances. Either way, 
“enhanced scrutiny” demonstrates that the courts realize that management cannot necessarily be 
trusted to act in the shareholders’ interests even in the absence of self-dealing. 
 112. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
 113. Id. at 785. 
 114. Id. at 787. 
 115. Id. 
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appointed directors were not defendants—the court was unwilling to say 
that the disinterested directors were truly unconflicted. Thus, the court felt 
that the directors’ decision required closer scrutiny. 
The response of the Delaware Supreme Court was to reserve the right 
to reject the committee’s decision altogether if the circumstances 
warrant.116 The court set forth a two-part test for reviewing the decision of 
an independent committee of directors to dismiss a derivative lawsuit. 
“First, the Court should inquire into the independence and good faith of 
the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions. . . . The 
corporation should have the burden of pro[of].”117 Second, “[t]he Court 
should determine, applying its own independent business judgment, 
whether the motion should be granted.”118 
This second step is an odd one. According to the Delaware Supreme 
Court, “[t]he second step is intended to thwart instances where corporate 
actions meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to 
satisfy its spirit . . . .”119 This is a perfectly reasonable concern. However, 
the method adopted by the court is theoretically and doctrinally suspect. 
Recognition of courts’ incompetence to make business decisions is one of 
the foundations of the business judgment rule.120 Yet the Delaware 
Supreme Court—perhaps the ultimate judicial oracle on corporate law 
matters—decided to give lower courts the discretion to apply their own 
business judgment over and above that of the directors who already would 
have been determined to be independent.121 This decision has been widely 
criticized,122 and many courts have refused to follow its lead.123 
 116. Id. at 788. The court seemed to understand the implications of its solution but felt that it was 
justified by the circumstances: “We recognize the danger of judicial overreaching but the alternatives 
seem to us to be outweighed by the fresh view of a judicial outsider. Moreover, if we failed to balance 
all the interests involved, we would in the name of practicality and judicial economy foreclose a 
judicial decision on the merits.” Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 789. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 121. Although the courts may consider the directors to be independent under their standards, the 
directors may not be truly independent. See infra Part III. 
 122. See, e.g., Dennis J. Block & H. Adam Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder 
Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 BUS. LAW. 27, 62–63 (1981); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to 
the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. 
U. L. REV. 913, 937–41 (1982); Charles Mark Holt, Alford v. Shaw: North Carolina Adopts a 
Prophylactic Rule to Prevent Termination of Shareholders’ Derivative Suits Through Special 
Litigation Committees, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1228, 1245–47 (1986); Kriston D. Qualls, Note, Zapata Corp. 
v. Maldonado: Delaware’s Judicial Business Judgment Rule—A Ship Without a Rudder?, 19 CAL. W. 
L. REV. 189, 209–10 (1983). 
 123. See, e.g., Hirsch v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 984 P.2d 629, 637 (Colo. 1999); Miller v. Register 
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In addition, one must struggle to find a principled way to limit the 
rationale for the second step of the Zapata test to derivative litigation. If 
the possibility of “subconscious abuse” stems from the fact that “directors 
are passing judgment on fellow directors,”124 then the principle should 
apply much more broadly. If independent directors cannot be trusted with 
respect to derivative litigation, they probably should not be trusted with 
respect to other conflict situations, either.125 There is no good reason to 
have a special rule for derivative litigation: whenever directors sit in 
judgment over other directors, “the realities of [the] situation . . . justify 
caution.”126 This is the essential claim of structural bias. 
Zapata is thus quite similar to Unocal. In each case, directors needed 
leeway to act in the interests of shareholders but could not be trusted 
completely to do so. The root of the problem is structural bias, and it 
demands a comprehensive solution. There is no good reason to have one 
special rule for hostile takeovers and another special rule for derivative 
litigation. 
3. Disinterested Approval 
A somewhat more tenuous endorsement of the concept of structural 
bias can be found in a third category of intermediate standard of review. 
That standard is a shift in the burden of proof on the issue of fairness, 
whereby the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the decision or 
transaction in question is unfair.127 In Delaware, this intermediate standard 
& Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983); Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 59 
(Mass. 1990); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002–03 (N.Y. 1979); Alford v. Shaw, 358 
S.E.2d 323, 326 (N.C. 1987); Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); see also 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44 (2002) (adopting business judgment rule approach). 
 “The fact that there have been no reported major trials to apply the Zapata approach raises 
questions as to whether courts or litigants ever will be serious about obtaining an independent judicial 
evaluation of the corporation’s interest.” GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 434. 
 124. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787. 
 125. It could be argued that all corporate decisions suffer under this logic because outside 
directors are always sitting in judgment on the inside directors. See supra note 91. The force of this 
argument is strengthened by the fact that most challenges to director misbehavior must be channeled 
through a derivative action. 
 However, the argument is a non-sequitur. All human judgment is imperfect, but in most 
circumstances the directors’ judgments are the best available. In situations where both inside and 
outside directors are honestly pursuing the interests of shareholders, structural bias is not a problem 
and directors’ judgments can be trusted. In conflict situations, on the other hand, directors may 
perceive themselves as pitted against shareholders and thus cannot be trusted. A special rule for 
conflict situations does not undermine the application of the business judgment rule generally. 
 126. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787. 
 127. A mere shift in the burden of proof may not seem like an intermediate standard of review 
because the underlying issue of fairness does not change. However, there is a significant practical 
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applies when the interested party is a controlling shareholder rather than 
merely one or more directors.128 In California, however, the principle 
applies to interested directors as well.129 Although not clearly expressed in 
such terms, the underlying concern must be that even independent 
directors cannot be trusted to act in the interest of shareholders. Again, 
that is the essential claim of structural bias. 
The test itself—that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the 
unfairness of the transaction or decision—is not a bad one. It does a better 
job in bridging the gap between the business judgment rule and the entire 
fairness test than any of the previous standards. However, as a general test 
for structural bias, it probably tilts too greatly toward accountability over 
directorial authority. After all, fairness is supposed to be a demanding 
standard.130 If so, then shifting the burden of proof, while significant, 
would not go far enough in relaxing the standard.131 
Admittedly, it is difficult to argue that the court’s overall handling of 
cases involving disinterested director or shareholder approval amounts to 
an endorsement of the concept of structural bias. After all, the general rule 
difference, from the directors’ point of view, between having to prove that a transaction is entirely fair 
on the one hand and having to avoid a characterization of unfairness on the other. If a standard of 
review is a “test a court [applies] when it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose 
liability or grant injunctive relief,” Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 437, and “defines the freedom of 
action (or, if you will, deference in the form of freedom from intrusion) that will be accorded to the 
persons who are subject to its reach,” Allen et al., supra note 3, at 867, then a shift in the burden of 
proof on the issue of fairness amounts to a new standard of review. 
 128. See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (“[A]n 
approval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed majority of 
minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or 
dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.”); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 
701, 703 (Del. 1983) (“[W]here corporate action has been approved by an informed vote of a majority 
of the minority shareholders, we conclude that the burden entirely shifts to the plaintiff to show that 
the transaction was unfair to the minority.”); see also In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders. Litig., 
663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
 129. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(2) (West 1990) (requiring, in addition to disinterested 
director approval, that a transaction be “just and reasonable”); Sammis v. Stafford, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
589, 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (“Where a disinterested majority approves the transactions and there 
was full disclosure, section 310(a)(2) applies, and the burden of proof is on the person challenging the 
transaction.”); see also Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 74–75 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1952). The Remillard case is the origin of the principle in California and was subsequently 
codified. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 310, legislative committee cmt. (1975) (“There is an additional 
requirement that the transaction be just and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it is approved, 
which is intended to codify a judicial decision indicating that the courts in any event will review the 
transaction for fairness.”). 
 130. But see infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 131. Another drawback is that, even with a shift in the burden of proof, a fairness standard would 
result in a dramatic increase in litigation expenses. See supra note 64; cf. infra notes 298–309 and 
accompanying text. 
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is that the business judgment rule applies.132 Such deference is inconsistent 
with a concern about structural bias. 
Moreover, many cases of burden shifting involve disinterested 
shareholder approval.133 Shareholder action has little to do with structural 
bias. In such cases, the shift is premised on “the potential for process 
manipulation by the controlling stockholder, and the concern that the 
controlling stockholder’s continued presence might influence even a fully 
informed shareholder vote.”134 Nevertheless, the dynamic in such cases is 
not entirely dissimilar to structural bias. An uncontrolled conflict of 
interest that does not rise to the level of self-dealing is a common theme. 
The minority shareholders may not be conflicted, but they cannot 
effectively police the controlling shareholder either. Because it is difficult 
to have confidence in shareholder approval, the invocation of the business 
judgment rule is unwarranted.135 Thus, although structural bias may not be 
involved, the situation is similar enough that a common solution should be 
feasible. In short, the shifting of the burden of proof on the issue of 
fairness provides some additional support for the notion that courts do, in 
fact, appreciate the concerns underlying structural bias. 
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT STRUCTURAL BIAS 
Courts recognize the importance of protecting beneficiaries from the 
conflicts of interest of their fiduciaries. Thus, they tend to describe the 
standard of conduct for the duty of loyalty in the strongest of terms.136 The 
effective standard of review, however, is not nearly so strong.137 Although 
 132. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 133. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 134. In re Wheelabrator Techs. S’holders. Litig., 663 A.2d. 1194, 1205 (Del. Ch. 1995); see also 
Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
 135. There must be some independent approval of an interested transaction. See Oberly v. Kirby, 
592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991) (“The key to upholding an interested transaction is the approval of 
some neutral decision-making body. . . . [A] transaction will be sheltered from shareholder challenge if 
approved by either a committee of independent directors, the shareholders, or the courts.”). 
 136. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 137. It is not clear that the entire fairness test is quite as strict as judicial statements suggest. In the 
first place, the courts have required more than merely a conflict of interest to invoke the test. There 
must be some evidence of disloyalty, see Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 
1993) (“[S]elf-interest, alone, is not a disqualifying factor even for a director. To disqualify a director, 
for [business judgment] rule rebuttal purposes, there must be evidence of disloyalty.”), such as self-
dealing. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“[T]he intrinsic fairness 
standard . . . will be applied only when the fiduciary duty is accompanied by self-dealing . . . .”). In 
fact, the conflict of interest must be “material,” and not merely “colorable.” See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d 
at 364 (“A trial court must have flexibility in determining whether an officer’s or director’s interest in 
a challenged board-approved transaction is sufficiently material to find the director to have breached 
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it may make sense to set the standard of review lower than the standard of 
conduct,138 the status quo leaves shareholders under-protected. 
Under current law, enforcement of the duty of loyalty essentially 
amounts to a prohibition against self-dealing.139 “[A] classic self-dealing 
transaction [is one] where a [fiduciary] stand[s] on both sides of a 
transaction,”140 or “when the [fiduciary] . . . causes the [company] to act in 
such a way that the [fiduciary] receives something from the [company] to 
the exclusion of, and detriment to, the . . . stockholders of the 
[company].”141 Self-dealing is an inadequate concept to address conflicts 
of interest for at least two reasons. First, it is not always easy for a plaintiff 
to demonstrate that self-dealing is involved. In many situations, the 
directors can argue plausibly that they are acting in the interests of 
shareholders even as they pursue their own agenda.142 Second, directors 
themselves may be unaware that they are not acting in the interests of 
shareholders. Bias may cloud their judgment.143 
his duty of loyalty and to have infected the board’s decision.”). Moreover, the entire fairness test does 
not require that a director’s conduct be perfect, only that it be fair. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 
306–07 (1930) (“The essence of the test [of intrinsic fairness] is whether or not under all the 
circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain.”); Cinerama, Inc. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995) (“A finding of perfection is not a sine qua non in 
an entire fairness analysis.”) (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983)). 
Finally, it is possible that director action could fail the more lenient business judgment rule and 
nevertheless withstand scrutiny under the entire fairness test. Compare Cede & Co., 634 A.2d 345 
(defendant directors grossly negligent and not entitled to protection of business judgment rule), with 
Cinerama, 663 A.2d 1156 (defendants satisfy burden of proving entire fairness on remand). There is 
nothing inherently illogical about such a result because a grossly negligent board could produce an 
entirely fair result fortuitously. Yet, there is something deeply unsettling about the possibility, and it 
casts doubt on the strictness of the entire fairness test. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in 
Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425 (1993) (arguing that fairness test is inadequate standard of review 
for fiduciary obligations). 
 138. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 18. 
 139. It has been said that the entire fairness test “will be applied only when the fiduciary duty is 
accompanied by self-dealing . . . .” Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
Nevertheless, enforcement of the duty of loyalty is not limited strictly to self-dealing. See, e.g., Cede 
& Co., 634 A.2d at 360 (“‘The presumption [of the business judgment rule] initially attaches to a 
director-approved transaction within a board’s conferred or apparent authority in the absence of any 
evidence of ‘fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing in the usual sense of personal profit or betterment.’”) 
(quoting Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (1988)). However, courts often use self-dealing as 
shorthand, and generally require that the disloyalty “rise to the level of self-dealing.” See id. at 363. 
 140. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 362. 
 141. Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d at 720. 
 142. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182–84 (Del. 
1986) (discussing potential benefits and detriments of lock-up options and no-shop provisions); 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (rejecting simple application of 
business judgment rule in hostile takeover setting “[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board 
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders”). 
 143. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981) (questioning “whether 
inquiry as to independence, good faith and reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against 
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Moreover, directors face many situations that, strictly speaking, do not 
involve self-dealing but in which they nevertheless may be conflicted. 
This is the case whenever directors stand to gain some benefit that is 
meaningful to them but which courts currently are unwilling to recognize 
as compromising their impartiality, perhaps because the benefit to 
directors is too intangible, indirect, or speculative. However, sometimes 
the benefit is quite concrete, such as the preservation of their positions; 
other times, the benefit is more indirect, such as the protection of a 
colleague, or speculative, such as the increase of benefits or reduction of 
accountability generally. In some such situations—e.g., hostile takeovers 
and derivative litigation—the courts already have recognized that neither 
the business judgment rule nor the entire fairness test is appropriate,144 but 
in other situations—e.g., executive compensation decisions—they have 
not. 
Although structural bias is the root of the problem, the topic rarely has 
been considered carefully. The failure to appreciate the true nature of 
structural bias has led to an inadequate judicial response to breach of 
fiduciary duty, at least at the intermediate level. This Part will consider 
structural bias in depth. It will propose three very different paradigms for 
understanding structural bias. First, structural bias can be understood as a 
form of implicit conspiracy: directors may pursue their group interests 
consciously, even in situations where there is no obvious personal benefit. 
Second, structural bias may be understood as the effect of relationships: 
directors may favor friends and colleagues over distant shareholders. 
Third, structural bias may be understood as a psychological phenomenon: 
a manifestation of ingroup bias, which may operate on an unconscious 
level. The claim is not that each instance of structural bias fits neatly 
within one of the three paradigms; rather, it is that each of these paradigms 
may be applicable, to a greater or lesser degree, to any situation involving 
structural bias. 
After considering each of the paradigms in turn, this Part will turn to 
the issue of whether and how structural bias might be overcome. The 
argument is that it cannot be. A proper understanding of structural bias 
serves to undermine confidence in the independence of all directors when 
there is a conflict of interest. Because the business judgment rule 
presupposes and demands such confidence, structural bias forces a 
reconsideration of the issue of dealing with such cases. In the face of 
abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse” in context of derivative litigation). This issue is considered in 
more detail supra, at Part II.B. 
 144. See supra Part II.B. 
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structural bias, the judicial practice of deferring to the judgment of 
“disinterested” directors becomes indefensible. Thus, an appropriate 
intermediate standard of review becomes indispensable. 
A. As Implicit Conspiracy 
One possible paradigm for structural bias contemplates an implicit 
conspiracy among directors to pursue their group interests. According to 
this implicit conspiracy theory, even independent directors may show 
favoritism for other directors because of the indirect benefits of doing so. 
The central claim of this theory is that all directors are interested 
directors when conflicts are the issue. “Independent” directors may be 
disinterested in the transaction in question, but they are not disinterested in 
the corresponding decision. The transaction may not offer them anything 
to the exclusion of shareholders, but the decision to favor other directors 
will. At the most abstract level, directors may show favoritism for each 
other out of solidarity or in return for the expectation of similar 
treatment.145 At the most concrete level, they may do so because it is 
necessary to maintain their membership on the board.146 
The implicit conspiracy is more expansive than it may first appear. 
This is because directors’ group interests extend beyond those of directors 
as such and include the group interests of management as well. It is easy to 
see why this would be the case with inside directors: they are the 
management. However, it is also true of outside directors because most 
outside directors are either executive officers of other companies, or at 
least former executive officers.147 Because executive officers naturally 
prefer pro-management boards, they may extend to each other the courtesy 
of deference. Thus, the implicit conspiracy covers the interests of officers 
as well as directors. 
In a strong form of the argument, the implicit conspiracy theory can be 
seen as nothing more than thinly-veiled self-dealing: directors might 
pursue their own immediate interests. A high-profile example would be 
 145. See infra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
 146. See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 162–63 and 
accompanying text. 
 147. “Outside directors tend to be corporate officers or retirees who share the same views and 
values as the insiders.” BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW, supra note 1, at 227. In large public 
companies these days, only a minority of directors are insiders. See SPENCER STUART, BOARD INDEX 6 
(2003) (approximately 20%). However, the great majority of new outside directors continue to be 
current or retired corporate executives. See id. at 7. In selecting outside directors, boards strongly 
prefer senior executives in other companies. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRECTORS, 2003–2004 
PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 16–17 (2003) (almost 85% of first-choice picks). 
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the entrenchment motive.148 By resisting hostile takeovers and proxy 
fights, directors may be acting to preserve their positions on the board of 
directors. This would be self-dealing because significant benefits, both 
financial and other, flow from such membership.149 
In a more moderate form of the argument, the implicit conspiracy 
theory can be seen as a form of enlightened self-interest. Although there 
may be no specific personal benefit from the decision at hand, directors 
might engage in favoritism because it is the type of behavior that would 
benefit them in other circumstances. A high-profile example would be 
executive compensation. By setting a liberal tone generally, directors can 
increase the likelihood of a better compensation package for themselves in 
their full-time positions.150 
In a weak form of the argument, the implicit conspiracy theory merely 
posits a coalition of like-minded individuals. Directors might act together 
because they share the same ideals, which just happen to align 
conveniently with their interests. A high-profile example would be 
derivative litigation. Directors naturally are averse to derivative litigation, 
which directly affects them in their roles both as directors and as officers. 
Thus, it is not surprising to find that they consistently reject demands and 
otherwise seek dismissal of derivative actions.151 
In short, the claim of the implicit conspiracy theory is that structural 
bias inherently carries a potential for self-dealing which is similar to that 
already recognized by the courts. Even if disinterested directors are not on 
both sides of the transaction, they are on both sides of the relevant issue. 
When directors have such conflicted interests, it is difficult to have 
confidence in their judgment and they cannot be afforded the deference of 
the business judgment rule. 
 148. See generally supra Part II.B.2. 
 149. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 25–30 (2004); James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in 
the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 93–96 (1985). 
 150. Cf. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 149, at 71–72 (discussing escalation of executive 
compensation). 
 151. See GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 412 (“Special litigation committees, almost without 
exception, have concluded that derivative suits which the committees looked into were not in the 
corporation’s best interests.”); see also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW, supra note 1, at 395, 399–
400. 
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B. As Relationship—Friendship and Collegiality 
A second possible paradigm for structural bias is based on the strength 
of relationships and claims that directors may pursue the interests of their 
friends and colleagues on the board over those of distant shareholders. 
According to this relationship theory, disinterested directors are likely to 
favor interested directors over shareholders out of friendship and 
collegiality. 
Courts have difficulty with the concept of friendship because of their 
narrow understanding of what constitutes a conflict of interest. Conflicts 
come in more forms than courts are willing to recognize, at least under the 
duty of loyalty. In order to raise a cognizable duty of loyalty issue and 
invoke the entire fairness test, shareholders generally must identify a direct 
or indirect financial interest that could tempt directors.152 Money, 
however, is not the only value that motivates directors, for good or for ill. 
For example, integrity often motivates directors to forsake their own 
interests and fulfill their fiduciary duties to shareholders.153 Friendship, on 
the other hand, may motivate directors to shirk their fiduciary duties for 
the sake of their colleagues. 
Courts do not feel comfortable with intangible values such as 
friendship. Thus, they generally do not accept friendship as a ground for 
challenging director independence.154 There is a very practical 
consideration in this: in the business world, as in any other setting, 
friendships are common.155 If shareholders were allowed to raise a duty of 
 152. Although courts may not require explicitly that the interest be financial in nature, the entire 
discourse clearly reflects an assumption to that effect. See supra note 139; see also DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 144(a) (2001) (discussing director interest in terms of direct and indirect “financial interest”); 2 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.60, at 8-377 to -379 (2002) (defining “conflicting interest” primarily in 
terms of direct or indirect “financial interest”); 1 RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE 
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2.1.1, at GCL-IV-20 (4th ed., 2004-1 Supp.) 
[hereinafter FOLK] (“Most basically, the duty of loyalty proscribes a fiduciary from any means of 
misappropriation of assets entrusted to his management and supervision.”). 
 Familial relations also generally are considered to be a sufficiently disqualifying interest. See, e.g., 
Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996) (“a majority of the board has a material financial 
or familial interest”). However, they are usually linked with financial interest and are essentially seen 
as a species of an indirect financial interest. Courts are willing to entertain the possibility that there are 
non-financial bonds that may impact director independence, see infra note 154 and accompanying text, 
but this recognition is more theoretical than real, see infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
 153. Cf. Bryan Ford, In Whose Interest: An Examination of the Duties of Directors and Officers in 
Control Contests, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 91, 127 (1994) (similar); Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of 
Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003) (discussing director motivations other than money). 
 154. See supra notes 80–89 and accompanying text. 
 155. “Business dealings seldom take place between complete strangers and it would be a strained 
and artificial rule which required a director to be unacquainted or uninvolved with fellow directors in 
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loyalty issue and invoke the entire fairness test merely by pointing to 
conflicts arising from friendship, the presumption of the business 
judgment rule would be watered down severely. This is not something 
courts are willing to do.156 
However, the influence of friendship should not be underestimated. To 
pretend that financial interests are inherently stronger than the bonds of 
friendship is both substantively indefensible and morally insulting. Surely 
there are many things that one would not do for money that one might 
nevertheless do for a friend.157 Moreover, friends are often willing to give 
each other the benefit of the doubt even when it might seem objectively 
unreasonable to do so.158 Thus, a director is likely to be conflicted when a 
friend’s interests are at stake. 
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, friendship should be 
considered material to a director’s independence only if, “because of the 
nature of [the] relationship . . . , the non-interested director would be more 
willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the relationship with the 
interested director.”159 The problem with this argument is that it assumes 
that favoritism entails a significant degree of risk. When their actions are 
to be reviewed under the business judgment rule, directors know that they 
do not face any real risk from judicial scrutiny.160 Moreover, the relevant 
reputation for directors is the one among their peers, who face the same 
order to be regarded as independent.” In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1442 
(N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 156. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004) (“[F]riendship must be accompanied 
by substantially more in the nature of serious allegations that would lead to a reasonable doubt as to a 
director’s independence.”); see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 21 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(“Recognizing the practical implications of the automatic requirement of an entire fairness review has 
led our Supreme Court to limit such automatic requirement to [a] narrow class of cases . . . ”). 
 157. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 
785–86 (1994) (discussing incommensurability of friendship and money). But see id. at 812–13. 
 158. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance With Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 86 (“[D]iscovering a compliance risk is 
unpleasant and hence aversive, especially if the employee is also a friend. . . . [P]eople tend to interpret 
data in a way that avoids aversive inference, subconsciously giving the agent an excessive benefit of 
the doubt.”); Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515, 1537 
(2000) (“[I]n everyday life, we give many second chances and even more benefits of the doubt to 
friends, family members, and associates for the sake of continuing and preserving the relationships.”). 
 159. Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1052, see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of 
Ownership & Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301, 315 (1983) (“[O]utside directors will monitor the 
management that chooses them because outside directors have incentive to develop reputations as 
experts in decision control.”). 
 160. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. The risk seems slight indeed when the 
additional difficulties of initiating and maintaining a derivative action are considered. See generally 
GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 395–423. 
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issues and are likely to be quite sympathetic.161 In the end, directors are 
left to grapple with two competing moral values—duty and friendship—
both of which claim the title of loyalty. Under these circumstances, it is 
difficult to have confidence in their judgment. 
Collegiality, while perhaps not as powerful an influence as friendship, 
should not be underestimated, either. The culture in corporate boardrooms 
is one of cooperation, not adversity.162 “Individuals who are quarrelsome, 
disagreeable, or rigid” are not likely to obtain or maintain membership on 
a board of directors.163 In such an environment, it would not be easy to 
question colleagues’ integrity by raising loyalty issues. Thus, even 
directors who are not friends may not be very critical of each other. 
In short, the claim of the relationship theory is that structural bias 
affects directors because of their friendship and collegiality. It does not 
mean to suggest that directors are unable to act in the interests of 
shareholders; only that they are likely to be ambivalent. When directors 
are so conflicted, it is difficult to have confidence in their judgment, and 
they cannot be afforded the deference of the business judgment rule. 
C. As Psychological Phenomenon—Ingroup Bias 
A third possible paradigm views structural bias as a complex 
psychological phenomenon. According to this psychological phenomenon 
theory, even disinterested directors will tend to favor other directors 
because of psychological forces such as ingroup bias. 
It is often assumed that structural bias entails conscious decisions by 
directors to prefer management interests to those of shareholders.164 
Viewed as such, it becomes a question of integrity. Although few would 
doubt that some directors might consciously disregard their duty some of 
 161. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 771 (2002) (arguing that reputation as experts in 
decision control may not be most relevant factor in market for directors). 
 162. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 161, at 767–69 (2002); Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 
91–92. 
 163. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 91. 
 164. See, e.g., Dooley & Veasey, supra note 91, at 535 (1989) (“The structural bias argument asks 
us to believe that outside directors generally are more willing to risk reputation and future income than 
they are to risk the social embarrassment of calling a colleague to account.”); E. Norman Veasey, The 
Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 405–06 (1997) 
(“Friendship, golf companionship, and social relationships are not factors that necessarily negate 
independence. . . . To make a blanket argument otherwise would create a dubious presumption that the 
director would sell his or her soul for friendship.”); see also Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 283 
(structural bias “may cause even the outside director to perceive his role . . . as that of a buffer by 
which to shelter and protect management . . . . ”). 
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the time, a theory that implicitly questions the integrity of all directors is 
difficult for many to accept. In fact, however, structural bias extends much 
further than conscious discrimination into the realm of semi-conscious, 
and even unconscious, bias. It is this less-than-conscious aspect that makes 
structural bias so dangerous and intractable. The claim is not that 
disinterested directors are dishonest or self-serving; rather, it is that even 
disinterested directors are not—indeed, cannot be—truly impartial.165 
Under this psychological phenomenon theory, structural bias can be 
understood as a manifestation of ingroup bias. Ingroup bias is “the 
tendency to favor the in-group over the out-group in evaluations and 
behavior.”166 Although the theories explaining ingroup bias may be the 
subject of debate,167 evidence of the existence of ingroup bias is 
extensively documented in the psychological literature.168 “Both 
psychological research and real world experience support the conclusion 
that ingroup bias is a remarkably prevalent and robust phenomenon.”169 
Although this favoritism is magnified as a person’s attraction to and 
identification with the ingroup increases,170 studies consistently have 
 165. Cf. supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 166. Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior 7, in 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7, 13 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 1986). 
“Ingroup bias” is sometimes used to encompass both a tendency to favor the ingroup and a willingness 
to discriminate against the outgroup. See, e.g., Miles Hewstone et al., Intergroup Bias, 53 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 575, 576 (2002). Though the literature is robust regarding the “ingroup-favoring” bias, see 
infra note 168, the evidence is mixed regarding the circumstances under which a group will be willing 
to impose negative outcomes on an outgroup. See, e.g., Thomas Buhl, Positive-Negative Asymmetry in 
Social Discrimination: Meta-Analytic Evidence, 2 GROUP PROCESSES AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 
51 (1999); Amélie Mummendey et al., Categorization is Not Enough: Intergroup Discrimination in 
Negative Outcome Allocation, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 125, 141–42 (1992). 
 167. By far, the most prominent theories explaining ingroup bias are social identity theory and 
self-categorization theory. See generally Michael A. Hogg, Intragroup Processes, Group Structure, 
and Social Identity, in SOCIAL GROUPS & IDENTITIES: DEVELOPING THE LEGACY OF HENRI TAJFEL 65, 
66–68 (W. Peter Robinson ed., 1996); Henri Tajfel, Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 20–27 (1982); John C. Turner, Some Current Issues in Research on Social 
Identity and Self-Categorization Theories, in SOCIAL IDENTITY: CONTEXT, COMMITMENT, CONTENT 6 
(Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, & Bertjan Doosje eds., 1999). However, there is mixed empirical 
support for some of the corollaries thought to stem from these theories. See, e.g., Rupert Brown, Social 
Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Challenges, 30 EUR. J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 745 (2000); Mark Rubin & Miles Hewstone, Social Identity Theory’s Self-Esteem 
Hypothesis: A Review and Some Suggestions for Clarification, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
REV. 40 (1998). Other theories explaining ingroup bias have similarly received mixed support. For an 
overview, see Hewstone et al., supra note 166, at 580–83. 
 168. See Brian Mullen, et al., Ingroup Bias as a Function of Salience, Relevance, and Status: An 
Integration, 22 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 103, 117 (1992); Tajfel et al., supra note 166, at 13. 
 169. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 99. 
 170. See André Gagnon & Richard Y. Bourhis, Discrimination in the Minimal Group Paradigm: 
Social Identity or Self-Interest, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1289, 1299 (1996); Michael 
A. Hogg, et al., Prototypical Similarity, Self-Categorization, and Depersonalized Attraction: A 
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found that categorization itself is enough to generate ingroup bias.171 
Structural bias may be easy to dismiss when viewed as the speculation of 
corporate law academics without any empirical support,172 but it is much 
more serious when understood as part of a broader psychological 
framework with substantial supporting evidence. 
Professors Cox and Munsinger have undertaken the task of applying 
the evidence to the issue of director independence in the context of 
derivative litigation.173 They sought to consider “the independent 
directors’ ability to perceive and represent the corporate interest in 
evaluating a demand to the board or in serving on a special litigation 
committee.”174 They concluded that “several psychological mechanisms 
can be expected to generate subtle, but powerful, biases which result in the 
independent directors’ reaching a decision insulating colleagues on the 
board from legal sanctions.”175 Their work argues forcefully that the 
independence of outside directors is limited. 
Most salient is their discussion of ingroup bias. Cox and Munsinger 
argue persuasively that directors are especially prone to ingroup bias 
because of various factors that increase their attraction to, and identity 
with, the group. For example, the position of director is a highly desirable 
one.176 In addition, directors tend to be relatively homogeneous and share 
Perspective on Group Cohesiveness, 25 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 159, 172 (1995); Stephanie Perreault 
& Richard Y. Bourhis, Ethnocentrism, Social Identification, and Discrimination, 25 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 92, 100 (1999). But see Steve Hinkle & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup 
Comparisons and Social Identity: Some Links and Lacunae, in SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY: 
CONSTRUCTIVE AND CRITICAL ADVANCES 48 (Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1990). 
 171. In the classic studies, subjects were randomly assigned to groups based on irrelevant criteria 
and then asked to distribute points independently and anonymously to ingroup and outgroup members; 
subjects consistently favored the ingroup over the outgroup in point awards. See, e.g., Henri Tajfel et 
al., Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior, 1 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149 (1971). A later 
study showed that the pattern of favoritism persisted even when subjects knew that the group 
assignments were completely arbitrary. See Michael Billig & Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization and 
Similarity in Intergroup Behavior, 3 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 27 (1973). As of 1982, there were “at 
least 30 studies which used minimal or near-minimal categorizations . . . which all show in-group-
favoring bias.” Tajfel, supra note 167, at 24. For other reviews confirming that categorization itself 
typically generates ingroup bias, see Marilynn B. Brewer, In-group Bias and the Minimal Intergroup 
Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 302 (1979); and John C. Turner, 
The Experimental Social Psychology of Intergroup Behavior, in INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 66, 75–84 
(John C. Turner & Howard Giles eds., 1981). 
 172. See Dooley & Veasey, supra note 91, at 534–36 (dismissing structural bias as “pop-
psychology, the logic of which is irrefutable only because it is unprovable” and “a relatively silly, but 
harmless, academic argument.”). 
 173. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149. 
 174. Id. at 84. 
 175. Id. at 85. 
 176. Id. at 104 (“[I]ndividuals place great value on their selection to and membership on a 
corporation’s board . . . .”); see also id. at 102 (“Studies suggest that as the attractiveness of a group 
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strong cultural bonds.177 As board members, they have a fair amount of 
familiarity and ongoing interaction with each other.178 Finally, they often 
find themselves in situations where there may be perceived competition 
with out-groups.179 Together, these factors strengthen the potential for 
ingroup bias significantly.180 Policies that minimize the effect of these 
aggravating factors, or perhaps eliminate some of them altogether, would 
surely help alleviate the problem. However, no such policies could be 
expected to eliminate ingroup bias entirely.181 Thus, even disinterested 
outside directors cannot be considered truly independent. 
Other psychological forces considered by Cox and Munsinger are also 
relevant to the current discussion. Within-group conformity behavior, for 
example, is another well-documented psychological phenomenon.182 Cox 
and Munsinger argue that “powerful psychological factors are at work 
within the boardroom, creating a cohesive, loyal, conforming ingroup that 
will support its members for positive and negative reasons, under low and 
and its members increases, and as the individual places greater and greater value on the rewards 
derived by identification with the group or continuing membership in the group, the degree of 
intergroup discrimination also increases.”) (footnote omitted). 
 177. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 105–06 (“Even though there is a perceived 
‘greening’ of today’s boardroom in the era of the independent director, the boards of American 
corporations continue to be distinguished by their homogeneity. Moreover, there is a great cultural gulf 
between the directors and their ‘adversary’ in the derivative suit [i.e., shareholders].”) (footnotes 
omitted); see also id. at 105 (“[C]ultural, personal, ethnic, and even linguistic similarities are factors 
that increase the members’ mutual attraction for each other. The heightened mutual attraction among a 
group’s members causes each member to have a stronger drive toward ethnocentrism and intergroup 
bias.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 178. See id. at 103 (“The directors called upon to evaluate a derivative suit against their colleagues 
are not, and generally have not been, isolated from the suit’s defendants . . . Even members of a special 
litigation committee who were appointed after the derivative suit was initiated . . . serve as directors on 
the full board.”) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 99 (“Prior or ongoing interaction between 
individuals . . . has been repeatedly demonstrated to be a source for strong biases favoring a familiar 
ingroup and correlatively disfavoring a threatening or unfamiliar outgroup.”) (footnote omitted). 
 179. Directors as a group face many situations that can be perceived as involving competition with 
out-groups, including hostile takeovers and derivative litigation. This adds to the group’s cohesiveness 
and the potential for ingroup bias. See id. at 101 (“[C]ompetition appears to clarify the distinctiveness 
of one’s membership in a group so that ingroup bias is more pronounced . . . .”). 
 180. See id. at 104 (“Not only does each of these biasing factors . . . contribute its individual 
influence to the overall strength of ingroup biasing, but when several complementary psychological 
factors occur together within the same person, they tend to exert extra psychological force by their 
coexistence. This enhanced effect is commonly referred to as synergism . . . .”). 
 181. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 182. For an overview of early research, see Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie R. Trost, Social 
Influence: Social Norms, Conformity, and Compliance, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
151 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998). Other studies have 
provided support for a general tendency to conform attitudes to ingroup norms. See, e.g., Daan Van 
Knippenberg & Henk Wilke, Prototypicality of Arguments and Conformity to Ingroup Norms, 22 EUR. 
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 141 (1992); Diane M. Mackie, Social Identification Effects in Group Polarization, 
50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 720 (1986). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 821 Velasco book pages.doc4/6/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
864 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:821 
 
 
 
 
 
 
high levels of motivation and group values.”183 Another example is choice 
editing. “Editing is a well-documented approach decisionmakers utilize to 
simplify and reduce to manageable proportions inherently complex 
decisions.”184 Cox and Munsinger argue that directors engage in choice 
editing through biased risk analyses and oversimplifications.185 These 
psychological forces cannot be considered an aspect of structural bias 
because they affect all decision making—including when directors’ 
interests are aligned with those of the shareholders.186 However, they are 
significant because they serve to exacerbate the effect of ingroup bias.187 
Conformity behavior, for example, can limit the possibility for meaningful 
dissent among directors. Choice editing can allow directors to justify their 
preferred decisions. 
The foregoing is not intended to suggest that courts are better at 
making business decisions than are boards of directors. Judges 
undoubtedly face cognitive biases of their own. Moreover, courts are not 
business experts.188 Furthermore, small groups (such as boards of 
directors) arguably are better at making decisions than individuals (such as 
judges).189 However, when they are conflicted, even groups with expertise 
are unreliable, and courts are called upon to take up the slack. The wisdom 
 183. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 99; see id. at 91–99 (discussing social needs and 
director service); see also Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003) (reviewing social psychology literature on small group decision making and 
applying it to Enron debacle). 
 184. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 85. 
 185. See id. at 85–91. 
 186. This Article seeks to address only structural bias, not all forms of cognitive bias. Structural 
bias is a form of cognitive bias that affects decision makers with conflicts of interest. The claim is that 
it can be remedied by means of an unconflicted decision maker, such as a court. Other forms of 
cognitive bias may affect all decision makers and thus may not be remediable. Still others may affect 
groups more than individuals, or vice versa. Although this can raise important issues, the evidence on 
such biases is far more ambiguous. Compare infra note 189 and accompanying text with supra notes 
168–69 and accompanying text. 
 187. “[W]hen several complementary psychological factors occur together within the same 
person, they tend to exert extra psychological force by their coexistence.” Cox & Munsinger, supra 
note 149, at 104; see also O’Connor, supra note 183, at 1240 (“Social psychology emphasizes that 
when several factors come together, they can multiply group biases so that the effect is much greater 
than simply adding the factors together.”). 
 188. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 189. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002). However, the evidence on this front is not unambiguous. See 
Norbert L. Kerr, et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 
687, 693 (1996) (“[R]esearch conducted to date indicates that there is unlikely to be any simple, global 
answer to the question, ‘Is group judgment more or less biased than individual judgment.’”); see also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762 (2003) (“Are groups able to 
avoid the judgment errors made by individuals? The evidence is mixed.”); Bainbridge, supra, at 19 
(“There is contested evidence as to whether groups outperform their best member . . . .”). 
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of the business judgment rule is not being questioned; rather, the 
importance of accountability is being emphasized. 
In short, the claim of the psychological phenomenon theory is that 
structural bias prejudices directors because of their membership on the 
board of directors. It does not mean to suggest that directors are hopelessly 
biased and incapable of acting in an objectively reasonable manner. 
Psychological forces are not necessarily decisive with respect to any 
individual choice, much less with respect to an entire class of decision 
makers.190 However, it does suggest that it is difficult to have confidence 
in directors’ judgment, and that they cannot be afforded the deference of 
the business judgment rule. 
D. Critique of Structural Bias 
The theory of structural bias asserts that, in cases involving conflicts of 
interest, directors are inherently prejudiced in favor of each other and of 
management, and may, consciously or unconsciously, favor their own 
interests over those of shareholders. Not everyone accepts the theory. 
Critics have two fundamental concerns: first, they demand proof of the 
existence of bias; second, they would prefer an alternative to any judicial 
solution. 
Critics often demand proof regarding the claims of structural bias. 
After all, it is just a theory. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
prove the existence of structural bias in any given case. This is true 
regardless of whether structural bias is seen as an implicit conspiracy, the 
effect of relationships, or a psychological phenomenon. Critics may be 
dismissive because the theory is conveniently impossible to disprove.191 
 190. Professors Cox and Munsinger’s caveat is worth reproducing here: 
We are careful to observe that the studies examined do not conclude that directors are biased 
or that their well-documented proclivity to shield colleagues from derivative suits is the 
product of such bias. Indeed, this precise question remains unexplored in the social 
psychology literature. Also, even given our description of the many biasing agents, these 
studies do not tell us whether natural psychological bias is so strong that it cannot be 
overcome by the advocacy of plaintiff’s counsel or by the directors’ knowledge that their 
evaluations will be reviewed by a court. Minimally, however, these factors strongly suggest 
there is bias in the boardroom favoring colleagues and disfavoring the derivative suit plaintiff. 
Furthermore, the preceding description offers no support for current assumptions that 
“outside” directors can be expected to act impartially, absent family or financial relationship 
with the defendants or a direct involvement in the underlying transaction. 
Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 107–08. 
 191. See, e.g., Dooley & Veasey, supra note 91, at 534 (“Were we less patient, we would be 
inclined to dismiss such broad brush attribution of character traits and feelings to masses of strangers 
as pop-psychology, the logic of which is irrefutable only because it is unprovable.”). 
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But dismissing structural bias for that reason would be imprudent. The 
appropriate question is whether it makes sense to be concerned about the 
issue. 
Confidence in directors’ judgment is a prerequisite to deference.192 
Such confidence is lacking when directors’ interests conflict with those of 
the shareholders.193 Unfortunately, the courts have held an overly narrow 
understanding of what constitutes a conflict.194 Structural bias forces a 
reconsideration of the issue. Each of the three paradigms proposed above 
demonstrates the difficulty of having confidence in directors’ judgment 
when they face conflicts of interest, even those that do not rise to the level 
of self-dealing. Without such confidence, the business judgment rule is 
inappropriate. 
Courts, however, insist upon proof before accepting a structural bias 
argument.195 The burden of proof is misplaced. Circumstances implicating 
structural bias should be enough to move the case out of the protection of 
the business judgment rule. Surely it is possible, perhaps even likely, that 
directors will do the right thing despite structural bias—just as it is 
possible for a party on both sides of a transaction to behave honorably.196 
But to invoke the entire fairness test, the plaintiff only needs to show a 
self-dealing transaction, not an actual abuse of trust by the directors.197 It 
 192. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 200–16 and accompanying 
text. 
 195. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 196. See 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 14, at 266–67. 
As the drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act explain: 
[T]he essential character of interest conflict is often, unfortunately, misunderstood by the 
public and the media (and sometimes misunderstood, too, by lawyers and judges). Interest 
conflicts can and often do lead to baneful acts. The law regulates interest conflict transactions 
because experience shows that people often do yield to the temptation to advance their self-
interests and, if they do, other people may be injured. That contingent fear is sufficient reason 
to warrant caution and to apply special standards and procedures to interest conflict 
transactions. 
 Nonetheless, it is important to keep firmly in mind that it is a contingent risk we are dealing with, 
that an interest conflict is not in itself a crime or a tort or necessarily injurious to others. Contrary to 
much popular usage, having a “conflict of interest” is not something one is “guilty of”; it is simply a 
state of affairs. Indeed, in many situations, the corporation and the shareholders may secure major 
benefits from a transaction despite the presence of a director’s conflicting interest. Id. (quoting MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–8.63, at 8-372, introductory cmt. (2002)). 
 197. The courts sometimes use language that suggest otherwise. For example, the Delaware 
Supreme Court has stated that “self-interest, alone, is not a disqualifying factor even for a director. To 
disqualify a director, for rule rebuttal purposes, there must be evidence of disloyalty.” Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 1993). However, that statement assumed “that the terms of 
8 Del.C. § 144 are met.” Id. A self-dealing transaction normally is adequate evidence of disloyalty, 
without proof of actual wrong-doing. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) 
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falls upon the directors to justify their behavior by establishing the fairness 
of the transaction. Similarly, to invoke the intermediate standards of 
review under Unocal or Zapata, the plaintiff need only show the 
appropriate class of circumstances, not a breach of fiduciary duty.198 The 
same general dynamic should apply to all cases involving structural bias. 
To be sure, the plaintiff should have the option of offering proof of lack 
of independence or actual wrongdoing. However, if the plaintiff can 
establish such a breach of the duty of loyalty as a matter of fact, then the 
entire fairness test should be applied.199 The relevant question is whether 
the directors should be afforded the deference of the business judgment 
rule in the absence of such proof. The “realities of the situation” and the 
“omnipresent specter” strongly suggest that they should not. An 
intermediate standard of review is the appropriate solution. 
Critics also argue that structural bias can be overcome in a way that 
would eliminate the need for judicial scrutiny. The standard way of 
dealing with conflicts of interest is to eliminate them by having issues 
decided by unconflicted parties, such as disinterested and independent 
directors.200 However, legal notions of disinterestedness and independence 
do not adequately address conflicts of interest that are less tangible in 
nature.201 In order to be considered “disinterested,” “directors can neither 
appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal 
financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a 
benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders 
generally.”202 Clearly the focus is on financial benefits.203 In order to be 
considered “independent,” “a director’s decision [must be] based on the 
(citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)). 
 198. See supra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2. 
 199. See, e.g., Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 363 (“To disqualify a director, for [business judgment] 
rule rebuttal purposes, there must be evidence of disloyalty. Examples of such misconduct include, but 
are not limited to, the motives of entrenchment . . . .”) (citations omitted). In Beam v. Stewart, 845 
A.2d 1040, 1043 (Del. 2004), the issue was not about the appropriate standard of review, but about 
demand futility. However, the issues are analogous. If demand is not futile, shareholders have to make 
a demand of the board of directors. The board’s decision is entitled to the business judgment rule. See 
Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1218–19 (Del. 1996). However, if demand is futile, shareholders 
are able to bring the derivative action on their own. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 
1993). 
 200. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 201. For a recent discussion of these concepts by the Delaware Court of Chancery, see Orman v. 
Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22–25 (Del. Ch. 2002) (defining and distinguishing “interest” and 
“independence”). 
 202. Id. at 23 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
 203. In fact, its focus on financial benefits is unduly narrow. Structural bias as implicit conspiracy 
is concerned with financial benefits, but is not covered by an approach that only focuses on financial 
benefits. See supra Part III.A. 
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corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous 
considerations or influences.”204 On its face, this definition would seem to 
be broad enough to extend beyond financial benefits. In fact, however, it 
does not go very far at all. The inquiry is whether the director is 
“controlled by”205 or “beholden to” another such that “[her] discretion 
would be sterilized.”206 A concept as subtle as structural bias—whether as 
implicit conspiracy, as relationship, or as psychological phenomenon—
generally is not covered. 
Moreover, the question courts now ask is not whether all of the 
directors qualify as disinterested and independent, but rather whether the 
board of directors does. Thus, the plaintiff generally must establish that a 
majority of the directors is interested or lacks independence.207 Even then, 
the board could avoid the entire fairness test by appointing a committee of 
disinterested and independent directors to decide the issue.208 This is far 
too deferential in light of the need for accountability. 
Until recently, it was assumed that a board consisting of a majority of 
outside directors could be trusted to make decisions in the interests of 
 204. Orman, 794 A.2d at 24 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816). 
 205. See Orman, 794 A.2d at 24 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815–16). 
 206. See id. (quoting Rales, 634 A.2d at 936). 
[Independence] . . . involves an inquiry into whether the director’s decision resulted from that 
director being controlled by another. A director can be controlled by another if in fact he is 
dominated by that other party, whether through close personal or familial relationship or 
through force of will. A director can also be controlled by another if the challenged director is 
beholden to the allegedly controlling entity. A director may be considered beholden to (and 
thus controlled by) another when the allegedly controlling entity has the unilateral power 
(whether direct or indirect through control over other decision makers), to decide whether the 
challenged director continues to receive a benefit, financial or otherwise, upon which the 
challenged director is so dependent or is of such subjective material importance to him that 
the threatened loss of that benefit might create a reason to question whether the controlled 
director is able to consider the corporate merits of the challenged transaction objectively. 
Id. at 25 n.50. 
 207. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 & n.8. 
As a general matter, the business judgment rule presumption that a board acted loyally can be 
rebutted by alleging facts which, if accepted as true, establish that the board was either 
interested in the outcome of the transaction or lacked the independence to consider 
objectively whether the transaction was in the best interest of its company and all of its 
shareholders. . . . To rebut successfully business judgment presumptions in this manner, 
thereby leading to the application of the entire fairness standard, a plaintiff must normally 
plead facts demonstrating “that a majority of the director defendants have a financial interest 
in the transaction or were dominated or controlled by a materially interested director.” 
Orman, 794 A.2d at 22 (footnotes omitted). But see id. (“I recognize situations can exist when the 
material interest of a number of directors less than a majority may rebut the business judgment 
presumption and lead to an entire fairness review.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See generally supra Part 
I.B.1. 
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shareholders. The recent financial scandals have exposed this fallacy. 
Enron’s collapse is particularly instructive: Enron’s board of directors was 
considered to be among the best in corporate America,209 and yet it proved 
to be a surprisingly ineffective monitor of management.210 Surely it is 
better to have decisions made by independent directors, under nearly any 
definition, than by interested parties. However, it is inappropriate to 
assume that such directors are truly unconflicted.211 
In response to recent events, the definition of independence has 
undergone revision on many fronts. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002212 
imposed stricter independence requirements for directors on audit 
committees,213 and the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock 
Market strengthened their own director independence requirements as 
well.214 It is arguable that courts, too, are taking a second look at these 
 209. See Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on the 
Role of Congress, in Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS 495, 504–05 (2004). 
[B]y all appearances, Enron’s board looked great. Of Enron’s 14 directors, only two (Kenneth 
Lay and Jeffrey Skilling) were insiders. The directors reflected a wide range of business, 
finance, accounting, and government experience. The board had all the committees one would 
hope to see . . . . Perhaps most important to the board’s monitoring role, the Enron audit 
committee had a model charter and was chaired by a former accounting professor who had 
served as the Dean of the Stanford Graduate School of Business. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 210. See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL 
AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, 107TH CONG., S. PRT. 107-70, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN 
ENRON’S COLLAPSE (2002) [hereinafter SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT]. The Senate Subcommittee found 
that, although Enron’s board had a “wealth of sophisticated business and investment experience and 
considerable expertise in accounting, derivatives, and structured finance,” id. at 8, it “failed to 
safeguard Enron shareholders and contributed to the collapse of the seventh largest public company in 
the United States, by allowing Enron to engage in high risk accounting, inappropriate conflict of 
interest transactions, extensive undisclosed off-the-books activities, and excessive executive 
compensation,” id. at 11; see also WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY 
THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 22–24 (Feb. 
1, 2002). “[T]he Board of Directors failed, in our judgment, in its oversight duties.” Id. at 22. 
 211. Even setting aside structural bias, notions of what qualifies as a financial conflict continually 
evolve. For example, although Enron’s board of directors mostly consisted of outsiders, see ENRON 
CORP. PROXY STATEMENT 3–7 (2001), and seemed the model of good corporate governance at the 
time, see supra note 209 and accompanying text, subsequent investigations found significant financial 
ties that reduced directors’ independence. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 210, at 51–53 
(discussing financial ties that reduced board independence). 
 212. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 213. See id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 775–76; see also Exchange Act Rule 10A-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-
3 (2004). The Act’s provisions dealing with auditor independence were far more extensive. See 
§§ 201–209, 116 Stat. at 745, 771–75 (2002); see also Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements 
Regarding Auditor Independence, Release No. 33-8183, 34-47,265, 35-27,642, IC-25,915, IA-2103, 
68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240, 249, and 274 (2003)), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/ rules/final/33-8183.htm. 
 214. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A; NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, 
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concepts.215 Such efforts clearly are worthwhile: the less conflicted the 
decision maker, the more appropriate it is to have confidence in her 
business judgment. However, the changes that have been made are not 
revolutionary; they merely extend the reach of the restrictions along 
existing lines.216 The concepts of disinterestedness and independence 
remain focused primarily on financial ties and, to that extent, remain 
inadequate. 
It is worth emphasizing that structural bias does not amount to an 
“implicit rejection of the value of disinterested outside directors;”217 nor 
does it suggest that “there is no relevant distinction between inside and 
outside directors.”218 The theory of structural bias merely recognizes the 
limits of director independence. When a conflict arises, it may be possible 
to find directors who are entirely disinterested from a financial perspective 
(although the implicit conspiracy theory suggests otherwise),219 but it is 
virtually impossible for directors to be unconflicted in all meaningful 
respects. The concept of structural bias instructs that less obvious conflicts 
must be taken seriously, and an intermediate standard of review is 
necessary to deal with them. 
IV. REVIEW FOR SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS 
The business judgment rule and the entire fairness test are 
complementary doctrines. The key insight of the former is that directors 
generally can be trusted; that is why its judicial review is so deferential. 
The key insight of the latter is that directors cannot be trusted when they 
are conflicted; that is why its judicial review is so exacting. The extreme 
divergence between the two standards of review, however, means that 
there are bound to be situations in which neither seems quite appropriate. 
It was argued above that structural bias is the root of the problem: there are 
many situations which do not involve self-dealing transactions and yet do 
INC. MARKETPLACE RULES IM-4200, IM-4350-4.  
 215. See, e.g., Amy Borrus, Less Laissez-Faire in Delaware?, BUS. WK., Mar. 22, 2004, at 80 
(citing In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003), and In re eBay, Inc. 
S’holder Litig., No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2004), as examples of 
Delaware courts “put[ting] independence under a microscope”). 
 216. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 149, at 25 (“Although these new requirements have 
attracted a great deal of attention, . . . they merely make mandatory a practice that most public 
companies already have been following for some time. Thus it seems unlikely that these new 
requirements, by themselves, will greatly change the relationship between executives and their 
boards.”). 
 217. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 91, at 535. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text. 
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involve serious conflicts of interest. In such situations, a balance must be 
struck between the deference of the business judgment rule and the rigor 
of the entire fairness test: judicial review must be meaningful, but not 
excessive. 
This Part will propose and defend an intermediate standard of review to 
address the issue of structural bias. It will begin by arguing that a 
moderate review of the substance of directors’ decisions best bridges the 
gap between the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test. It then 
will argue that a reasonableness standard, properly qualified, is the 
appropriate substantive standard. After sketching the outlines of an 
appropriate reasonableness standard, it will address some of the 
shortcomings of that standard and how they might be handled. 
A. Lessons Learned 
In order to devise an appropriate standard of review, one must first 
assess the needs that the standard is intended to serve.220 When the 
standard is an intermediate one, it must bridge the gap between the two 
extreme standards. This section will review the lessons learned thus far in 
order to determine the boundaries of the endeavor. 
1. Need for Substantive Review  
The business judgment rule focuses primarily on the decision making 
process221 while the entire fairness test carefully scrutinizes the substance 
of the decision itself.222 An important question, then, is whether an 
intermediate standard should focus on process or substance. 
It would be possible for an intermediate standard of review to focus on 
process. After all, the various standards of review all have a process 
component. The business judgment rule subjects the directors’ decision 
making process to review for gross negligence.223 The entire fairness test 
demands that the process be entirely fair.224 An intermediate standard of 
review presumably should strike a balance between the two. An obvious 
 220. See generally Allen et al., supra note 3, at 867–71. 
 221. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 224. Actually, the demands of the entire fairness test are slightly more nuanced. It is not easy to 
articulate accurately either component of the entire fairness test because they are not two separate 
tests; rather, they must combine to produce a result that is entirely fair overall. See supra note 47 and 
accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 821 Velasco book pages.doc4/6/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
872 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:821 
 
 
 
 
 
 
candidate would be an ordinary negligence standard—the typical standard 
for breach of duty in non-corporate settings.225 
In fact, however, corporate standards of review generally have both a 
process and a substance component. The business judgment rule, for 
example, allows review of the substance of business decisions for 
irrationality or waste.226 Although this is an extremely deferential standard, 
substance is not completely beyond review. The entire fairness test 
reviews the substance of directors’ decisions for fairness.227 Courts have 
recognized that the substance of a decision can be sufficiently fair that it 
may be treated as the preponderant consideration under the entire fairness 
test.228 Thus, it is easy to view the business judgment rule as primarily 
concerning process and the entire fairness test as primarily concerning 
substance. Nevertheless, both standards have the two components. 
It stands to reason, then, that an intermediate standard of review also 
should have both a process and a substance component. Because 
negligence is a logical candidate for an intermediate standard of review for 
process, it very well might make sense for courts to apply it in the 
appropriate case. However, the issue of the appropriate standard for 
process review will be considered later.229 
In order to combat structural bias, an intermediate standard of review 
must include meaningful review of the substance of directors’ decisions. 
Good procedures cannot guarantee good results; they can only increase the 
likelihood of good results. Even so, requiring directors to follow a careful 
decision making process is sensible because it is likely to lead to better 
business judgments. However, if the decision maker’s good faith or 
loyalty is questionable, a careful process is not nearly so valuable; in the 
absence of good faith or loyalty, it is meaningless. If substance is beyond 
review, any amount of process can be overcome to reach the desired 
result: the decision maker need only hear the evidence before rejecting it. 
Minimal review of substance, such as that provided by the business 
judgment rule, is not much more difficult to overcome.230 
Lawyers can be very helpful in laying the groundwork for a finding of 
adequate process. The case of Smith v. Van Gorkom231 serves as a useful 
example. In that case, shareholders challenged a merger on the grounds 
 225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(b) (1965). 
 226. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 229. See infra notes 301–02 and accompanying text. 
 230. Cf. supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 231. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
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that directors had breached their duty of care in approving the transaction. 
The Delaware Supreme Court found for the plaintiffs.232 In the course of 
its opinion, the court admonished the directors for a number of procedural 
shortcomings: the meeting at which the decision was made was too short; 
there was insufficient advance notice; the directors had not read the 
relevant documents; and there was no fairness opinion from an investment 
bank.233 The court’s intuition was sensible enough: with more notice, 
enough time to read the documents and debate the merits of the merger, 
and the advice of professionals, directors are likely to reach better 
decisions. Even if the end result is the same, shareholders and the courts 
would have more confidence in the decision. The problem is that the 
lawyers for the directors in the next case will have read the Van Gorkom 
opinion. They will know the pitfalls and will arrange to avoid them 
without necessarily modifying the directors’ underlying intentions or 
motives. Thus, the directors will be provided the relevant documents in 
advance—but that will not ensure that they actually will read them. They 
will have a longer meeting—but that will mean little if the directors feel 
perfectly capable of deciding the matter more quickly. They will even 
secure a fairness opinion from investment bankers—but a fairness opinion 
sought and paid for by management is not very reliable.234 In short, 
process is manipulable. Lawyers can help directors appear more careful 
without necessarily making any meaningful changes in behavior. Directors 
 232. Id. at 864. 
 233. See id. at 874–76. To be fair, the court’s rationale was stated broadly and did not depend 
entirely on the individual details listed above. However, even the court’s own summary of its reasons 
suggests the importance of those details: 
The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom’s role in forcing 
the “sale” of the Company and in establishing the per share purchase price; (2) were 
uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company; and (3) given these circumstances, at a 
minimum, were grossly negligent in approving the “sale” of the Company upon two hours’ 
consideration, without prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or emergency. 
Id. at 874. 
 234. Investment banks have been known to provide highly questionable fairness opinions. See, 
e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1272–73 (Del. 1989). 
Notwithstanding the fact that on May 30 both . . . had given opinions that the management 
restructuring, with a value of $64.15, was fair, and on June 7 had advised the board that the 
company had a maximum breakup value of $80 per share, [the two investment banking firms] 
issued new opinions on August 25 that $80 was unfair and inadequate. 
Id.; see also William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and Why We Should Do 
Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523, 523–24 (1992) (listing further examples). This has led many 
legal scholars to question the value and reliability of such opinions generally. See, e.g., Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They And What Can Be Done About It?, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 27; Charles M. Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or Should We Care?, 53 
OHIO ST. L.J. 951 (1992). 
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almost certainly will be interested in such appearances, if only to avoid 
liability.235 
Even assuming good faith on the part of directors, process is likely to 
be of limited usefulness if structural bias is the issue. This is true with 
respect to any of the three paradigms: under the weakest form of implicit 
conspiracy theory, directors are likely to share the same point of view;236 
under the relationship theory, directors are likely to trust their friends and 
colleagues;237 and under the psychological phenomenon theory, directors 
are likely to favor the ingroup unconsciously.238 After any amount of 
process, directors will have a tendency to come to the same conclusions. It 
is this tendency that undermines confidence in directors’ judgment and 
demands recourse to a substantive review of their decisions. 
The key insight of the entire fairness test is that directors cannot be 
trusted when they face conflicts of interest.239 With the entire fairness test, 
the courts wisely recognized that they must step in and review not only the 
decision making process, but also the substance of the business decision in 
question. Although courts may be unqualified to do so,240 conflicted 
directors are even worse.241 This logic is as applicable to structural bias as 
it is to self-dealing. The only difference is one of degree: just as structural 
bias is not necessarily as acute a problem as self-dealing, so the 
substantive scrutiny in an intermediate standard of review need not be as 
strict as in the entire fairness test. 
2. Need for Latitude 
Situations involving structural bias often are very different than 
situations involving self-dealing. Self-dealing transactions usually can be 
avoided altogether. In fact, historically they were not permitted; eventually 
they were allowed because they can be beneficial to the corporation.242 To 
protect against abuse by the conflicted party, however, the courts review 
such transactions for fairness. Nevertheless, self-dealing transactions 
 235. Directors often will not personally be liable for breaches of the duty of care because of 
charter provisions adopted pursuant to statutory authorization. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 102(b)(7) (2001). However, even directors who cannot be held financially liable nevertheless will be 
interested in avoiding the embarrassment that would follow a holding of carelessness. 
 236. See supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra notes 158, 162 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra notes 166–71 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 44, 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
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remain optional, and could be restricted in any number of ways or 
outlawed altogether. 
Situations involving structural bias generally are not avoidable. Often, 
they are initiated by third parties and require a response by the directors. 
Takeovers and derivative litigation are examples. Sometimes the situation 
is not initiated by third parties, as with executive compensation decisions. 
Even then, however, the situation is not avoidable and absolutely demands 
the business judgment of directors. In order to respond appropriately, 
directors need the kind of discretion and freedom that is provided by the 
business judgment rule.243 The problem is that there is a conflict of 
interest, so the deference of the business judgment rule is inappropriate. 
In situations involving self-dealing, strict scrutiny under the entire 
fairness test makes sense. After all, the alternative would be a blanket 
prohibition. A compromise that allows a transaction to proceed only if the 
court is persuaded of the merits of the transaction is an improvement from 
the directors’ perspective. Directors can avoid the scrutiny simply by 
avoiding the transaction that gives rise to it. In situations involving 
structural bias, however, the entire fairness test makes less sense. Directors 
do not have the option of avoiding such situations, nor can the courts or 
the legislature issue a blanket prohibition. External circumstances simply 
demand the exercise of the directors’ business judgment. Court 
involvement is much more of an interference, and therefore must be 
carefully circumscribed. Applying the entire fairness test could prove 
disastrous because of the possibility that no response could be defensible 
as “entirely fair.”244 While it makes sense to have directors hesitate to 
engage in self-dealing unless they can establish that the transaction is 
entirely fair, it would be unwise to make directors too hesitant with respect 
to situations involving structural bias. Thus, the courts must afford 
directors significant latitude for the exercise of discretion. 
Of course, too much deference is also problematic. In situations 
involving structural bias, the business judgment rule is inappropriate 
because directors are conflicted. It is not clear that the judgment of a 
conflicted expert is better than the judgment of an impartial layman. 
Courts must take this into account in setting the appropriate level of 
scrutiny. 
 243. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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B. Substantive Reasonableness 
The discussion thus far indicates that any standard addressing structural 
bias must go beyond mere process and inquire into the substance of the 
actions taken, while also affording directors significant latitude for the 
exercise of discretion.245 Thus, what is needed is a moderate review of the 
substance of the directors’ decisions. A review for substantive 
reasonableness, properly implemented, fits this role neatly. 
1. Outlines of Reasonableness 
In order to maintain a claim in a situation involving structural bias, the 
plaintiff should have to establish that the directors’ decision was 
unreasonable. Reasonableness is a concept with which the corporate 
lawyer is acquainted already. Thus, familiar concepts should help in 
sketching the outlines of the appropriate intermediate standard. 
To begin, reasonableness is a standard that is significantly more 
demanding than the business judgment rule’s rationality standard.246 The 
American Law Institute’s explanation of the distinction is a helpful one: 
It is recognized that the word “rational,” which is widely used by 
courts, has a close etymological tie to the word “reasonable” and 
that, at times, the words have been used almost interchangeably. But 
a sharp distinction is being drawn between the words here. The 
phrase “rationally believes” is intended to permit a significantly 
wider range of discretion than the term “reasonable,” and to give a 
director or officer a safe harbor from liability for business 
judgments that might arguably fall outside the term “reasonable” 
but are not so removed from the realm of reason when made that 
liability should be incurred.247 
 245. See supra Part IV.A. 
 246. It has been said that the substantive review of the business judgment rule is limited to 
decisions that are “so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially 
inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.” In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 
(Del. Ch. 1988), cited in Parnes v. Bally Entm’t. Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999); see also 
Allen, supra note 3, at 868 (“[T]he business judgment review standard (‘rationality’) diverges from, 
and [is] more lenient than, the normative standard of conduct (‘reasonableness’).”); Eisenberg, supra 
note 18, at 442–43 (“[T]he prevalent formulation of the standard of review [for substance] under the 
business judgment rule . . . is that the decision must be rational. This rationality standard of review is 
much easier to satisfy than a prudence or reasonability standard.”). 
 247. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 15, § 4.01 cmt.; see also id., 
Comment to § 4.01(c) cmt. f (“Sound public policy dictates that directors and officers be given greater 
protection than courts and commentators using a ‘reasonableness’ test would afford. Indeed, some 
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Almost any decision reached by a competent board of directors ought 
to be considered rational: it is hard to imagine such a board coming to “a 
decision that cannot be coherently explained.”248 It is not nearly so 
problematic to suggest that a board decision is objectively unreasonable. 
This is because, while most actors behave rationally most of the time, 
many actors behave unreasonably at least some of the time.249 Thus, 
review for substantive reasonableness would limit the opportunity of 
conflicted directors to misbehave more meaningfully than the business 
judgment rule. 
However, a reasonableness standard does not require that decisions be 
ideal; even the entire fairness test does not demand perfection.250 Rather, a 
reasonableness standard demands only that the decision be one that a 
prudent and impartial decision maker could realistically—as opposed to 
merely hypothetically—consider wise. Thus, the plaintiff should have to 
establish that the decision reached by the board of directors was one that 
could not be expected of a prudent and impartial decision maker. 
The proposed standard would allow directors a considerable amount of 
discretion. The intended latitude is captured suitably by a portion of the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s discussion of the “range of reasonableness” 
under the Unocal test:251 
courts and commentators, even when using a ‘reasonableness’ test, have expressly indicated that they 
do not intend that business judgments be given the rigorous review that the word ‘reasonable’ may be 
read to imply.”). But cf. William T. Allen, et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due 
Care With Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny As a Standard of 
Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 452 n.13 (2002) (“Admittedly, the distinction between 
‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’ actions is often subtle and elusive to grasp. Linguistically, it is odd to think 
of a board decision as unreasonable yet ‘rational,’ since both concepts rest in great part on whether the 
conduct was logical in the circumstances.”). 
 248. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 443. This is why the business judgment rule is so deferential. 
See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 249. See Allen et al., supra note 247, at 452 (“[A]n irrational decision [is] one that is so blatantly 
imprudent that it is inexplicable, in the sense that no well-motivated and minimally informed person 
could have made it. By contrast, even the best of us will occasionally make a lapse in judgment or a 
factual error that a judge could later second-guess as ‘unreasonable’ . . . .”); Eisenberg, supra note 18, 
at 443 (“To see how exceptional a rationality standard is, we need only think about the judgments we 
make in everyday life. It is common to characterize a person’s conduct as imprudent or unreasonable, 
but it is very uncommon to characterize a person’s conduct as irrational.”); see also Neil MacCormick, 
Reasonableness and Objectivity, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1575, 1580 (1999) (“Perfectly reasonable 
people would doubtless be unreal paragons of virtue. There are few to be found. Ordinary people are 
not; but most are reasonable some of the time and some are reasonable most of the time.”). 
 250. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306–07 (1930) (“The essence of the test [of intrinsic 
fairness] is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s 
length bargain.”); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995) (“A finding of 
perfection is not a sine qua non in an entire fairness analysis.”) (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 
A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983)). 
 251. But see infra notes 259–64 and accompanying text. 
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[A] court applying judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the 
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a 
board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should 
not second guess that choice even though it might have decided 
otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s 
determination. Thus, courts . . . will determine if the directors’ 
decision was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness.252 
Reasonableness is a relational concept.253 Thus, the circumstances of 
the board’s decision must be considered. Factors such as uncertainty, time 
pressure, and available options should factor into the analysis. Also 
important would be the extent of the directors’ independence:254 a close 
call might be deemed reasonable if it were to come from a newly 
appointed director who has had no contacts with the company or its 
directors, and unreasonable if it were to come from the defendant’s college 
roommate. However, it cannot be forgotten that the very reason for the 
intermediate standard of review is that all directors share in structural bias 
to some extent.255 
Review for substantive reasonableness satisfies the two criteria 
specified above.256 First, it inquires into the substantive merits of the 
directors’ decision. Regardless of the process employed by the directors, 
decisions that are unreasonable will not be upheld. Thus, biases, whether 
conscious or unconscious, will not go unchecked. Second, it affords a 
significant amount of latitude without being overly deferential. Plaintiffs 
will prevail only if they can establish that the directors’ decisions were 
unreasonable, in the sense of being outside the range of reasonableness. 
 252. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1385–86 (Del. 1995) (quoting Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994)); see also MacCormick, 
supra note 249, at 1582 (“[O]n some questions, or in relation to some decisions, there may be more 
than one reasonable answer or, at least, a range of answers that cannot be shown to be, or dismissed as, 
unreasonable.”). 
 An important part of the quote in the text has been omitted deliberately. See infra note 260 and 
accompanying text. 
 253. See MacCormick, supra note 249, at 1577. 
A value like “reasonable” may be very context-sensitive . . . . [T]here may be many factors 
which in any given situation have to be considered and assessed in judging the reasonableness 
of an act . . . or a decision in its concrete context. For this reason and in this sense, 
“reasonableness” taken out of context is . . . a “legal category of indeterminate reference.” 
Id. 
 254. Independence is not a binary issue. A disinterested outsider is more independent than a 
disinterested insider, and one disinterested outsider may be more independent than another. 
 255. See supra Part III. 
 256. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, review for substantive reasonableness charts a middle course 
between the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test. 
2. Hostile Takeover and Derivative Litigation Standards Distinguished 
It is important to note that the proposed standard of substantive 
reasonableness is not one that already has been adopted by the Delaware 
courts.257 Despite the fact that the term “reasonable” is employed with 
respect to the existing intermediate standards of review, the proposed 
standard is significantly different. 
Under the second prong of the Unocal test, which is known as the 
proportionality test, the court purports to determine whether the actions 
taken fall within a “range of reasonableness.”258 The concept was a 
promising one, and some of the discussion was quoted above.259 However, 
in a portion of the discussion omitted from the above quote, the court 
stated clearly that, under the proportionality test, “Courts will not 
substitute their business judgment for that of directors . . . .”260 This sort of 
deference is very reminiscent of the business judgment rule, and is 
inappropriate when structural bias is an issue. The Delaware Supreme 
Court went on to dilute the standard further. In Unitrin, Inc. v. American 
General Corp.,261 the court recharacterized the proportionality test by 
suggesting that non-draconian defenses are to be deemed reasonable.262 
This is an unfortunate non-sequitur: while draconian action may be 
unreasonable per se,263 it does not follow that non-draconian action is 
necessarily reasonable. Thus, the court reduced the proportionality test to 
the limited role of screening out only the most extreme behavior.264 
 257. Cf. In re PSE&G S’holders Litig., 801 A.2d 295, 312 (N.J. 2002) (adopting “a modified 
business judgment rule” that inquires into the reasonableness of the board’s decision). 
 258. See supra notes 105, 107 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra notes 251–52 and accompanying text. 
 260. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386 (Del. 1995) (quoting Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45–46 (Del. 1994)); see also Unitrin, 651 
A.2d at 1388 (“The ratio decidendi for the ‘range of reasonableness’ standard is a need of the board of 
directors for latitude in discharging its fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders when 
defending against perceived threats. The concomitant requirement is for judicial restraint.”). 
 261. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 262. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
 263. It is also not clear that draconian action is necessarily unreasonable. See Velasco, supra note 
96, at 420 & n.245 (arguing that Unocal itself involved draconian defenses that were reasonable under 
the circumstances); see also infra notes 316–22 and accompanying text. 
 264. The Unocal test arguably does not even screen out draconian defenses very well. See 
Velasco, supra note 96, at 422 (arguing that poison pill, often upheld under Unocal, is draconian); see 
also infra notes 335–47 and accompanying text. 
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The standard proposed in this Article would have significantly more 
bite. Aware of structural bias, the courts should not be overly concerned 
with substituting their own business judgment for that of conflicted 
directors. They should, with confidence, determine whether the decision in 
question was unreasonable under the circumstances. The only deference 
that courts should show would come from the breadth of the term 
“reasonable”—which is significant, but not boundless. The extreme 
deference that would normally be afforded to directors under the business 
judgment rule should not apply.265 
Despite the inevitable concerns, review for substantive reasonableness 
would not amount to a substitution of a court’s business judgment for that 
of directors. In this respect, it differs significantly from the Zapata test.266 
Zapata provides that, after a review of the directors’ independence and the 
procedures employed, the courts are empowered to reject the directors’ 
decision and apply their own business judgment in reaching a different 
decision if they conclude that the circumstances warrant.267 This is justly 
criticized on the grounds that courts do not have the appropriate skills to 
make business judgments.268 
Under Zapata, courts are authorized to reject the independent directors’ 
decision in favor of a superior one.269 Review for substantive 
reasonableness is very different. Rather than make their own business 
judgments, courts merely review the directors’ decisions and reject those 
that are shown to be unreasonable. It is not a substitution of a superior 
decision, only the rejection of a demonstrably poor one. This is the type of 
exercise with respect to which courts are competent. It is the same exercise 
as in the entire fairness test, where directors are required to defend their 
actions and courts are required to decide whether they have done so.270 
The difference between the entire fairness test and review for substantive 
reasonableness is the burden imposed on directors: in the former, directors 
must establish that their actions were entirely fair, while in the latter, 
directors must only defend their decisions as not unreasonable. 
The judicial standards for derivative litigation must be distinguished 
from the proposed standard in another important respect as well. In 
Aronson v. Lewis,271 the Delaware Supreme Court announced a 
 265. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 267. See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra text accompanying note 121. 
 270. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
 271. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). This case is discussed at supra notes 76–79 and accompanying 
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“reasonable doubt” standard to determine whether demand should be 
considered futile.272 The standard of reasonableness in Aronson is entirely 
unlike that in the proposed standard. Although the Aronson court stated 
that “the Court of Chancery must make two inquiries, one into the 
independence and disinterestedness of the directors and the other into the 
substantive nature of the challenged transaction and the board’s approval 
thereof,”273 the second inquiry does not amount to a review for substantive 
reasonableness. 
In the case of Grimes v. Donald,274 the court reaffirmed the Aronson 
“reasonable doubt” standard275 and elaborated on its meaning: 
“Reasonable doubt can be said to mean that there is reason to doubt.”276 
This is not particularly helpful. However, the court continued: “Stated 
obversely, the concept of reasonable doubt is akin to the concept that the 
stockholder has a ‘reasonable belief’ that the board lacks independence or 
that the transaction was not protected by the business judgment rule.”277 
This is hardly an obvious interpretation of “reasonable doubt”: to doubt a 
fact is not the same as to believe the opposite fact. This standard sets a 
very high threshold for the plaintiff who, it seems, must justify as 
reasonable not merely skepticism, but an affirmative belief. 
In the case of Beam v. Stewart,278 the Delaware Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of “the quantum of doubt about a director’s 
independence that is ‘reasonable’ in order to excuse a presuit demand.”279 
The court framed the issue in terms of the strong presumption of the 
business judgment rule and held that “[t]he court must determine whether 
a plaintiff has alleged particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt of a 
director’s independence to rebut the presumption at the pleading stage.”280 
This burden is difficult to meet because the presumption that must be 
rebutted is powerful.281 Moreover, in the course of their analyses, both the 
Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery italicized the term 
reasonable, apparently in an effort to highlight the fact that not all doubts 
text. 
 272. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 273. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
 274. 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996). 
 275. See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1217 (“[T]he term is apt and achieves the proper balance.”). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 1217 n.17. 
 278. 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004). This case is discussed at supra notes 80–89 and accompanying 
text. 
 279. Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1048. 
 280. Id. at 1049 (emphasis added). 
 281. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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are sufficient to rebut the presumption.282 The ultimate holding in the case 
confirmed the demanding nature of the standard.283 
The proposed standard of substantive reasonableness is nothing like 
Delaware’s reasonable doubt standard. In the first place, the presumption 
of the business judgment rule would not be applied. Moreover, the two 
standards evince a very different understanding of the breadth of the term 
“reasonableness.” To those familiar with criminal law, the term 
“reasonable doubt” suggests a very low standard.284 A small doubt will 
suffice, although not a fanciful one.285 Delaware’s reasonable doubt 
standard bears no relation to that standard;286 only a doubt with a solid 
foundation seems to qualify. The criminal law standard is far more 
consistent with an ordinary interpretation of reasonableness in that it 
allows the doubter considerable latitude, while Delaware’s standard does 
not. 
Ultimately, the Delaware reasonable doubt standard should be 
scrapped. As has been argued, the proposed standard of substantive 
 282. Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1051 (“[Courts] must review the complaint . . . to determine whether it 
states with particularity facts indicating that a relationship . . . is so close that the director’s 
independence may reasonably be doubted.”); id. at 1050 (quoting Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 979 
(Del. Ch. 2003)) (“Some professional or personal friendships . . . may raise a reasonable doubt whether 
a director can appropriately consider demand. . . . Not all friendships, or even most of them, rise to this 
level and the Court cannot make a reasonable inference that a particular friendship does so without 
specific factual allegations to support such a conclusion.”). 
 283. The court found that the facts did not create a reasonable doubt about directors’ 
independence and so demand was not futile. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 284. See generally Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994). See also Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 
39, 41 (1990) (“[T]he words ‘substantial’ and ‘grave,’ as they are commonly understood, suggest a 
higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable-doubt standard.”). Actually, 
criminal law is more accustomed to speaking of the standard “beyond a reasonable doubt” as a very 
high standard. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (“a subjective state of near 
certitude”), which is the corollary of a very low standard for reasonable doubt. 
 285. Compare Victor, 511 U.S. at 20 (describing reasonable doubt as “a doubt that would cause a 
reasonable person to hesitate to act”), with id. at 17 (“A fanciful doubt is not a reasonable doubt.”). 
 286. Judge Easterbrook of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressed 
his frustration with the Aronson standard as follows: 
The reference to “reasonable doubt” summons up the standard applied in criminal law. It is a 
demanding standard, meaning at least a 90% likelihood that the defendant is guilty. If 
“reasonable doubt” in the Aronson formula means the same thing as “reasonable doubt” in 
criminal law, then demand is excused whenever there is a 10% chance that the original 
transaction is not protected by the business judgment rule. Why should demand be excused on 
such a slight showing? Surely not because courts want shareholders to file suit whenever 
there is an 11% likelihood that the business judgment rule will not protect a transaction. 
Aronson did not say, and later cases have not supplied the deficit. If “reasonable doubt” in 
corporate law means something different from “reasonable doubt” in criminal law, however, 
what is the difference?, and why use the same term for two different things? 
Starrels v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1175 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted). 
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reasonableness should be applied in all cases involving structural bias. As 
will be argued, that includes all decisions relating to derivative litigation, 
whatever the setting.287 Thus, the proposed standard will supplant not only 
the Zapata test, but also the Aronson test.288 There will be no need for the 
reasonable doubt standard. 
C. Shortcomings 
Critics are likely to raise at least three arguments against the proposed 
standard, all of which are rooted in the indeterminate nature of the concept 
of reasonableness. The first is that a reasonableness standard is too 
amorphous and does not provide much guidance. The second is that a 
reasonableness standard is too malleable and capable of collapsing into the 
business judgment rule. The third is that implementing a reasonableness 
standard would be too costly for society because of the increase in 
litigation expenses that it may occasion. Each of these arguments will be 
considered in turn. 
Some critics may complain that a reasonableness standard is too 
amorphous and does not provide much guidance. While reasonableness is 
an objective standard, it can “be applied only as mediated through the 
subjectivity of the judge.”289 However, the same could be said for virtually 
any standard, including “fairness.”290 Courts are required to apply 
indeterminate standards all the time. While directors might prefer more 
certainty, so would any other fiduciary or potential litigant—but the 
business judgment rule is not available to provide special treatment.291 
In any event, the proposed standard is not so indeterminate. Because 
the range of reasonableness affords the directors significant latitude, the 
proposed standard should neither be too difficult for the courts to apply 
nor involve the courts in business affairs too heavily. It is more likely that 
courts would err on the side of less intrusion. Too little accountability for 
directors would not be warranted. However, as long as the standard, as 
applied, does not approach the deference of the business judgment rule’s 
 287. See infra notes 370–71 and accompanying text. 
 288. See infra notes 372–76 and accompanying text. 
 289. See MacCormick, supra note 249, at 1576. 
 290. See Mitchell, supra note 137, at 444 (“The attempt to identify and articulate the content of 
the fairness test is, predictably, frustrating. Courts and commentators long have decried this ephemeral 
nature of the standard, but efforts to make the test more determinate . . . themselves have dissolved 
into indeterminacy . . .”). 
 291. It is only the business judgment rule that gives directors a greater claim to deference than 
other fiduciaries such as doctors, attorneys, or auditors. Cf. supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
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rationality standard, there would be some benefit to an intermediate 
standard.292 
Other critics may complain that the standard is too malleable and 
capable of collapsing into the business judgment rule. Unocal, for 
example, sounded promising at first and later proved to be relatively 
ineffectual.293 Adopting a test that sounds a lot like the Unocal test could 
easily lead to a similar result. However, the court in Unocal laid the seeds 
of the standard’s destruction from the beginning.294 By tying the test so 
closely to the business judgment rule, the court doomed Unocal to be of 
limited significance.295 The standard proposed in this Article is born of the 
need for a truly intermediate standard of review and is firmly ensconced 
between the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test. In fact, the 
deference of the business judgment rule, which was the downfall of the 
Unocal standard, is explicitly rejected because of the directors’ conflicting 
interests.296 In that sense, the proposed standard resembles the entire 
fairness test. Thus, it should not be as easy for the proposed standard to 
drift towards the business judgment rule.297 
The third and most significant critique of the reasonableness standard is 
that its adoption would be too costly for society because of an associated 
increase in litigation expenses.298 It cannot be denied that replacing the 
business judgment rule with an intermediate standard of review would be 
likely to cause an increase in litigation expenses, at least at the margin. 
The number of lawsuits filed would increase because litigants (or 
litigators) who do not foresee a reasonable opportunity for success under 
the business judgment rule may come to a different conclusion under a 
review for substantive reasonableness. However, the proposed standard 
should not have a dramatic effect on the legal landscape or corresponding 
 292. Cf. MacCormick, supra note 249, at 1586–87 (“Even though different people can come to 
different evaluations in . . . questions of balance, and a variety of evaluations could be accepted as 
falling within the range of reasonable opinions . . . the range has some limits. Some opinions are so 
eccentric or idiosyncratic that they are not accepted as valid judgments at all.”). 
 293. See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text. 
 294. See, e.g., supra notes 106, 260 and accompanying text. 
 295. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he 
business judgment rule, including the standards by which director conduct is judged, is applicable in 
the context of a takeover.”); id. at 955 (“[Directors] satisfy that burden ‘by showing good faith and 
reasonable investigation . . . .’”) (citation omitted); id. at 957 (“If the board of directors is disinterested, 
has acted in good faith and with due care, its decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion will be 
upheld as a proper exercise of business judgment.”). 
 296. See supra text accompanying note 265. 
 297. Of course, a determined court could easily make this happen. But a determined court likely 
would never adopt the proposed standard in the first place. 
 298. Cf. supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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litigation volume and expense. The proposed standard would extend the 
reach of judicial review modestly beyond the business judgment rule, 
which currently covers only the most extreme circumstances. Under the 
proposed standard, the vast majority of business decisions should be 
upheld without difficulty. 
Nevertheless, critics will maintain that, despite the intention, a 
significant increase in litigation expenses would be the inevitable result. 
This is because reasonableness seems to be a question of fact: as such, it 
generally could not be decided on the pleadings and often would require a 
trial. Thus, the cost of defending against lawsuits would increase 
dramatically because many cases that would have been dismissed on the 
pleadings under the business judgment rule would survive motions for 
summary judgment under the proposed standard. The expense and 
disruption involved with discovery and trial are considerable. Because 
situations involving structural bias are far more common than situations in 
which judicial interference is ultimately justified,299 critics may argue that 
adopting the proposed standard would not benefit shareholders or society. 
This concern is a valid one, but does not carry the day. The business 
judgment rule permits dismissal of many cases, which allows for 
tremendous savings in litigation expenses. The entire fairness test, on the 
other hand, generally does not permit dismissal and does require 
significant expenditures on litigation.300 The increase in litigation costs is 
great, but justified based on the relative estimates of the merits of the 
underlying claims, the need for accountability, and the benefits that can be 
expected from litigation. Similarly, an intermediate standard would be 
worthwhile if the benefits of litigation justify the increased cost. 
Because the proposed standard is intended to have a relatively modest 
effect on plaintiffs’ chances for success on the merits, it ought to minimize 
wasteful litigation expenses by preserving the ability of the courts to grant 
dismissals and summary judgments in most cases.301 An ordinary 
negligence standard for process review would be problematic. Negligence 
is a question of fact that cannot easily be resolved without a trial, and 
almost certainly not on the pleadings. Discovery would become routine, 
and trials would become common. The effect on both litigation volume 
 299. See supra notes 250–55 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra note 64. 
 301. Judicial review must balance the competing values of authority and accountability. See supra 
notes 1–3 and accompanying text. Just as “losses tolerated by judicial abstention must be outweighed 
by benefits elsewhere in the system,” Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 110, so too 
must losses tolerated by judicial intervention be outweighed by benefits elsewhere in the system. 
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and expense could be dramatic. By contrast, the gross negligence standard 
allows the courts to cut off wasteful litigation early while allowing the 
closer cases to proceed. Thus, a gross negligence standard for process 
review seems more appropriate.302 
As for substance review, the range of reasonableness is more analogous 
to gross negligence than ordinary negligence. There should be a 
presumption that a business decision is reasonable, although the 
presumption would be weaker than under the business judgment rule. With 
such a presumption, however, the issue of reasonableness under the 
proposed standard can, and should, be decided as a question of law, at 
least as a threshold matter.303 Treating “reasonableness” as a question of 
law as a threshold matter would be compatible with existing corporate law 
practices. The courts treat the presumption of the business judgment rule 
as a matter of law.304 This is also how the courts handle the “reasonable 
doubt” standard in Aronson.305 This treatment makes sense for the 
proposed standard as well, given the intended breadth of the range of 
reasonableness. This would allow courts to decide the issue on the 
pleadings in many cases. Only when the circumstances warrant—when the 
pleadings are sufficiently promising—would a case be permitted to 
proceed, forcing the company to incur the expense of discovery and trial. 
Any increase in litigation expenses also would be minimized by the 
procedural hurdles of derivative litigation, especially the requirement of 
particularized allegations. As will be argued, these procedural hurdles 
have the effect of reducing litigation volume and expense significantly.306 
Because most cases involving structural bias must be pursued by means of 
derivative litigation, these procedural hurdles will help keep down 
litigation expenses resulting from the proposed standard. 
 302. It may be that “gross negligence,” as applied by the courts is a bit too deferential. However, 
cases such as Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), suggest otherwise. See Allen et al., 
supra note 3, at 872–74 (arguing that the Van Gorkom court actually applied ordinary negligence 
standard). 
 Gross negligence is not the only alternative to ordinary negligence. A reasonableness standard 
could be employed for both the substance and process components of review, as is the case with the 
fairness standard. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 303. Although the ultimate issue could be decided as a question of fact in close cases, the court 
would be able to decide, as a matter of law, whether the pleadings are sufficient to raise a legitimate 
issue under the proposed standard. 
 304. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra notes 271–83 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 284–87 and accompanying 
text (disagreeing with court’s substantive interpretation of reasonableness). Reasonableness is also 
decided as a matter of law in certain other contexts, such as Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, 
e.g., Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690 (1996). 
 306. See infra notes 350–51, 359–69 and accompanying text. 
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In short, the additional cost to society will not be nearly as great as may 
be feared. Although the cost of litigation is a serious issue, it should not be 
the controlling factor. Meritorious claims should not be cut off in the 
interests of judicial economy.307 Savings in litigation costs come at the 
expense of accountability. Extreme deference may make sense when 
directors are unconflicted,308 but not when self-dealing or structural bias is 
an issue. In such cases, the cost-benefit analysis changes radically: the 
value of accountability takes on greater significance vis à vis the value of 
authority.309 
V. APPLICATION 
In Part IV, a new intermediate standard of review for dealing with 
cases involving structural bias was proposed and defended. It was argued 
that courts should review directors’ decisions for substantive 
reasonableness in order to provide a meaningful check on directorial bias. 
This Part will attempt to apply that standard in a few important situations. 
First, it will consider how the standard would work in the context of a 
hostile takeover and resulting defensive strategies employed by the target 
company’s board of directors. The proposed standard will be contrasted 
with the enhanced scrutiny provided by Unocal. This Part then will 
consider how the standard would apply in the context of derivative 
litigation and a board’s decision to terminate such litigation. How the test 
manages derivative litigation is particularly important because most 
substantive breaches of fiduciary duty are enforced by means of derivative 
litigation. Next, this Part will consider how the standard would work in the 
context of a particular substantive issue that is a common subject of 
derivative litigation: executive compensation. The ability to make a 
difference on the merits of a substantive issue is, after all, what gives 
meaning to the proposal. Finally, this Part will consider a very important 
issue with respect to structural bias claims: the applicability of charter 
provisions that limit directors’ personal liability for breach of fiduciary 
duty. This issue raises the difficult question of whether structural bias 
should be seen as a duty of care issue or a duty of loyalty issue. The goal 
 307. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) (“[I]f we failed to balance all 
the interests involved, we would in the name of practicality and judicial economy foreclose a judicial 
decision on the merits. At this point, we are not convinced that is necessary or desirable.”). 
 308. See supra note 18. 
 309. The issue is the same as with self-dealing and the entire fairness test, albeit on a smaller 
scale. See supra notes 139–44 and accompanying text. 
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of this Part is to demonstrate that the proposed standard is not nearly as 
radical as it may seem at first.310 
A. Hostile Takeovers 
The basic standard of review for takeover defenses is set forth in 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.311—there must be reasonable 
grounds to believe there is a threat, and the response must be reasonable in 
relation to the threat.312 At first glance, it may appear that there is not 
much of a difference between the Unocal standard and the standard 
proposed here. However, there is a great difference in the way the standard 
would be applied. 
One way in which the proposed standard would differ from Unocal is 
that it would not necessarily require a threat. However, this is not a great 
point of divergence for two reasons. First, the existence of a threat would 
certainly factor into the circumstances under which the action in question 
must be deemed reasonable.313 Second, Unocal has been interpreted to 
perceive a threat under virtually any circumstance: even when there is no 
actual threat, the court will recognize the potential for a hostile takeover as 
a threat.314 It is the second prong that does the work under Unocal, and 
potential takeovers are circumstances that could be considered under the 
proposed standard. Thus, the two tests can accommodate threats equally 
well. 
Unocal’s second prong—the proportionality, or “range of 
reasonableness,” test—is another matter. As has been argued, Unocal is a 
very deferential standard, and seems to prohibit only those defenses which 
would be considered draconian because they are either coercive or 
 310. An important caveat must be given at this point: the following attempts to apply the review 
for substantive reasonableness are not intended to be definitive. Reasonableness is an evaluative norm, 
and different people can come to different conclusions. See MacCormick, supra note 249, at 1581–82 
(“In any question that involves weighing much evidence or many interests and values and coming to a 
conclusion on what may seem a relatively fine balance, it does not surprise us to find others reaching a 
conclusion different from our own . . . . Such a difference of judgment is no mere difference of taste 
. . . .”). Qualifications—such as the “range of reasonableness” formulation, see supra notes 251–55 
and accompanying text, may help reduce variability among judges, but cannot eliminate it entirely. 
What follows, then, is the author’s good faith effort at applying a standard of substantive 
reasonableness. This admission should not denigrate the value of an intermediate standard of review. 
See supra notes 289–91 and accompanying text. 
 311. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 312. See id at 955; see also supra notes 95–111 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text. 
 314. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985) (“[H]ere we have 
a defensive mechanism adopted to ward off possible future advances . . . .”); see also Velasco, supra 
note 96, at 416–19. 
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preclusive.315 The proposed standard would have a greater reach. It would 
recognize that there are many defenses that may not be draconian but that 
would nevertheless be unreasonable. However, it also would recognize 
that some draconian defenses might nevertheless be reasonable. 
The defensive measures employed in Unocal itself serve as a good 
example. In that case, Mesa Petroleum had made a two-tiered, front-
loaded tender offer for the shares of Unocal.316 The Unocal board 
responded to the coercive offer with a selective self-tender.317 The court 
upheld the defense as reasonable under the circumstances,318 and the 
proposed standard should produce the same result. However, at least as 
originally proposed, the defense in Unocal was arguably draconian. The 
selective self-tender was preclusive because it was made contingent upon 
the success of Mesa Petroleum’s initial tender offer.319 Mesa Petroleum 
would be unwilling to go forward in the face of the selective self-tender; 
as a result, there would be no selective self-tender, either. Thus, Unocal’s 
defense would have precluded any transaction from going forward. The 
defense was also coercive: shareholders would be forced to accept its 
terms, even if opposed, because not doing so would make them worse 
off.320 It was essentially a two-tiered, back-loaded tender offer. After 
Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,321 such a draconian defense 
would not be upheld under Unocal.322 Under the proposed standard, 
however, it could be deemed reasonable because of the coercive nature of 
Mesa Petroleum’s offer: it would be a case of fighting fire with fire. 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.323 presents a situation in 
which the court upheld a defensive response that would not be upheld 
under the proposed standard. In that case, Time entered into a merger 
agreement with Warner.324 Prior to the consummation of the transaction, 
Paramount stepped in with a higher offer for Time.325 Time refused to 
negotiate with Paramount and instead restructured its transaction with 
 315. See supra notes 109–10, 258–65 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 318. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–56 (Del. 1985). 
 319. This requirement was later partially waived. See id. at 951. 
 320. Shareholders might be opposed to the superior terms because the offer was, in fact, 
preclusive. They would nevertheless tender because failure to do so would result in the same dilution 
that Mesa Petroleum was facing. 
 321. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 322. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
 323. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
 324. Id. at 1143–46. 
 325. Id. at 1147. 
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Warner so as to frustrate Paramount’s efforts.326 The court characterized 
this response as merely an implementation of a pre-existing strategic plan, 
and considered the associated defenses reasonable in relation to this 
limited goal.327 In its efforts to avoid “substituting its judgment as to what 
is a ‘better’ deal for that of [the] corporation’s board of directors,”328 the 
court failed to appreciate how radical the restructuring of the transaction 
really was. Time was not merely defending its long-term strategic plan. 
Rather, it gave up on its proposed merger of equals in favor of an outright 
acquisition of Warner. This change in plans would have serious 
operational consequences for the company.329 The plans were changed in 
order to avoid a shareholder vote that directors knew would not have been 
obtainable because of the superior Paramount offer.330 
The board’s conduct should not have been upheld because it was 
draconian: it was coercive in that it eliminated the need for shareholder 
approval in order to cram the transaction down the shareholders’ 
throats;331 it was preclusive in that it would prevent the combined 
company from being acquired for the foreseeable future.332 In any event, 
without the business judgment rule-like deference afforded by Unocal,333 
the board’s conduct would have been deemed unreasonable under the 
proposed standard. Going to such lengths to deprive the shareholders of a 
 326. Id. at 1146–48. 
 327. Id. at 1154–55 (“Here, on the record facts, the Chancellor found that Time’s responsive 
action to Paramount’s tender offer . . . had as its goal the carrying forward of a pre-existing transaction 
in an altered form. Thus, the response was reasonably related to the threat.”) (footnote omitted). 
 328. Id. at 1153. 
 329. Id. at 1148 (In the restructured transaction, “Time would assume 7–10 billion dollars worth 
of debt, thus eliminating one of the principal transaction-related benefits of the original merger 
agreement.”). Compare id. at 1145–47 (discussing advantages of original transaction) with id. at 1148–
49 (describing restructured transaction). 
 330. The market valued the Time-Warner transaction at $126 per share of Time, while Paramount 
offered $175 per share initially, and $200 per share eventually. Id. at 1147–49. 
 331. Time had sought other ways of avoiding a shareholder vote before restructuring the merger 
as an acquisition. See, e.g., id. at 1148 (“Time sought permission from the New York Stock Exchange 
to alter its rules and allow the Time-Warner merger to proceed without stockholder approval.”); see 
also supra note 327. 
 332. Compare Time, 571 A.2d at 1154 (“Paramount argues that . . . Time’s response was 
unreasonable in precluding Time’s shareholders from accepting the tender offer or receiving a control 
premium in the immediately foreseeable future.”), with id. at 1155 (“[T]he revised agreement . . . did 
not preclude Paramount from making an offer for the combined Time-Warner company . . . .”). 
Although the Time-Warner deal was not technically preclusive, it is hard to imagine any deal that is. 
See Velasco, supra note 96, at 421 n.251. The fact is that the size and debt burden of the combined 
Time-Warner would make the company acquisition-proof for years to come. 
 333. See supra notes 260–65 and accompanying text. 
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vote on a proposed merger may not be utterly irrational, but it is 
unreasonable.334 
Judicial review of the poison pill defense could benefit from the 
proposed standard as well.335 As the author has argued elsewhere, the 
poison pill should be considered draconian in that it is both coercive and 
preclusive.336 The courts disagree: they do not consider the poison pill to 
be unreasonable under Unocal.337 Thus, it might seem unlikely that the 
courts would consider the poison pill unreasonable under the proposed 
standard, either. However, without the deference afforded by Unocal, the 
courts should be able to see the poison pill for what it is: part of a “just say 
no” strategy to avoid hostile takeovers of any kind.338 
Shareholders essentially have two rights: the right to vote and the right 
to sell their shares. The Delaware courts have recognized the “central 
importance of the [shareholder] franchise to the scheme of corporate 
governance.”339 Unfortunately, they have not recognized the fundamental 
importance of shareholder exit.340 However, the logic is equally 
applicable. To paraphrase the Delaware Court of Chancery: 
A board’s decision to act to prevent the shareholders from [selling 
their shares] does not involve the exercise of the corporation’s 
power over its property, or with respect to its rights and obligations; 
rather, it involves allocation, between shareholders as a class and 
the board, of effective power with respect to [property rights in the 
company’s shares].341 
 334. Such conduct also is problematic under Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 
(Del. Ch. 1988). Because the board intentionally interfered with a shareholder vote, it should have to 
demonstrate a compelling justification for its conduct. See supra note 111. 
 335. “The poison pill is the ultimate defense against a hostile takeover.” Velasco, supra note 96, at 
381. For a brief description of the poison pill, see id. at 383–84. For a more detailed description, see 
Julian Velasco, Just Do It: An Antidote to the Poison Pill, 52 EMORY L.J. 849, 856–68 (2003). 
 336. See Velasco, supra note 96, at 419–22. 
 337. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351–57 (Del. 1985) (flip-over pill); see 
also Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 780 A.2d 245, 249–50 (Del. 2001) (reaffirming Moran); Unitrin, 
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995) (flip-in pill); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180–81 (Del. 1986) (back-end pill). 
 338. See Velasco, supra note 96, at 384; Velasco, supra note 335, at 850. 
 339. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659; see supra note 111. 
 340. Cf. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 328 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“If stockholders are 
presumed competent to buy stock in the first place, why are they not presumed competent to decide 
when to sell in a tender offer after an adequate time for deliberation has been afforded them?”); Ronald 
J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 501 
(2001) (arguing against Delaware court’s “preference that control contests be resolved through an 
election, rather than a market”). 
 341. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 821 Velasco book pages.doc4/6/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
892 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:821 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shareholders should be able to sell their shares freely, whether on the 
market or in a tender offer. The company should be permitted to interfere 
only in the interests of shareholders—for example, when they are 
confronted with a coercive offer. However, when shareholders face a non-
coercive offer, such as an all-cash, all-shares offer, director interference is 
unjustifiable.342 A board’s decision to block such an offer may be rational, 
in that it could allow directors to negotiate a better price for 
shareholders,343 but it would not be reasonable because it allows directors 
to intrude upon shareholder prerogatives. 
Some might disagree that the poison pill is so powerful, at least 
standing alone, because the hostile bidder can eliminate the poison pill by 
means of a successful proxy contest. Surely, however, certain variants can 
be preclusive—such as the dead hand poison pill.344 Moreover, even a 
garden-variety poison pill can be quite potent when combined with other 
defenses, such as a staggered board of directors.345 Such preclusive 
defenses should not be considered reasonable, even under Unocal.346 
Under the proposed standard, even an ordinary poison pill defense should 
 342. “The term ‘all-cash, all-shares offer’ generally refers to a tender offer for any and all shares 
of the target company’s stock, with consideration to be paid in cash. There is often a promise to cash 
out remaining shareholders at the same price.” Velasco, supra note 96, at 388 n.44. “[A]n all-cash, all-
shares offer does not pose any real threat.” Id. at 419. 
 343. See William B. Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and 
Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1093–96 (1999). 
 344. “In substance, the ‘dead hand’ provision operates to prevent any directors . . . , except those 
who were in office as of the date of the [poison pill]’s adoption . . . or their designated successors, 
from redeeming the [poison pill] until they expire.” Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1184 
(Del. Ch. 1998). The validity of the dead hand provision was called into doubt by the Delaware Court 
of Chancery in Carmody. See id. at 1182. A less powerful relative, the “delayed redemption provision” 
or “no hand” pill, was struck down by the Delaware Supreme Court in Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. 
v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). However, some other courts have upheld such provisions. See, 
e.g., AMP, Inc. v. Allied Signal, Inc., No. 98-4405, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15617 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 
1998); Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997). 
 But see Velasco, supra note 335, at 903 (“The antidote strategy . . . can even be successful in 
states where dead-hand and no-hand provisions are legal . . . .”). 
 345. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence & Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002). But see Velasco, supra note 335, at 902 
(The antidote strategy “should be able to overcome the combined effect of a poison pill together with a 
staggered board.”). 
 346. The cases of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986), and Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), provide specially-
enhanced versions of enhanced scrutiny. See supra note 111. It already has been argued that those 
cases could be seen as mere extensions of Unocal. See supra note 111. Given business judgment rule-
like deference, however, the author is skeptical that the courts would reach the same result under 
Unocal. The author is far more confident that Revlon and Blasius would be decided similarly under the 
proposed standard because it does not provide such extreme deference. 
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be considered unreasonable if it is used to prevent shareholders from 
selling their shares.347 
B. Derivative Litigation 
When shareholders wish to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty, 
they generally must do so by means of a derivative action. This is because 
it is usually the company that is harmed by the directors’ breach; 
shareholders are harmed only indirectly, through their ownership 
interest.348 Because directors’ decisions with respect to derivative litigation 
are among the key situations involving structural bias, there is an 
important link between the proposed standard and enforcement of all 
fiduciary duties. 
Courts are ambivalent about derivative litigation. On the one hand, they 
sympathize with directors who insist that much of it is wasteful; on the 
other hand, they recognize the need to allow shareholders to pursue 
meritorious claims when conflicted directors refuse to do so.349 The result 
 347. The poison pill may have a legitimate role as a temporary defensive measure, but not as part 
of a “just say no” defense. 
[If] the threat is defined as one involving the possibility that stockholders might make an 
erroneous investment or voting decision, the appropriate response would seem to be one that 
would remedy that problem by providing the stockholders with adequate information. The 
corporate board . . . may legitimately need more time to ensure that it can get its message out 
to the market place. 
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 325 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 348. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004). 
The derivative suit has been generally described as “one of the most interesting and ingenious 
of accountability mechanisms for large formal organizations.” It enables a stockholder to 
bring suit on behalf of the corporation for harm done to the corporation. Because a derivative 
suit is being brought on behalf of the corporation, the recovery, if any, must go to the 
corporation. A stockholder who is directly injured, however, does retain the right to bring an 
individual action for injuries affecting his or her legal rights as a stockholder. Such a claim is 
distinct from an injury caused to the corporation alone. In such individual suits, the recovery 
or other relief flows directly to the stockholders, not to the corporation. 
Id. at 1036. The Delaware Supreme Court has recently “set forth . . . the law to be applied henceforth 
in determining whether a stockholder’s claim is derivative or direct;” id. at 1033. “The issue must turn 
solely on the following questions: (1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing 
stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy 
(the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?” Id. 
 349. The courts have engaged in this sort of balancing explicitly: 
The jurisprudence of Aronson and its progeny is designed to create a balanced environment 
which will: (1) on the one hand, deter costly, baseless suits by creating a screening 
mechanism to eliminate claims where there is only a suspicion expressed solely in conclusory 
terms; and (2) on the other hand, permit suit by a stockholder who is able to articulate 
particularized facts showing that there is a reasonable doubt either that (a) a majority of the 
board is independent for purposes of responding to the demand, or (b) the underlying 
transaction is protected by the business judgment rule. 
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is a body of law that could be characterized as schizophrenic. For example, 
derivative litigation is frustrated by requirements such as the 
contemporaneous ownership rule350 and the demand requirement,351 but 
facilitated by the reimbursement of litigation expenses352 and the ability to 
argue demand futility.353 
Despite their ambivalence, courts have recognized the need for 
meaningful review of such matters. They have struggled to find the 
appropriate balance between directorial authority and accountability by 
seeking ways to block frivolous litigation while allowing meritorious 
claims.354 To do this properly, however, courts must deal adequately with 
structural bias. Directors’ decisions with respect to derivative litigation 
cannot be trusted fully. However, neither can every shareholder be 
permitted to control the company’s fate. The courts are wise in seeking 
structural safeguards, such as the establishment of board committees that 
are as independent as possible and the encouragement of solid decision-
making processes. Such safeguards increase, at least to some extent, the 
confidence that can be had in directors’ judgment. However, because of 
structural bias, and the limits of independence355 and process,356 these 
safeguards must be followed by meaningful judicial review. 
Meaningful judicial review is expensive.357 However, reliance upon 
unaccountable directors who are inherently conflicted is not a satisfactory 
alternative. Moreover, the cost of judicial review need not be great if 
Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1217 (Del. 1996) (footnotes omitted). 
At the risk of stating the obvious, the problem is relatively simple. If, on the one hand, 
corporations can consistently wrest bona fide derivative actions away from well-meaning 
derivative plaintiffs through the use of the committee mechanism, the derivative suit will lose 
much, if not all, of its generally-recognized effectiveness as an intra-corporate means of 
policing boards of directors. If, on the other hand, corporations are unable to rid themselves of 
meritless or harmful litigation and strike suits, the derivative action, created to benefit the 
corporation, will produce the opposite, unintended result. . . . It thus appears desirable to us to 
find a balancing point where bona fide stockholder power to bring corporate causes of action 
cannot be unfairly trampled on by the board of directors, but the corporation can rid itself of 
detrimental litigation. 
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786–87 (Del. 1981) (citations omitted); see also Levine v. 
Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984). 
 350. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2001). 
 351. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. 
 352. See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Coker, 847 A.2d 330, 333 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“This Court consistently has 
held that, in . . . derivative actions, plaintiffs’ counsel are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and 
expenses where their efforts achieve a benefit for the corporation or its shareholders.”). 
 353. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 (Del. 1984). 
 354. See supra note 349. 
 355. See supra notes 200–19 and accompanying text. 
 356. See supra notes 230–41 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra notes 298–302 and accompanying text. 
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courts are permitted to decide the easy cases as a matter of law.358 Finally, 
there are a number of procedural requirements, such as the 
contemporaneous ownership rule and the demand requirement, that have 
the effect of minimizing litigation volume and expense.359 
One such requirement that bears special emphasis is the Delaware 
requirement of particularized allegations. As part of the demand 
requirement, the Delaware Chancery Court Rules require that “the 
complaint shall . . . allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the 
plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or 
comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain 
the action or for not making the effort.”360 
A quick read might suggest that particularized allegations are necessary 
only with respect to demand issues. However, a more careful reading of 
the rule in context reveals that the requirement actually reaches the merits 
of the underlying claims. 
In Delaware, a shareholder plaintiff in a derivative action faces a 
difficult decision. The plaintiff must either argue demand futility, in which 
case particularized allegations are necessary, or make a demand, in which 
case the argument of demand futility is waived and the business judgment 
rule is invoked.361 Although it may be difficult to make particularized 
allegations, it is a better option than facing the business judgment rule on 
the directors’ response to the demand. 
The test for demand futility is a two-part test set forth in Aronson v. 
Lewis.362 The first prong, the inquiry into whether “the directors are 
disinterested and independent,”363 deals with the duty of loyalty, which is 
what one would expect of a “demand futility” argument. However, the 
second prong, the inquiry into whether “the challenged transaction was 
 358. See supra notes 303–05 and accompanying text. 
 359. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004) (“[I]f an 
action is derivative, the plaintiffs are then required to comply with the requirements of Court of 
Chancery Rule 23.1, that the stockholder: (a) retain ownership of the shares throughout the litigation; 
(b) make presuit demand on the board; and (c) obtain court approval of any settlement. . . .”); see also 
id. (“The decision whether a suit is direct or derivative may be outcome-determinative.”). 
 360. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. 
 361. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1218–19 (Del. 1996). 
If a demand is made, the stockholder has spent one—but only one—“arrow” in the “quiver.” 
The spent ‘arrow’ is the right to claim that demand is excused. The stockholder does not, by 
making demand, waive the right to claim that demand has been wrongfully refused. . . . If a 
demand is made and rejected, the board rejecting the demand is entitled to the presumption of 
the business judgment rule . . . . 
Id. 
 362. 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984); see supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 363. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
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otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment,”364 extends 
to the duty of care. It provides that plaintiffs can establish demand futility 
by “alleg[ing] particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that the 
actions of the defendants were protected by the business judgment rule.”365 
Because of the flexibility of the Aronson test, it makes sense for 
plaintiffs to raise all of their fiduciary duty claims under the mantle of 
demand futility rather than to make a demand. Although the “reasonable 
doubt” standard may not be very generous,366 it surely is better than facing 
the business judgment rule directly. As a result, the requirement of 
particularized allegations affects almost all derivative litigation. Thus it is 
fair to say, as a general matter, that “pleadings [in derivative suits] must 
comply with stringent requirements of factual particularity that differ 
substantially from the permissive notice pleadings . . . .”367 These stringent 
requirements are made more difficult by the fact that the plaintiff will not 
yet have the benefit of discovery.368 The aggregate effect is a reduction in 
both the volume and expense of derivative litigation. The benefits of the 
particularized allegations requirement should apply to the proposed 
standard as well.369 
However, the proposed standard would work some fairly significant 
changes in the way questions regarding derivative litigation would be 
handled. Delaware has an elaborate system in place in order to determine 
when the business judgment rule should apply.370 Under the proposed 
standard, the business judgment rule never would apply because of 
structural bias. The question would always be one of substantive 
reasonableness. This would simplify matters significantly because a 
plaintiff’s choice between making a demand and alleging demand futility 
 364. Id. 
 365. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255 (Del. 2000). 
 366. See supra notes 271–86 and accompanying text. 
 367. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 254. 
 368. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 & n.10 (Del. 1993) (“derivative plaintiffs . . . are 
not entitled to discovery to assist their compliance with Rule 23.1”); see also Eisner, 746 A.2d at 254–
55 (discussing the limited discovery rights of stockholders when making specific allegations under 
Rule 23.1). 
 369. As will be argued, all issues of demand will be reviewed for substantive reasonableness, such 
that there will not be a pressing need to argue demand futility. Thus, it might seem that a plaintiff 
could escape the requirement of particularized allegations by making a demand: particularized 
allegations would be required only for the demand issue and not the underlying merits. However, the 
court would be deciding whether the directors’ response to the demand was reasonable. Without 
particularized allegations suggesting otherwise, the rejection of a shoddy demand will be difficult to 
characterize as unreasonable. See infra notes 370–83 and accompanying text. 
 370. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) (waiver of demand futility); Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (standards for demand futility); see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (demand excused). 
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would not be so consequential. If shareholders were to make a demand, or 
the directors otherwise were to decide on whether to proceed with the 
derivative action, the directors’ decision would be subject to review for 
substantive reasonableness. If the shareholder plaintiffs were to argue 
demand futility and the directors did not have the opportunity to make a 
decision on the matter, the plaintiffs would have to argue that a decision 
not to proceed with litigation would be unreasonable. Finally, if demand 
were excused or wrongfully refused and the board subsequently 
established a special litigation committee to dismiss the action, the 
decision of the committee also would be subject to review for substantive 
reasonableness.371 
The proposed standard eliminates the need for both the Zapata and 
Aronson tests. Zapata’s reliance on the court’s business judgment372 would 
be replaced by the review for substantive reasonableness. Aronson’s two-
part test would be unnecessary because plaintiffs would have the benefit of 
the intermediate standard of review:373 they would never need to establish 
irrationality or waste (although they would be free to argue that the 
directors were, in fact, interested or not independent).374 Moreover, 
Aronson’s “reasonable doubt” standard would be too awkward when 
combined with the “range of reasonableness” standard.375 However, 
Aronson’s underlying interpretation of the particularized allegations 
requirement should stand. Thus, the Aronson framework could be replaced 
by a simpler one: that the plaintiff must allege particularized facts creating 
a strong inference of unreasonableness.376 
The proposed standard also would have the benefit of encouraging 
shareholders to make a demand. Shareholders would not feel unable to do 
so because, even if they were to lose the ability to claim demand futility, 
they would retain the benefits of review for substantive reasonableness 
due to structural bias. In fact, under the proposed standard it should be 
easier to prevail after a demand has been refused than it would be in the 
 371. But see infra notes 378–80 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 373. However, the proposed standard could be incorporated into the Aronson framework: 
plaintiffs would be permitted to make the typical arguments, challenging the directors’ independence 
or business judgment, as well as a reasonableness argument. 
 374. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. In light of the availability of special litigation 
committees, it would be the rare case indeed where plaintiffs could make a showing sufficient to 
invoke the entire fairness test. 
 375. Although it would be quite awkward, Aronson’s “reasonable doubt” standard could be 
retained despite the adoption of the proposed standard: plaintiff would have to allege facts with 
particularity creating a reasonable doubt about whether the directors’ decision was reasonable. 
 376. Cf. supra note 365 and accompanying text. 
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absence of a litigation decision by directors, as might be the case in a 
demand futility claim. To establish demand futility without a record, the 
plaintiffs would have to prove that a decision not to proceed would not—
which is to say, could not—be reasonable; the courts would have to give 
directors the benefit of hypothetical reasoning.377 However, once there is a 
record complete with directors’ reasons, as always would be the case after 
a demand had been made, the plaintiffs would need to show only that the 
actual decision was unreasonable. 
Moreover, directors would be handicapped in subsequently establishing 
a special litigation committee to dismiss the case. Once it has been 
established that it would be unreasonable not to pursue the case—whether 
because of demand futility or wrongful refusal—it would be difficult 
(although not impossible) to argue subsequently that the case should be 
dismissed.378 In a court’s review of such a decision, “some tribute must be 
paid to the fact that the lawsuit was properly initiated.”379 It would be 
especially difficult to justify a dismissal as reasonable “after years of 
vigorous litigation for reasons unconnected with the merits of the 
lawsuit.”380 To the extent that the proposed standard encourages demand 
or discourages wasteful efforts by special litigation committees,381 it also 
would reduce the expenses incurred in litigating demand futility. Although 
litigation expenses might increase overall,382 this would be another 
mitigating factor.383 
A good example of a case that likely would have been decided 
differently under the proposed standard is the case of Brehm v. Eisner.384 
At first, the case may seem to be a poor candidate. The court described the 
complaint as “a pistache of prolix invective . . . permeated with conclusory 
allegations,”385 that “does not comply with . . . fundamental pleading 
mandates” of particularized allegations.386 This characterization was 
 377. See infra note 406. 
 378. This is because a derivative lawsuit would only be permitted to proceed—whether demand 
had been refused or considered futile—after a determination that not proceeding would be 
unreasonable. The special litigation committee’s decision to dismiss the case would have to be based 
on new facts or arguments in order to be considered reasonable. 
 379. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). 
 380. Id. 
 381. Not all efforts by special litigation committees to dismiss properly initiated derivative 
lawsuits would be wasteful. However, since the standard of review would be unchanged—i.e., 
substantive reasonableness—such efforts would be wasteful in many cases. 
 382. See supra notes 298–302 and accompanying text. 
 383. See also supra notes 303–06, 357–69 and accompanying text. 
 384. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 385. Id. at 249. 
 386. Id. at 254. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/4
p 821 Velasco book pages.doc4/6/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] STRUCTURAL BIAS 899 
 
 
 
 
 
 
justified by the subsequent amended complaint, which presents a very 
different set of the facts.387 However, despite the “inartfully drafted” 
complaint, the court was able to “ferret out” sufficient allegations to admit 
that “both as to the processes of the two boards and the waste test, this is a 
close case.”388 If the case was a close one under the business judgment 
rule, it seems fairly obvious that it could have been decided differently 
under an intermediate standard of review. 
The Eisner court was willing to dismiss the case on the facts as alleged. 
Given the extreme nature of those facts, this is a troubling precedent. As it 
turns out, there was no harm done because the plaintiffs were able to do a 
little more legwork, discover a different set of facts, and produce a 
superior complaint. However, had the plaintiffs been unable to do so, 
either because of a lack of discovery or because the facts actually were as 
originally alleged, their meritorious claim would have been dismissed for 
the sake of judicial economy. This would have been unfortunate. 
In essence, the original complaint alleged that the directors of The Walt 
Disney Company breached their fiduciary duties in approving an 
employment agreement with Michael S. Ovitz as president and in later 
granting him a “non-fault” termination of that agreement.389 The structure 
of the employment agreement was criticized on the grounds that “the 
contract gave Ovitz an incentive to find a way to exit the Company via a 
non-fault termination as soon as possible because doing so would permit 
him to earn more than he could by fulfilling his contract.”390 The grant of a 
 387. Compare id. at 249–53 (facts as originally pleaded), with In re The Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278–85 (Del. Ch. 2003) (facts as pleaded in amended complaint). 
 388. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 249. 
This is potentially a very troubling case on the merits. On the one hand, it appears from the 
Complaint that: (a) the compensation and termination payout for Ovitz were exceedingly 
lucrative, if not luxurious, compared to Ovitz’ value to the Company; and (b) the processes of 
the boards of directors in dealing with the approval and termination of the Ovitz Employment 
Agreement were casual, if not sloppy and perfunctory. On the other hand, the Complaint is so 
inartfully drafted that it was properly dismissed under our pleading standards for derivative 
suits. From what we can ferret out of this deficient pleading, the processes of the Old Board 
and the New Board were hardly paradigms of good corporate governance practices. 
Moreover, the sheer size of the payout to Ovitz, as alleged, pushes the envelope of judicial 
respect for the business judgment of directors in making compensation decisions. Therefore, 
both as to the processes of the two Boards and the waste test, this is a close case. 
Id. 
 389. See id. at 248–49. In addition, the choice of Ovitz was criticized because of his lack of 
qualifications, see id. at 249 (“At the time, Ovitz was an important talent broker in Hollywood . . . . 
[H]e lacked experience managing a diversified public company.”), and it was alleged that he was 
selected because of his long-standing friendship with the chairman and CEO, Michael Eisner. See id. 
These allegations were not well supported. 
 390. Id. at 251. The court summarized the terms of the employment agreement as follows: 
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non-fault termination was criticized on the grounds that it was wasteful391 
and that the company could have sought a termination for cause.392 The 
facts were sufficiently egregious that even the basic allegations would 
have been sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under the proposed 
standard. 
The court defended the structure of the employment agreement on the 
ground that the directors were statutorily protected in relying on an 
expert.393 This was so even though “‘nobody’—not Crystal [the expert] 
Ovitz’ Employment Agreement had an initial term of five years and required that Ovitz 
“devote his full time and best efforts exclusively to the Company,” with exceptions for 
volunteer work, service on the board of another company, and managing his passive 
investments. In return, Disney agreed to give Ovitz a base salary of $1 million per year, a 
discretionary bonus, and two sets of stock options (the “A” options and the “B” options) that 
collectively would enable Ovitz to purchase 5 million shares of Disney common stock. 
 The “A” options were scheduled to vest in three annual increments of 1 million shares 
each, beginning on September 30, 1998 (i.e., at the end of the third full year of employment) 
and continuing for the following two years (through September 2000). The agreement 
specifically provided that the “A” options would vest immediately if Disney granted Ovitz a 
non-fault termination of the Employment Agreement. The “B” options, consisting of 2 
million shares, differed in two important respects. Although scheduled to vest annually 
starting in September 2001 (i.e., the year after the last “A” option would vest), the “B” 
options were conditioned on Ovitz and Disney first having agreed to extend his employment 
beyond the five-year term of the Employment Agreement. Furthermore, Ovitz would forfeit 
the right to qualify for the “B” options if his initial employment term of five years ended 
prematurely for any reason, even if from a non-fault termination. 
 The Employment Agreement provided for three ways by which Ovitz’ employment 
might end. He might serve his five years and Disney might decide against offering him a new 
contract. If so, Disney would owe Ovitz a $10 million termination payment. Before the end of 
the initial term, Disney could terminate Ovitz for “good cause” only if Ovitz committed gross 
negligence or malfeasance, or if Ovitz resigned voluntarily. Disney would owe Ovitz no 
additional compensation if it terminated him for “good cause.” Termination without cause 
(non-fault termination) would entitle Ovitz to the present value of his remaining salary 
payments through September 30, 2000, a $10 million severance payment, an additional $7.5 
million for each fiscal year remaining under the agreement, and the immediate vesting of the 
first 3 million stock options (the “A” Options).  
Id. at 250 (footnotes omitted). 
 391. The court agreed that “the non-fault termination left Ovitz with what essentially was a very 
lucrative severance agreement,” but noted that “in the end the payout to Ovitz did not exceed the 1995 
contractual benefits.” Id. at 252. 
 392. Id. at 253 (“The allegation of waste is based on the inference most favorable to plaintiffs that 
Disney owed Ovitz nothing, either because he had resigned (de facto) or because he was unarguably 
subject to firing for cause.”). 
 393. See id. at 261. Section 141(e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides as follows: 
A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee designated by the board 
of directors, shall, in the performance of such member’s duties, be fully protected in relying 
in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports 
or statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation’s officers or employees, 
or committees of the board of directors, or by any other person as to matters the member 
reasonably believes are within such other person’s professional or expert competence and 
who has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation. 
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and not the directors—[calculated ‘the economic exposure of the 
corporation to the payout scenarios of the Ovitz contract’], although all the 
necessary information presumably was at hand to do so.”394 While this 
might be acceptable behavior under the business judgment rule,395 it would 
not fall within the range of reasonableness. 
Directors may be entitled to rely in good faith on “information, 
opinions, reports or statements”396 of experts, but they should not be 
permitted to delegate the ultimate decision to experts. The directors, not 
the experts, are the ones who must exercise business judgment in deciding 
on such fundamental questions as the nature and amount of executive 
compensation.397 Thus, they should not be protected in relying on experts 
without first coming to a rudimentary understanding of the agreement. 
The employment agreement was not terribly complicated. Even a basic 
understanding would have revealed the problem described in the 
complaint. The contract provided that Ovitz would receive a salary of $1 
million per year, plus discretionary bonuses and stock options. He also 
would receive a $10 million bonus if his contract were not renewed. 
However, if Ovitz were to obtain a non-fault termination, he would receive 
the $1 million per year salary payments, plus $7.5 million per year, as well 
as $10 million in severance pay, and most, but not all, of the options.398 
Even excluding the value of stock options, which could be tremendous but 
are inherently volatile,399 the cash payments under the employment 
agreement totaled $15 million, plus discretionary bonuses, if Ovitz 
completed his term of employment, and approximately $52.5 million if 
Ovitz was granted a non-fault termination on the first day.400 It would not 
take a qualified expert to appreciate the deficiencies of such an 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001). As the Eisner court pointed out, however, “[t]his protection 
. . . is not without limitation, as in a case of corporate waste.” Eisner, 746 A.2d at 261 n.51. 
 394. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 260; see id. at 259. 
 395. Id. at 260–61. 
 396. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001). 
 397. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”). 
 398. See supra note 390. Actually, he would receive only “the present value of his remaining 
salary payments,” Eisner, 746 A.2d at 250, which would make the amount somewhat less than $1 
million per year. 
 399. Most of the value of Ovitz’s severance package came from the stock options. In fairness, the 
Chancery Court “concluded that the vesting schedule of the options actually was a disincentive for 
Ovitz to leave Disney,” Eisner, 746 A.2d at 263, because Ovitz would be giving up a significant 
number of options. However, the mere possibility of obtaining such options would not necessarily 
make up for the certainty of reduced payments and five years of labor. 
 400. In addition, Ovitz would be able to pursue other employment or investment activities for five 
years. This is a significant benefit to an early termination. 
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arrangement. A decision to approve such a contract may or may not be 
rational, but it would not be reasonable. 
The court defended the board’s subsequent decision to grant a non-fault 
termination on the basis of the uncertainty and expense of litigating the 
issue of fault: 
All [that the Complaint] shows is that the Board had arguable 
grounds to fire Ovitz for cause. But what is alleged is only an 
argument—perhaps a good one—that Ovitz’ conduct constituted 
gross negligence or malfeasance. First, given the facts as alleged, 
Disney would have had to persuade a trier of fact and law of this 
argument in any litigated dispute with Ovitz. Second, that process 
of persuasion could involve expensive litigation, distraction of 
executive time and company resources, lost opportunity costs, more 
bad publicity and an outcome that was uncertain at best and, at 
worst, could have resulted in damages against the Company.401 
This type of argument is commonly used by boards of directors in refusing 
a demand and by special litigation committees in seeking dismissal.402 It is 
therefore a very important issue in derivative litigation. 
A cost/benefit analysis is an important consideration in the decision of 
whether to proceed with any lawsuit. Litigation is expensive and risky. A 
decision to sue entails more than just a determination of the merits of the 
claim:403 even a risky case may be worth pursuing because of the potential 
reward, and even an easy case may not be worth pursuing because of the 
related expenses.404 However, the claim that the costs outweigh the 
benefits is ubiquitous among directors deciding on whether to pursue 
derivative litigation. Surely the argument is valid in many cases, perhaps 
even in most cases. But it is implausible that it should be valid in nearly all 
 401. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 265. 
 402. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 997 (N.Y. 1979) (The special litigation 
committee concluded “that if the action were allowed to proceed the time and talents of the 
corporation’s senior management would be wasted on lengthy pretrial and trial proceedings, that 
litigation costs would be inordinately high in view of the unlikelihood of success, and that the 
continuing publicity could be damaging to the corporation’s business.”). 
 403. The court’s suggestion that plaintiffs had to “set forth particularized facts that he resigned or 
unarguably breached his Employment Agreement,” Eisner, 746 A.2d at 264, was a bit simplistic. 
Lawsuits may be worth pursuing even if the outcome is not perfectly clear. 
 404. Ultimately, it boils down to a very sophisticated calculation of expected values. A simplistic 
example follows. Assume two lawsuits have similar litigation-related expenses of $1 million each. The 
first lawsuit offers a 10% chance of a $20 million verdict, while the second lawsuit offers a 99% 
chance of a $1 million payout. The first case would be worth pursuing because it has an expected value 
of $1 million ($20 million × 10% - $1 million), while the second would not be worth pursuing because 
it has a slightly negative expected value ($1 million × 99% - $1 million). 
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cases.405 Although litigation is expensive, the potential award in many 
cases is quite large. 
The cost/benefit argument is legitimate as to form. As to the merits, it 
is the type of decision that courts would normally leave to the business 
judgment of directors. However, because of structural bias, that would be 
inappropriate. On matters of derivative litigation, courts cannot defer to 
directors’ expertise. Rather, they must consider the merits of the 
competing arguments to decide whether the directors’ decision was 
unreasonable. In many cases, the directors’ decision will be the obviously 
correct one; in some cases, the decision will be a difficult one, but not 
unreasonable. Sometimes, however, it will be objectively unreasonable not 
to pursue a claim. 
Whether a given decision is reasonable may depend on the reasons 
given.406 When the potential award is sufficiently great, a casual claim or 
conclusory assertion by the directors should not be sufficient to carry the 
day. A more serious analysis would allow the court to evaluate the 
decision on the merits—not to decide whether it was correct, but only to 
decide whether it was unreasonable. If the directors’ analysis is realistic, 
their decision is likely to be upheld as reasonable.407 On the other hand, if 
their decision is based on unrealistic assumptions, it could lead the court to 
conclude that the decision was unreasonable.408 
In Eisner, over $140 million was at stake. As long as the case was not 
frivolous—and it was clear that the court thought it had some merit409—it 
would be difficult to believe that the case should be dismissed on 
cost/benefit grounds. Although such a decision might be upheld under the 
business judgment rule, it should not be upheld under the proposed 
standard—at least not without sufficient justification.410 
 405. If the courts believe that the costs of derivative litigation outweigh the benefits, they should 
consider eliminating the derivative action altogether. 
 406. In theory, the court may have to engage in a hypothetical analysis in cases alleging demand 
futility because no decision will have been made. See supra text accompanying note 377. In practice, 
directors likely would be permitted to present an analysis to the court. 
 407. Nevertheless, it is possible that conflicted directors could come to an objectively 
unreasonable decision. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 408. As a simplistic example, directors may conclude that a lawsuit is not worthwhile based on the 
assumptions of a 10% chance of success, a $10 million dollar award, and $2 million in attorneys fees 
(expected value: -$1 million). However, if the court were to believe that the chance of success were 
more like 50%, the likely award closer to $20 million, and the likely attorneys fees only $1 million 
(expected value: $9 million), it could conclude that the directors’ decision was objectively 
unreasonable. 
 409. The court considered the argument to be “perhaps a good one.” Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 
244, 265 (Del. 2000). Overall, the court considered the complaint to present “a close case.” Id. at 249. 
 410. When the stakes are high enough, it is not reasonable to assume that the costs of litigation 
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Thus, review for substantive reasonableness could have made a 
difference in the Eisner case, both on the issue of the initial approval of 
the employment agreement and on the subsequent grant of a non-fault 
termination. The Delaware Supreme Court was uncomfortable with its 
decision but felt compelled because of the deference of the business 
judgment rule.411 The proposed standard would have permitted the court to 
come to a more reasonable conclusion. 
C. Executive Compensation 
If the shareholder-plaintiffs make it past the procedural hurdles of 
derivative litigation, they will have the opportunity to challenge the 
substantive merit of the directors’ decisions. This section will consider 
how review for substantive reasonableness might operate in an important 
and controversial setting: executive compensation decisions. It will 
attempt to apply the proposed standard in three notorious cases. This 
should help to illustrate the impact of a review for substantive 
reasonableness. 
First, however, it must be asked why the business judgment rule would 
not apply to executive compensation decisions in the face of state laws 
such as section 144(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.412 That 
statute provides as follows: 
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 [one] or 
more of its directors or officers . . . shall be void or voidable solely 
for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is present at 
or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which 
authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because of any such 
director’s or officer’s votes are counted for such purpose, if: 
(1) The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or 
interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are 
known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or 
committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the 
outweigh the benefits, so directors should have to justify such a conclusion. In fairness, Eisner was a 
demand futility case. Thus, even if the proposed standard had been applied, the court may not have had 
the benefit of the directors’ analysis and may have resorted to hypothetical reasoning to decide 
whether a decision not to pursue the case could be reasonable. See supra text accompanying note 377. 
However, even hypothetical reasoning has its limits. A $140 million claim is a difficult hurdle to 
overcome. 
 411. See Eisner, 746 A.2d at 249. 
 412. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001). 
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affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even 
though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or 
(2) The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or 
interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are 
known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract 
or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the 
shareholders; or  
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the 
time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, 
a committee or the shareholders.413 
Executive compensation decisions would seem to fall within the 
protection of such statutes. Thus, justification must be given for subjecting 
such decisions to an intermediate standard of review. 
One possible reason would be to argue that, because of structural bias, 
no directors should qualify as “disinterested directors.” Although there is 
some truth in the claim, it is the type of argument that would be better 
directed in support of an amendment of the statute rather than an 
eviscerating interpretation of it. 
More promising is the statutory language itself. The Delaware Supreme 
Court has interpreted section 144 as “merely remov[ing] an ‘interested 
director’ cloud . . . and provid[ing] against invalidation of an agreement 
‘solely’ because such a director or officer is involved,” but not as 
“sanction[ing] unfairness . . . or remov[ing] the transaction from judicial 
scrutiny.”414 Thus, such contracts and transactions are not immune from 
review, but generally are given the protection of the business judgment 
rule.415 However, the decision to apply the business judgment rule instead 
of the entire fairness test or an intermediate standard of review is a 
deliberate one by the courts, not one that necessarily was required by 
statute.416 Moreover, even when the business judgment rule is applied, the 
contract or transaction is considered voidable if the plaintiff can establish 
either gross negligence or waste.417 In light of structural bias, the standard 
 413. Id. 
 414. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976). 
 415. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 416. See, e.g., Fliegler, 361 A.2d at 221 (applying entire fairness test despite statutory language in 
case in case involving shareholder approval). See generally GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 337–41. 
 417. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) (“[A]pproval by fully-informed 
disinterested directors . . . or disinterested stockholders . . . permits the invocation of the business 
judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of proof upon the 
party attacking the transaction.”). 
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should be changed to unreasonableness. Thus, the contract or transaction 
in question would not be voidable solely because of the conflict, but 
because, in addition, the plaintiff has established that the contract or 
transaction was unreasonable.418 
The first notorious example of executive compensation deals with the 
post-retirement benefits that were to be received by Jack Welch, former 
Chairman and CEO of General Electric Co. By all accounts, Mr. Welch 
was an exceptional manager.419 Under his leadership, the company 
flourished.420 His compensation packages were large—salary and bonus of 
over $16 million in 2000 and 2001, in addition to millions of stock options 
and other benefits421—but few were heard to complain. That is, until the 
details of his post-employment benefits were exposed in his divorce 
proceedings.422 In addition to a lucrative consulting arrangement, Mr. 
Welch was to receive, “for the remainder of his life, continued access to 
Company facilities and services comparable to those provided to him prior 
to his retirement, including access to Company aircraft, cars, office, 
apartments, and financial planning services.”423 The aggregate value of 
these benefits was over $2 million per year.424 The resulting outrage was 
severe, and Mr. Welch’s previously golden reputation suffered 
significantly.425 
 418. In any event, even if an unreasonable executive compensation agreement were not voidable, 
the directors could still be liable for breach of fiduciary duty in approving such an agreement. In a 
derivative action against the directors, the proposed standard would apply. Thus, it remains important 
to consider the application of the proposed standard to executive compensation decisions. 
 419. See Jeffrey E. Garten, Jack Welch: A Role Model for Today’s CEO?, BUS. WK., Sept. 10, 
2001, at 32 (“Already [Jack Welch] has been hailed as one of the great business leaders of the past 
half-century—and deservedly so.”); Jack Welch: A CEO Who Can’t Be Cloned, BUS. WK., Sept. 17, 
2001, at 130 (“It is a testament to the success of the man that no other business manager anywhere 
rivals him in terms of peer respect.”). 
 420. See Garten, supra note 419, at 32 (“From 1982 through 2000, GE’s average annual total 
return to shareholders was 25%, compared with 17% for the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index.”); 
CNN/Money, SEC Probes Welch Deal (Sept. 16, 2002), available at http://money.cnn.com/ 
2002/09/16/news/companies/welch_wsj/ (“GE’s market capitalization stood at $402.4 billion when 
Welch retired a year ago, about a 5,000 percent increase in the stock’s value, including dividends, 
while he was at the helm.”). 
 421. See GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. PROXY STATEMENT 20–21 (2002). 
 422. Although the details were fleshed out in his wife’s divorce filings, the terms of Welch’s 
retention agreement were made public shortly after the agreement was executed. See Employment and 
Post-Retirement Consulting Agreement, Dec. 20, 1996, in GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. ANNUAL REPORT 
ON FORM 10-K, Exhibit 10(w) (1996) [hereinafter Welch Agreement]. 
 423. See Welch Agreement, supra note 422, at ¶ 5. 
 424. See Jack Welch, My Dilemma—And How I Resolved It, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2002, at A14 
(“I will pay the costs for my use of all other facilities and services provided by GE such as planes and 
the company apartment. I estimate that I will be paying between $2 million and $2.5 million a year for 
these services.”). 
 425. See Anthony Bianco, The Fall of an Icon, BUS. WK., Sept. 23, 2002, at 46 (“After a year of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/4
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In fact, however, Welch’s post-retirement benefits easily would 
withstand scrutiny under the proposed standard. Although $2 million a 
year may seem like a great deal of money to the author or to the average 
reader, it is not particularly great by comparison to Mr. Welch’s overall 
compensation; his pension alone entitles him to over $7 million 
annually.426 Thus, if the remainder of his compensation were reasonable—
a characterization that few have bothered to challenge—then it would be 
difficult to hold the incremental post-retirement benefits unreasonable. 
The reasonableness of Mr. Welch’s post-retirement benefits becomes 
clearer when the circumstances of the award are considered. They were 
not a gift bestowed upon Mr. Welch on his retirement for a job well done. 
Such an award arguably would be a waste of corporate assets.427 Rather, 
Mr. Welch’s benefits were negotiated as part of a retention agreement. Mr. 
Welch was approaching retirement age when he suffered a heart attack and 
underwent quintuple bypass surgery.428 The board wanted to ensure that he 
would remain with the company long enough to groom a successor. 
According to Mr. Welch, the board offered him $100 million; he turned 
the offer down and requested a package of benefits that almost certainly 
would be worth significantly less.429 The real issue, then, is whether such a 
large retention bonus would have been reasonable. In his rare case, it 
probably would have been.430 If so, it should not matter that he preferred to 
take the bonus in kind over the course of his retirement rather than in cash 
or stock immediately. 
The second notorious example is the compensation received by 
Richard Grasso, former Chairman and CEO of the New York Stock 
Exchange. Although the New York Stock Exchange is a not-for-profit 
unrelenting corporate scandal, tolerance of CEO self-aggrandizement is so low that even Welch, once 
crowned the ‘Manager of the Century,’ has become a target of resentment and revisionism.”). 
 426. See Plaintiff’s Financial Affidavit at 1, John F. Welch, Jr. v. Jane B. Welch, at 1 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2002) (“Gross Monthly Pension: $618,687”). 
 427. See, e.g., Adams v. Smith, 153 So. 2d 221, 226 (Ala. 1963) (holding decision to pay pension 
to widows of recently-deceased officers ultra vires for lack of consideration). 
 428. JOHN F. WELCH, JR., JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT 325–28 (John A. Byrne ed., 2001). 
 429. See Life After GE? And How, BUS. WK., Mar. 8, 2004, at 76 (“The board came to me . . . and 
they said: ‘We’d like to give you $100 million in restricted stock to stay ‘til you’re 65 and make the 
succession work.’ I said: ‘I don’t need $100 million. I’m too cheap to spend it anyway . . . . But what I 
would like to do is keep the plane and the apartment, which cost about $1.7 million a year.”); Welch, 
supra note 424, at A14 (“[T]he board . . . suggested an employment contract, which offered me a 
special one-time payment of tens of millions of dollars to remain as CEO until . . . [age] 65. I instead 
agreed to take the post-retirement benefits . . . instead of cash compensation . . . that would have been 
much more expensive for the company.”). 
 430. Cf. infra note 456 and accompanying text. 
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entity rather than as a business corporation,431 the following discussion 
nevertheless will apply the proposed standard as if the same principles 
applied. Like Mr. Welch, Mr. Grasso undeniably was an exceptional 
manager.432 Under his leadership, the New York Stock Exchange 
flourished433 at a time when it might have been expected to whither away 
in the face of increasing competition from more modern rivals.434 
Problems for Mr. Grasso began when it was announced that, in connection 
with the extension of his employment contract, he would be receiving a 
cash payment in an amount of $139.5 million.435 
Of course, Mr. Grasso had not received an annual salary of $139.5 
million; nor was that amount a retention bonus. It was an aggregate 
amount that represented his earnings over a number of years pursuant to 
complicated benefit plans and deferral programs.436 His salary had been 
capped at $1.4 million for a number of years.437 However, his incentive 
compensation and capital accumulation plan awards were significantly 
greater—as high as $16 million and $8 million, respectively, in 2001.438 
The appropriate question, then, is not whether a $140 million payout was 
reasonable, but rather whether an aggregate annual compensation in the 
 431. See infra note 441 and accompanying text. 
 432. See Gary Weiss, The $140,000,000 Man: What Dick Grasso’s Excessive Payout Reveals 
About How He Runs the New York Stock Exchange, BUS. WK., Sept. 15, 2003, at 84, 86 (“Grasso is an 
undeniably talented manager. . . . Even his sharpest critics agree that Grasso has almost single-
handedly built up the exchange’s public image—which, along with an intense detail-oriented 
approach, has helped maintain the NYSE’s superb market-share numbers.”). 
 433. See id. at 84–87. “Grasso’s allies credit him with . . . maintaining a prosperous exchange, 
with 1,549 of its 2,800 companies joining on his watch, and a consistent 80% market share of the 
trading of NYSE stocks.” Id. at 87. “In addition, seat prices have tripled in price since he became 
chairman in 1994.” Id. at 86. 
 434. See Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Who Decides How Much is Too Much?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 
2003, at A21 (“Mr. Grasso’s tenure happened to coincide with a universal panic that the NYSE 
franchise, funnel for $9 trillion a year in trading volume, was in danger of slipping away.”). 
 435. See Kate Kelly, NYSE Chief Will Collect $139.5 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2003, at C1. 
It also was announced that he would be entitled to receive an additional $48 million over the course of 
the next few years. See Kate Kelly, Grasso Takes More Heat on Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2004, at 
C1. 
 436. See Kelly, NYSE Chief, supra note 435, at C1. 
[Mr. Grasso] is withdrawing $139.5 million in savings he has acquired during his career of 
more than three decades at the NYSE. That payout is a combination of $40 million in a 
savings account, a previously accrued retirement benefit of $51.6 million, and a previously 
earned balance of $47.9 million that is the result of prior incentive awards. 
Id. 
 437. See Carol J. Loumis, Dick Grasso’s Pay: The Sequel, FORTUNE, Feb. 9, 2004, at 22, 24. 
 438. Letter from Carl McCall to William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission 7 (Sept. 9, 2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/donaldsonletter.pdf [hereinafter 
McCall Letter]. 
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eight-figure range (over $30 million in 2001 alone!439), together with other 
benefits,440 was reasonable. 
If the New York Stock Exchange were a typical business, it likely 
would have been reasonable for the board to pay Mr. Grasso such large 
amounts. After all, Mr. Grasso’s leadership was extraordinary. However, 
there are a number of factors that complicate the analysis. 
In the first place, the New York Stock Exchange is not a typical 
business. In fact, it is a not-for-profit corporation. Under the New York 
Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, an officer’s compensation must be 
“reasonable” and “commensurate with [the] services performed.”441 
Whether the management of a not-for-profit organization should receive 
compensation that equals or even exceeds the private market is a difficult 
question. New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer believes that it should 
not, and has sued Mr. Grasso for reimbursement on behalf of the New 
York Stock Exchange.442 If, however, the New York Stock Exchange’s 
desire to “attract and retain superior ‘world class’ executives”443 is 
reasonable, then the payment of competitive compensation should also be 
considered reasonable. And if Mr. Grasso’s performance were exceptional, 
it should not be surprising that his compensation also would be 
exceptional. 
However, an additional complicating factor is the fact that the New 
York Stock Exchange also is a self-regulatory organization under the 
federal securities laws.444 That made Mr. Grasso a regulator. His 
compensation was not only far greater than that of public regulators, such 
as the Chairman of the SEC,445 but also far greater than other private 
regulators,446 such as the heads of the Public Company Accounting 
 439. See id. (total compensation of $25,550,000 plus “Special Payment” of $5,000,000). 
 440. For example, Mr. Grasso was also entitled to participate in various retirement plans that were 
also quite generous. See id. at 5–7; see also Shawn Tully, See Dick Squirm, FORTUNE, Sept. 29, 2003, 
at 77, 80 (“In 2001 . . . Grasso made some $30 million in salary, bonus, and long-term comp, not 
including a hefty contribution to his retirement account.”) (emphasis added). 
 441. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (McKinney 1997). 
 442. See Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, Spitzer Files Suit Seeking Millions of Grasso Money, WALL 
ST. J., May 25, 2004, at A1. 
 443. See McCall Letter, supra note 438, at 2. 
 444. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000). 
 445. “Mr. Donaldson receives a salary of $142,500 as S.E.C. Chairman, and no bonus.” Landon 
Thomas Jr., S.E.C. Chairman Wants Details of Compensation Paid to Grasso, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 
2003, at C1. 
 446. Although most quasi-regulators have not received nearly as much as Mr. Grasso, there is at 
least one exception: 
 By the standards of the New York Stock Exchange, James J. McNulty, the president and 
chief executive of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, does not have an outsized salary. It was 
slightly less than $1.9 million last year. 
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Oversight Board447 or the National Association of Securities Dealers.448 
For Mr. Grasso to be paid so much more than other regulators is more than 
just unseemly; it raises serious questions about whether he might be 
tempted to ignore his regulatory duties in favor of business matters. After 
all, the business of regulation is not a profit center that would justify 
increased compensation. In light of the special nature of the New York 
Stock Exchange, Mr. Grasso’s compensation arguably should be deemed 
unreasonable. 
Finally, the most disturbing factors are those alleged by Mr. Spitzer in 
his complaint. Mr. Spitzer claims that Mr. Grasso’s employment 
agreements were “the product of a process that permitted Grasso 
improperly to influence both the amounts awarded to him and the 
members of the New York Stock Exchange Compensation Committee and 
Board of Directors who were required to approve those awards.”449 If this 
heightened structural bias concern can be shown to have undermined the 
independence of the directors, then the entire fairness test should apply.450 
Even if not, however, the circumstances should be factored into the 
determination of reasonableness.451 Mr. Spitzer also alleges that the 
agreements were “approved by the NYSE Board of Directors based upon 
  But when his stock options are added, his total potential compensation is many times larger. 
 At yesterday’s closing price of $70.25, his exercisable options on the shares of Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange Holdings, which recently went public, were worth $69 million. Add the 
options he holds that cannot be exercised yet and the total value climbs to $86 million. 
Jonathan Fuerbringer, As More Markets Go Public, Salaries Are Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
24, 2003, at C1. 
 447. “Mr. McDonough will be paid handsomely in his new post, earning an annual salary of 
$556,000. That may be modest compared with the pay packages of many top accounting executives, 
but it’s one of Washington’s biggest salaries.” Deborah Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, ‘Tough’ Cop 
for Accounting Beat, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2003, at C1. 
 448. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, NASD Filing Discloses Salary and Bonus of Chief, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 25, 2003, at C7 (“Robert Glauber, the chairman and chief executive of NASD, was paid a salary 
and bonus totaling $2.1 million in 2002 . . . . In addition, Mr. Glauber received a payment award 
toward his executive retirement fund of $6.67 million. He also had deferred compensation of $283,663 
and expenses and other allowances totaling $375,669.”); see also Peter A. McKay, Deals & Deal 
Makers NYSE: Rivals Disclose Their Top Officers’ Pay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at C5 (reporting 
that Salvatore Sodano, Chairman and CEO of the American Stock Exchange, received “$5 million, 
including salary, bonus, pension, other benefits and deferred compensation” in 2002). 
 449. Complaint at 1, Spitzer v. Grasso (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/nys/nygrasso52404cmp.pdf (last visited Mar. 2005); see Kelly & 
Craig, supra note 442, at A1 (“The complaint accuses Mr. Grasso . . . of leaving some board members 
with the impression that if they opposed his pay packages, it would be at their peril. . . . It also alleges 
that Mr. Grasso took actions that benefited firms run by executives determining his compensation 
. . . .”). 
 450. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 451. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text. 
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materially incomplete, inaccurate and misleading information.”452 
Disclosure to the board for decision-making purposes is a very serious 
matter. If the facts are as alleged by Mr. Spitzer,453 then Mr. Grasso’s 
compensation must be deemed unreasonable. 
The third notorious example is one with which the reader is already 
familiar: Michael Ovitz’s termination payment from The Walt Disney 
Company. Unlike Mr. Welch and Mr. Grasso, Mr. Ovitz did not prove to 
be an exceptional manager for Disney. However, he did receive a similar 
compensation package. The structure of Mr. Ovitz’s compensation 
package and the circumstances of his award of a non-fault termination 
already have been discussed at length.454 In the author’s view, they should 
be sufficient to support a holding of unreasonableness. 
An additional basis for a holding of unreasonableness, however, would 
be the sheer size of the termination payment under the circumstances. Mr. 
Ovitz was awarded $140 million after fourteen months of lackluster 
service.455 Although the size of Mr. Ovitz’s termination payment was 
similar to that of Mr. Welch’s retention bonus offer, the two payments 
could not be more different: such a large payment may be justified to 
retain an exceptional manager, but not to remove an inferior one.456 Courts 
may be tempted to give directors the benefit of the doubt under the 
business judgment rule, but there is not much doubt when the termination 
payment is so large. Moreover, such deference to the directors’ business 
judgment on compensation matters is not warranted because of structural 
bias. The question under the proposed standard is whether the termination 
payment falls within the range of reasonableness. The answer is that it 
clearly does not. 
The circumstances surrounding the ultimate decision do not change the 
result. The directors entered into an agreement that allowed for the 
possibility of such an unreasonable payment457 and then voluntarily agreed 
 452. See Complaint at 1, Spitzer v. Grasso (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/up/docs/nys/nygrasso52404cmp.pdf (last visited Mar. 2005). 
 453. The author finds it difficult to believe that the board of directors was misled, and the claim 
has been forcefully denied by Ken Langone, former chairman of the NYSE compensation committee 
and co-defendant in the lawsuit. See Ken Langone, Let’s Bring on the Jury, Mr. Spitzer, WALL ST. J., 
June 10, 2004, at A12 (“It is absurd to suggest that the brightest minds and keenest thinkers on Wall 
Street were befuddled by the complexity of Richard Grasso’s compensation package—especially one 
composed just like their own.”). 
 454. See supra notes 384–410. 
 455. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 252–53 (Del. 2000). 
 456. See supra note 430 and accompanying text. 
 457. See supra note 390 and accompanying text. 
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to a non-fault termination.458 While it may be possible that a good 
employment contract would lead to an unforeseeably large and unfortunate 
payment, this was not such a case. The result was entirely foreseeable. 
Directors cannot be permitted to justify such an unreasonable termination 
payment decision by reference to previous poor compensation decisions. 
A comparison of the three examples illustrates how the three standards 
of review diverge. Welch’s post-termination benefits surely would survive 
under either the business judgment rule or a review for substantive 
reasonableness; in fact, they probably even would survive under the entire 
fairness test, given his value to the company. Grasso’s compensation may 
not be entirely fair, but surely would be considered rational. Whether it 
should be considered reasonable is a more difficult question, but given the 
special circumstances of the New York Stock Exchange, it arguably 
should not. Ovitz’s termination payment is an easier case. Clearly it could 
not be considered entirely fair; it also should not be deemed reasonable. 
Even the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that it barely survived under 
the business judgment rule.459 
Of course, a review for substantive reasonableness will not be a 
complete solution to the problem of excessive executive compensation. 
Because the proposed standard allows directors considerable discretion, it 
would not be suited for a direct challenge to compensation levels across 
the board. However, it would enable more aggressive enforcement against 
the outliers. This, in turn, could serve an important systemic function. At 
the very least, it should cause directors to hesitate before embarking on an 
overly-generous path. Increased accountability should serve to slow down 
the rate of increase in executive compensation, as well: directors likely 
would be less willing to engage in ratcheting behavior if they face the 
threat of meaningful review than they would if they knew that almost any 
compensation package would be protected by the business judgment rule. 
Moreover, when an extreme compensation package is challenged, the 
process employed to approve it is likely to be criticized. Because the 
process tends to be similar across companies, this may force all boards to 
reconsider their practices and significant change may result.460 Thus, the 
impact of catching a few additional cases of abuse should not be 
underestimated. 
 458. See supra notes 389–392 and accompanying text. 
 459. See supra note 388 and accompanying text. 
 460. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 149. 
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D. Director Exculpation Statutes 
One final issue that ought to be addressed is whether charter provisions 
that limit or eliminate liability for breach of fiduciary duty should apply in 
situations involving structural bias.461 The answer to that question depends 
on whether structural bias is considered a duty of care issue or a duty of 
loyalty issue. As either a practical or a doctrinal matter, there is no easy 
answer. 
“[S]tarting in late 1984 the market for directors’ and officers’ (D&O) 
liability insurance changed dramatically: premiums skyrocketed, 
deductibles increased, and coverage was reduced. There are reports of 
directors resigning because their firms had lost insurance coverage and of 
individuals declining invitations to serve on boards in increasing 
numbers.”462 In response to the crisis, many states adopted “director 
exculpation statute[s],”463 which serve to limit director liability for breach 
of fiduciary duties. Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law is a typical example; it provides that a company’s certificate of 
incorporation may contain: 
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a 
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages 
for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such 
provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) 
For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or 
its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which 
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) 
under § 174 of this title [unlawful distributions]; or (iv) for any 
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal 
benefit. . . .464 
 461. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); cf. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 2.02(b)(4) (2002). 
 462. Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance?, 14 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 1–2 (1989) (footnotes omitted). 
 463. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1219 (Del. 1999). 
 464. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). The Model Business Corporation Act has a 
similar provision: 
[The articles of incorporation may set forth] . . . a provision eliminating or limiting the 
liability of a director to the corporation or its shareholders for money damages for any action 
taken, or any failure to take any action, as a director, except liability for (A) the amount of a 
financial benefit received by a director to which he is not entitled; (B) an intentional infliction 
of harm on the corporation or the shareholders; (C) a violation of section 8.33 [unlawful 
distributions]; or (D) an intentional violation of criminal law . . . . 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2002). 
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The general effect of such laws is to allow corporations to limit or 
eliminate the liability of directors for breach of the duty of care, but not for 
breach of the duty of loyalty.465 Thus, director liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty in cases involving structural bias depends on the 
characterization of that breach. 
It may seem obvious that structural bias is a duty of loyalty issue. After 
all, the problem is one of conflicts of interest. However, the issue is not so 
simple. In cases involving structural bias, the business judgment rule is 
replaced by an intermediate standard of review because confidence in 
directors’ judgment is compromised by conflicts of interest.466 There is no 
proven breach of the duty of loyalty; if there were, the entire fairness test 
would apply.467 Thus, although structural bias may seem to involve the 
duty of loyalty, it does not necessarily involve a breach of the duty of 
loyalty. 
As previously discussed, the existing understanding of the duty of 
loyalty is fairly narrow.468 When state legislatures enacted the statutory 
provisions, they presumably intended to exclude only what was 
understood to be covered—e.g., self-dealing. Establishing the 
unreasonableness of a board decision in a structural bias situation does not 
amount to a proven breach of the duty of loyalty.469 Thus, structural bias 
cases should not be excluded from the scope of the statutory protection. 
It may seem odd to consider unreasonable action a breach of the duty 
of care. However, as a technical matter, the designation does not matter. 
Liability for breach of fiduciary duty may be limited unless it is a breach 
of the duty of loyalty.470 Thus, whether it is called a duty of care issue or 
some other fiduciary duty—perhaps a duty of reasonableness—the result 
is the same: liability may be limited. 
As a policy matter, the question is whether shareholders ought to be 
able to relieve directors of personal liability for unreasonable decisions in 
situations involving structural bias. There is little reason to believe that 
 465. See, e.g., S. 533, 133d Gen. Assembly 2, 65 Del. Laws ch. 289, §§ 1–2 (1986), reprinted in 1 
FOLK, supra note 152, § 102.15, at GCL-I-27 n.56; cf. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02 cmt. 2.i., at 2–
10 (2002) (“[t]erms such as ‘duty of loyalty,’ [and] ‘good faith,’” rejected as imprecise). 
 Such laws also generally forbid limitation of liability for breach of the duty of good faith. The 
significance of the duty of good faith as a separate doctrine is unclear. See supra note 2. 
 466. See supra notes 239–41 and accompanying text. 
 467. See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text. 
 468. See supra notes 139–44 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 200–16 and 
accompanying text. 
 469. A finding of unreasonableness does not imply a breach of the duty of good faith, either. 
 470. Of course, liability also may not be limited in the other circumstances listed, including breach 
of the duty of good faith. See supra note 464 and accompanying text. 
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they should not. As previously discussed, situations involving structural 
bias demand the business judgment of directors.471 Such business 
judgment can be faulty.472 “[S]hareholders should be permitted—except 
when important societal values are at stake—to decide how to allocate the 
economic risk of the directors’ conduct between the corporation and the 
directors.”473 While disloyal actions or actions taken in bad faith may rise 
to the level of seriousness that would make even voluntary exculpation 
inappropriate, structural bias—without more—does not. 
If charter provisions allow directors to escape personal liability despite 
structural bias, one may wonder about the value of an intermediate 
standard of review that may serve to increase litigation costs without 
providing any shareholder benefit. There are at least two responses to this 
concern. First, not all directors will be relieved of liability. In many states, 
including Delaware, director exculpation provisions are optional: only 
directors of companies whose shareholders have adopted a charter 
provision eliminating their liability will be fully protected.474 Thus, in 
many cases, directors will face personal liability. 
Second, and more importantly, a finding of breach of fiduciary duty 
also would open the door to appropriate equitable relief. This is because 
the statutory provisions “do[] not operate to defeat the validity of a 
plaintiff’s claim on the merits, [but only] to defeat the plaintiff’s ability to 
recover monetary damages.”475 They “have no effect on the availability of 
equitable remedies, such as injunction or rescission.”476 Thus, in most 
cases, the improper conduct can be prevented or undone.477 
In addition, there are other benefits to a finding of a breach of fiduciary 
duty under the proposed standard. For example, there is a powerful 
 471. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 472. But see In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“If 
the shareholders thought themselves entitled to some other quality of judgment than such a director 
produces in the good faith exercise of the powers of office, then the shareholders should have elected 
other directors.”). 
 473. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02 cmt. 2.i., at 2–9 (2002). 
 474. See supra note 464 and accompanying text. 
 475. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 92 (Del. 2001). 
 476. S. 533, 133d Gen. Assembly 2, 65 Del. Laws ch. 289, §§ 1–2 (1986), reprinted in 1 FOLK, 
supra note 152, § 102.15, at GCL-I-27 n.56; see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02 cmt. 2.i., at 2–9 
(2002) (Section 2.02(b)(4) “follows the path of virtually all the states that have adopted charter option 
statutes and is applicable only to money damages and not to equitable relief.”). 
 477. In many cases, the typical equitable remedies of injunction and rescission should be 
sufficient to prevent or undo the harm resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty. An aggressive 
remedy that might be helpful in other cases would be to find an unreasonable contract to be invalid and 
unenforceable, even as against non-fiduciaries. See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC 
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 50–51 (Del. 1994). 
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expressive effect.478 Under the business judgment rule, courts are limited 
in their ability to develop the standard of conduct under the duty of care. 
Because the standards of review are mere rationality and gross negligence, 
courts spend far more time justifying shoddy behavior than demanding 
excellence.479 With an enhanced standard of reasonableness, the law may 
be developed in a more meaningful way. Directors will have a better 
understanding of what the law expects of them. Even without the fear of 
personal liability, directors’ conduct should improve because of their 
desire to avoid the embarrassment of a judicial pronouncement of their 
unreasonableness.480 
In short, personal liability for directors is only one of many practical 
reasons to support an intermediate standard of review. Even the 
elimination of such liability would not render judicial review meaningless. 
Thus, it should not undermine the purpose of an intermediate standard of 
review to consider structural bias a duty of care issue rather than a duty of 
loyalty issue, and to permit corporations to limit or even eliminate the 
liability of directors for unreasonable decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Structural bias presents a challenge to corporate law. On the one hand, 
the deference of the business judgment rule is inappropriate because of 
directors’ conflicting interests; on the other hand, the rigor of the entire 
fairness test is inappropriate because of the lack of evidence of self-
dealing. An intermediate standard of review that could bridge the gap 
between these two doctrines is necessary. A moderate review of the 
substantive merits of directors’ decisions is the solution. 
The standard proposed in this Article—review for substantive 
reasonableness—is both practical and intellectually satisfying. It draws on 
the insights of the twin pillars of enforcement of fiduciary duties in 
corporate law while overcoming their respective weaknesses. Although the 
proposed standard may lead to an increase in litigation expense, the effect 
 478. For discussions of the expressive effect of law, see generally Lawrence Lessig, Social 
Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, 
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); and Cass R. Sunstein, On the 
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). 
 479. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (“[T]he law of corporate fiduciary 
duties and remedies for violation of those duties are distinct from the aspirational goals of ideal 
corporate governance practices.”). 
 480. Moreover, once certain behavior is deemed unreasonable, similar behavior in the future may 
be deemed a breach of the duty of good faith. If so, directors would not be shielded from personal 
liability. 
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should not be nearly as dramatic as might be feared. The return on the 
investment is a better balance between the competing values of directorial 
authority and accountability. 
Nothing in this Article is intended to undermine either the business 
judgment rule or the entire fairness test. Both doctrines are sensible and 
well-suited for their primary function. However, neither is adequate for 
dealing with structural bias. In proposing and defending an intermediate 
standard of review, the author has sought to deal with subtle and 
complicated issues of conflicted interests while preserving the essential 
role of the two core doctrines of corporate law. 
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